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Abstract 
This thesis explores the idea that an equality state has evolved in Britain since the 1960s.  
The policies and institutions that make up the equality state are those that seek to ensure 
some forms of equality between its citizens.  Its latest development has been through the 
2010 Equality Act that promotes equality in relation to nine protected characteristics, but 
just two of these are considered here, race and sex. 
 
The study will investigate the origins of the equality state under the 1964-1970 Labour 
governments through the formulation of policies that explicitly or implicitly promoted sex 
and racial equality.  The main areas examined in relation to racial equality are the anti-
discrimination provisions of the 1965 and 1968 Race Relations Acts; measures to promote 
the integration of immigrants, particularly in employment, education, housing and 
policing; the institutions which aided integration particularly the National Committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants and Community Relations Commission; and the Urban 
Programme and other measures taken in response to Enoch Powell's 1968 'Rivers of 
Blood' speech. 
 
With sex equality the areas considered are the 1970 Equal Pay Act; the development of 
policy to promote equal opportunity in employment; and the reform of law relating to 
abortion, divorce and the availability of contraceptive services through state agencies. 
 
iv 
 
The primary focus of the thesis is on the policy making process and the research is based 
on government papers in The National Archives.  Other influences on these policy areas 
have been researched through primary sources, particularly policies' origins in the Labour 
Party, the influence of the trade union movement, campaigning groups and, in the case of 
sex equality, the remaining first wave feminist organisations.  Through this the thesis 
develops an understanding of the nature and limitations of the equality that the equality 
state promotes. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction:  the rise of the equality state. 
1.1: Nature and scope of the research. 
In July 1943 the former West Indies cricketer Learie Constantine1 was preparing to play for the 
Dominions against England in a charity match at Lord’s, a game that would draw a record wartime 
crowd of 25,000.2  He was working for the Ministry of Labour and National Service as a welfare 
officer seeing to the needs of temporary wartime workers from the Caribbean and made 
broadcasts for the BBC to the Caribbean in support of the war effort.  Having arrived at the 
Imperial Hotel in Russell Square, London, where he had booked rooms for himself and his family, 
the manager told a colleague of Constantine's that 'we will not have any niggers in the hotel 
because of the Americans' and that if they stayed, in the morning they would find their bags put 
out on the street and their door locked.  Constantine took the hotel to court where Justice 
Birkett,3 while clearly sympathetic to Constantine's action and stating that the language used was 
'deeply offensive', ruled that damages of five guineas would be awarded only for failing to honour 
the common law duty to provide a room when one was available.4  
 
                                                     
1
 1901-1971.  Trinidadian and British cricketer, journalist, politician and diplomat.  Created  Baron 
Constantine of Maraval in Trinidad and Nelson in the County Palatine of Lancaster (1969). 
2
 'Cricket', The Times 3/8/1943. 
3
 Norman Birkett, 1883-1962.  Politician, barrister and judge.  Liberal MP, Nottingham (1923-1924, 1929-
1931).  High Court Judge from 1941, Created Baron Birkett (1958). 
4
 Learie Constantine, Colour Bar (Tiptree:  Anchor Press, 1954), p137; Peter Mason, Learie Constantine 
(Oxford: Macmillan Education, 2008), pp94-97; Gerald Howat, Learie Constantine (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1975), pp135-137. 
2 
 
Twenty-three years later Constantine was appointed as one of the three members of the Race 
Relations Board (RRB),5 established under the 1965 Race Relations Act with responsibility for 
hearing complaints of discrimination.  Between Constantine vs. Imperial Hotels London Ltd and the 
1965 Act, racial discrimination was dragged from the realm of private opinion to being an 
actionable offence.  Out of this grew an equality state, a public space characterised by equality, 
and people operating in that space are compelled to treat people without discriminating.  So, 
when in October 2010 Susanne Wilkinson refused to let two gay men share a bed in her guest 
house the outcome was different to Constantine's case.  Wilkinson  presented this as a clash of her 
rights to her Christian beliefs and the couple's rights to their sexuality but the courts ruled that 
Wilkinson had put herself into a commercial relationship with the public and was no longer free to 
act on her personal preferences.6 
 
It is the origins of this equality that this thesis will explore.  They are to be found in the policies on 
racial7and women's equality pursued by the Labour governments 1964-1970.  There is a longer 
history of laws removing inequalities, such as those that had advanced women's equality in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century by giving women the same legal and political rights as 
men.  Although racial minorities (unless they were unlucky enough to be merchant seamen)8 had 
formal equality under the law, they had little protection from discrimination under either statute 
                                                     
5
 The National Archives: Public Record Office HO376/161 Cunningham to Jenkins, 17/1/1966.  [Henceforth 
TNA: PRO]. 
6
 Black-Wilkinson Judgement, <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/black-
wilkinson-judgment-18102012.pdf> (Accessed 21/03/2013). 
7
 For the use of 'race' and other value-laden terms, see the annex at the end of this thesis. 
8
 Peter Fryer, Staying Power (London: Pluto, 1984), pp356-357; Humayun Ansari, 'The Infidel Within' 
(London:  Hurst, 2004), pp42-44, 97, 110-111, 118. 
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or case law.9  These existing forms of equality were different to what Labour enacted after 1964 in 
three ways.  First, the previous equality was negative in character, it consisted of the absence (or 
removal) of legal obstacles.  Although only weakly, some of the reforms of the 1960s had a 
positive character in that they required some action from either the state or a private body, to use 
their resources for purposes, such as building new housing, to create greater equality.  This 
understanding of equalities policy is developed in section 1.3 of this introduction.  Second, these 
earlier forms of equality were confined to a narrowly defined public sphere of the state, for 
example the right to vote.  The reforms of the 1960s trespassed into what many considered the 
private sphere, such as the right of an employer to set wages as they pleased or the right of a 
publican to serve whom they wished.  Third, unlike previous reforms, the measures in the 1960s 
sought to change behaviour in wider society.  These two features will be examined in section 1.4. 
 
The measures to promote the equality of women and racial minorities grew into what is now 
called equalities and diversity policy.  This has been legislated for, particularly in the Equality Acts 
of 2006 and 2010, and has been institutionalised in the creation of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) and the Government Equalities Office in 2007.  I would argue that Britain has 
developed an equality state, analogous to the welfare state.  As the welfare state seeks to 
guarantee a degree of welfare for its citizens, so the equality state attempts to ensure certain 
kinds of equality exists between the citizenry.  As with the welfare state, there is a debate about 
the necessity and efficacy of the equality state, and this is reflected in the historiography in section 
1.5.  The task here is not to judge the equality state but to understand how and why these 
equalities policies were developed in the 1960s. 
                                                     
9
 Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman, Race and Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp23-72. 
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In order to study the emergence of the equality state, this thesis is primarily a history of the policy 
making process.  It examines how the ideas that the equality state incorporated emerged through 
the 1950s, particularly through the Labour Party.  Government papers are drawn on to uncover 
how these ideas were developed and then implemented by the Labour governments of 1964-
1970.  Where they exist, the papers of campaigning groups for racial minorities' and women's 
rights are considered to understand the degree to which these influenced government policy.  The 
development of policy in the trade union movement, particularly the TUC, is considered too.  The 
trade unions were important not only because they were linked to the Labour Party both 
organisationally and ideologically, but also because they were gatekeepers to the entry of both 
minorities and women to greater equality in employment. 
 
The focus on Labour Party and labour movement bodies is important.  The creation of the equality 
state has been by Labour governments.  The Conservatives have contributed little more than the 
1995 Disability Discrimination Act.  The Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976 were all 
Labour governments' measures, as were the 1970 Equal Pay Act and the 1975 Sex Discrimination 
Act.  The Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010 too were passed by a Labour government, and in this at 
least the Blair and Brown administrations showed continuity between old and new Labour.  This 
continuity is personified in Anthony Lester10 who played a key role in framing anti-discrimination 
legislation in the 1960s, and again between 1974 and 1976 as adviser to Roy Jenkins11 at the Home 
Office.12  By the time of the 1997 election, the now Lord Lester had long decamped from Labour's 
                                                     
10
 b.1936.  Lawyer and political adviser.  Created Lord Lester of Herne Hill (1993). 
11
 1920-2003.  Labour MP, Southwark/Birmingham Stechford (1948-1997), SDP MP Glasgow Hillhead (1983-
1987).  Home Secretary (1965-1967, 1974-1976), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1967-1970). 
12
 Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p375. 
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ranks, sitting as a Liberal Democrat in the Lords.  Nonetheless, his impact continued as he met 
with others under the auspices of the Runnymede Trust to restart the programme for equality 
legislation, a process that ended with the 2010 Equality Act.13 
 
Although the equality state was only developed under Labour governments it became a 
permanent institution, continuing in colder climates under Conservative administrations.  After 
their election victory in 1970, the Conservatives did not abolish the Community Relations 
Commission or Race Relations Board.  In 1979 Margaret Thatcher did not abolish the Commission 
for Racial Equality or the Equal Opportunities Commission, even though they found their roles 
circumscribed by a belief that the market would solve most problems.14  Most recently, the 
Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition, which has been in power since 2010, has continued 
handing a portfolio for Women and Equalities to a Cabinet minister15 and has allowed the EHRC to 
continue its work even if on a reduced budget and without its powers expanded as planned.16 
 
To a degree, therefore, this thesis is also about Labour's ideology.  Crudely put, in the 1950s a 
three way ideological divide had opened up in the Labour Party.  The traditional right in the party 
was unencumbered with theory, but embodied what Geoffrey Foote (and many others) have 
called labourism.  Foote's analysis is that the Labour right's raison d'être was not the 
                                                     
13
 Bob Hepple , 'The New Single Equality Act in Britain', Equal Rights Review 5 (2010). 
14
 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp180-199; Ruth Lister, 'The 
Family and Women' in Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (eds.), The Major Effect (London: Macmillan, 
1994), p357. 
15
 'Full list of new Cabinet ministers', The Guardian, 13/5/2010; 'Equalities minister: macho political culture 
deters women' ,The Guardian , 14/5/2010. 
16
 'Equality and Human Rights Commission has workforce halved', The Guardian, 15/5/2012. 
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transformation of society but the distribution of an increased portion of the national wealth to the 
working class.  There had been longstanding conflict in the party and the trade unions between 
these labourites, who dominated the leadership, and the left wing.  Unlike the right, the left 
supported polices of social transformation, through nationalisation or more stringent regulation of 
the market.  Revisionism emerged in the 1950s as a third current in the party clearly on the right 
aligned to the leadership and particularly Hugh Gaitskell17 as shadow chancellor in the early 1950s, 
and then as Labour Party leader from 1955 until his death in 1963.  The central tenet of 
revisionism was an acceptance of the market economy, while combating the worst forms of class 
inequality through a welfare state that both redistributed wealth and offered equality of 
opportunity most notably through tackling class inequalities in education.  Unlike the labourite 
right, the revisionists were liberal on social issues, and many supporters of the liberal measures 
pursued under the Labour governments of 1964-1970 were drawn from their ranks.  Many on the 
left were liberal in their views too, creating an unlikely alliance against the traditional right in the 
party.18 
 
This thesis examines the origins of the equality state in the 1964-1970 Labour governments in the 
1965 and 1968 Race Relations Acts (chapter 2) and the 1970 Equal Pay Act (chapter 4).  Chapter 3 
considers the policies that the government formulated to integrate immigrants into British society 
and the emergence of a multiculturalist policy.  Although immigration policy is not the subject 
                                                     
17
 1906-1963.  Labour MP, Leeds S (1945-1953).  Minster of Fuel and Power (1947-1950), Minister for 
Economic Affairs (1950), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1950-1951), leader of the Labour Party (1955-1963). 
18
 Geoffrey Foote, The Labour Party's Political Thought (Second Edition, London: Croom Held, 1986), pp3-16, 
193-199., 206-233. 
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here, it cannot be ignored since, in the words of Lester and his ally Geoffrey Bindman,19 'the most 
obvious conclusion that has generally been drawn is that if coloured immigration poses a threat to 
Britain's well-being so does the coloured minority living in Britain.'20  The Labour government 
combined measures to promote racial equality with immigration controls that were clearly racially 
discriminatory in the 1965 White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth and the 1968 
Commonwealth Immigration Act.  The impact of such immigration policy is part of the analysis 
here, as is Labour's response to Enoch Powell's21 'Rivers of Blood' speech. 
 
Chapter 5 considers the policies that affected women's position in society beyond their equality in 
the public sphere, specifically those that reflected (and perhaps affected) women's changing role 
in the domestic/private sphere.  Here the relevance to the emergence of the equality state is at its 
least obvious, but the changing in nature of the moral content of the law affecting women's 
position in the private sphere is central to the changing nature of the British state.  On a practical 
level, abortion and the wider availability of contraception helped women avoid large and early 
families.  Although both had been the subject of first wave feminist and labour movement 
campaigns in the 1920s and 1930s, the degree to which it was thought of in terms of women's 
equality by the 1960s cannot be assumed.  Divorce is more complicated.  It is included here not 
least because, with the rise of second wave feminism, the family and marriage came to be 
considered central limitations to the equality of women.  Thus, loosening the ties that bind women 
to men might be considered a move toward equality.  It is certainly the case that after the 1969 
                                                     
19
 b.1933.  Human rights lawyer. 
20
 Lester and Bindman, Race and the Law, p13. 
21
 1912-1998.  Conservative MP, Wolverhampton SW (1950-1974), Ulster Unionist MP, South Down (1974-
1987).  First Secretary to the Treasury (1957-1958), Minister of Health (1960-1963). 
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Divorce Law (Reform) Act came into force, women outnumbered men two-to-one in petitioning 
for divorce,22 but these reforms were opposed by many first wave feminists. 
 
The distinction between first and second wave feminism is important.  The main focus of first 
wave feminists was reforming the political and legal status of women, not in their role as wives 
and mothers.  First wave feminism declined even before complete equality in voting was won in 
1928, but some organisations continued into the 1960s.  As explained in chapter 4, most of these 
groups pursued reforms in the public sphere, such as equal pay.  A minority of first wave feminists, 
grouped around Eleanor Rathbone23 in the National Union of Society for Equal Citizenship 
(NUSEC), argued primarily for changes in the private sphere, such as NUSEC's immediate demands 
of 1926 for family allowance and greater access to contraception.24  It was not until the arrival of 
second wave feminism, which had no clear organisational structure until the first Women's 
Liberation Movement Conference of April 1970, that the goal of transforming women's position in 
the private/domestic sphere as mothers and wives was asserted , in part in the effort to gain 
greater equality in the public sphere of employment and politics.  Nonetheless, care has been 
taken in this thesis to search for emergent thinking which could have affected policy making in the 
1960s. 
 
There are some areas of equality that are not examined here.  Under the 2010 Equality Act there 
are now nine 'protected characteristics', age; disability; gender assignment; marriage and civil 
                                                     
22
 David Coleman, 'Population and Family' in Halsey and Webb (eds), Twentieth Century British Social Trends 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p62. 
23
 1872-1946.  Feminist. Independent MP, Combined Universities (1929-1946). 
24
 Susan Pedersen, Eleanor Rathbone and the Politics of Conscience (Newhaven CT: Yale UP, 2004), p194. 
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partnership; pregnancy and maternity; religion or belief; race; sex; and sexual orientation.25  Under 
the 1960s Labour administrations four of these were the subject of reform.  In addition to race and 
sex, disability and sexual orientation were the subjects of backbench Private Members' Bills in this 
period.  Leo Abse's26 1967 Sexual Offences Act might be considered to have offered gay men the 
most basic of equalities, although it has frequently been interpreted as a remodulation rather than 
a relaxation of control.27  Alf Morris’28 1970 Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act is seen more 
favourably as the first step towards legal protection for people with disabilities.29  Neither will be 
considered here since both make much more sense as part of a story that continues through the 
1970s than one that stops with the dissolution of Parliament in May 1970.  Another area left 
unexamined is hate crime, first enacted under the provisions to criminalise incitement to racial 
hatred contained in the 1965 Race Relations Act.  Although to a degree these fit with the themes 
of this thesis, limiting free speech in the name of public order, the separateness of these measures 
from other race equality provisions has led to the decision for their exclusion.  Additionally, where 
separate laws applied to Scotland and Northern Ireland these have not been considered, except 
where it casts light on the development of the law in England and Wales. 
 
1.2: Originality of the research. 
There has been a great deal of research carried out on the areas covered in this thesis, although 
none focusing on equality in a historical perspective.  Beyond this, the originality of this thesis 
                                                     
25
 Bob Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p25-28. 
26
 1917-2008.  Labour MP,  Pontypool/Torfaen (1958-1987). 
27
 Jeffrey Weeks, Sex, Politics and Society (3rd edition, Harlow: Pearson, 2012), p346. 
28
 1928-2012.  Labour MP, Manchester Wythenshawe (1964-1997). 
29
  Alf Morris and Arthur Butler, No Feet to Drag (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972), pp8-11, 111-124. 
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consists in four elements.  First, it is based on a comprehensive reading of government papers in 
The National Archives.  Some histories have incorporated top level papers from the Cabinet and 
Prime Ministers' Offices, but here the approach is to delve into lesser departments, particularly 
searching for conflicts which may indicate competing concepts of equality.  Second, linkages are 
sought to policy making in the Labour Party and the wider labour movement.  These were 
specifically reforms of Labour governments, so it is pertinent to examine the degree to which 
these were rooted in the Labour Party's policy making process.30  Third, the impact of campaigns 
for reform is examined, including the surviving elements of first wave feminism and the impact 
that this had on equality legislation.  Lastly, this will be used to understand the form of equality 
that was created and how the creation of new areas of state activity related to divisions between 
the public and private spheres. 
 
There are two notable works on race based sources in The National Archives: Public Record Office 
(PRO), those by Zig Layton-Henry31 and Shamit Saggar,32 but both stop short of 1964 in their use of 
government papers.  Randall Hansen's Immigration and Citizenship in Post-war Britain (2000) uses 
PRO sources (and, as here, Labour Party and TUC papers) across the period but is focused mainly 
on immigration and the main overlap here is on the 1965 Race Relations Act and 1965 White 
Paper.  Kathleen Paul's Whitewashing Britain33 uses PRO sources up to 1965 and also has a focus 
on migration policy.  Paul does not look beyond the top level papers of the Cabinet and Prime 
Minister's Office, and Hansen does not look much further with some Home Office papers from this 
                                                     
30
 An outline of the Labour Party and TUC policy making process can be found in annex 1 at the end of the 
thesis. 
31
 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration. 
32
 Shamit Saggar, Race and Politics in Britain (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
33
 Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
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period.  Erick Bleich in his study of integration policy in Britain and France does have some very 
slight use of PRO sources.34  In addition there is a full insider history of the Urban Programme with 
access to government papers, and this research has been drawn on rather than replicated here.35  
In all cases this thesis incorporates research based on government papers in greater depth and 
across the period. 
 
Much history relating to women in this period is written in a 'from below' perspective (see 
methodology, section 1.6).  There are, however, some histories that draw on PRO sources.  Dolly 
Wilson Smith's unpublished 2005 PhD thesis on equal pay is based on government, union and 
campaigning group papers and there is some inevitable replication here.36  The issues of abortion 
and contraception have been subject to some study based on PRO sources, notably by Andrew 
Holden.  Again, this is mainly at Cabinet and Prime Minister's Office level.  This is both relatively 
brief and in relation to changing morality not women's equality and there is limited overlap with 
the current research.37 
 
There is also some work that draws on labour movement archives.  Steven Fielding's volume on 
cultural change under the 1964-1970 Labour governments contains chapters on race and women 
but these draw more on Labour Party sources and only slightly on PRO material.  The focus in 
Fielding is on culture and the idea of non-economic forms of equality falls between the cracks of 
Fielding's volume and Jim Tomlinson's book in the same series on the Labour governments' 
                                                     
34
 Erick Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France (Cambridge: CUP, 2003). 
35
 John Edwards and Richard Batley, The Politics of Positive Discrimination (London: Tavistock, 1978). 
36
 Dolly Wilson Smith, 'The True Sphere of Women'? (Boston MA College, 2005), pp281, 310-321. 
37
 Andrew Holden, Makers and Manners (London: Politicos, 2004). 
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economic policy.38  Stephen Brooke's recent Sexual Politics39 uses some Labour Party archival 
material, and emphasises that abortion and contraception reform both had deep roots in the 
Labour Party and socialist radicalism, and there is some limited overlap here.  On the trade unions, 
Annie Phizacklea and Robert Miles examine the attitudes of the trade unions to racial minorities in 
the unions, but draw only on TUC Congress Reports.40  On equal pay, Sarah Boston in her analysis 
of the campaign for equal pay relies on published sources by the TUC and other trade unions41 
whereas a full range of material from the TUC archive is used here. 
 
Many of the campaigning groups considered in this thesis are subjects of sustained studies.  The 
impact on government policy of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) is examined by 
Benjamin Heinemann.  Since he uses the now lost archive of CARD I have drawn on this.42  The 
Abortion Law Reform Association's (ALRA) archive is well frequented, with Barbara Brookes43 
particularly basing her work on it as do Keith Hindell and Madeline Simms'44 insider history of 
ALRA. 45  I have used material from these books but have returned to the ALRA archive since the 
catalogues suggested that there was new light to be cast, particularly on how ALRA related to the 
political parties, Parliament and government.  Audrey Leathard has produced an account based on 
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the Family Planning Association (FPA) archive,46 and here too it appeared that there was material 
in the archives that could add to the specific purposes of the current research.  BH Lee's study of 
divorce law reform looks at the impact of the Divorce Law Reform Union (DLRU) on the policy 
making process leading to 1960s reform.47  In the absence of an extant archive for the DLRU this 
has been incorporated into this research.  The impact of the Society of Labour Lawyers and the 
Movement for Colonial Freedom is considered here.  These archives have not been previously 
used in relation to the development of policy on racial equality.  A focus on first wave feminist 
groups is unusual too, although these are included in Smith Wilson's study. 
 
What is more unusual here is the focus on equality.  Eric Bleich48 and Adrian Favell49 both look at 
the idea of the integration of immigrants (both comparatively with France), a different focus to 
that developed here.  Some rightist critics50 have looked at the rise of the 'equalities industry' or 
'race relations industry' which they view as a self-serving bureaucracy, but these studies are based 
on secondary sources alone.  Similarly, radical critics develop an analysis that no equality was 
delivered, and the current research is, in part, intended as a revision of this major element of the 
historiography (see section 1.5). 
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1.3: Equality of what? 
In order to understand the nature of the equality promoted by policies developed in the 1960s, it 
is necessary to establish what equality means.  For Amartya Sen the first question to ask is 
'equality of what?'51  The most commonly made distinction being that between equality of 
opportunity to access various social resources, and equality in terms of the various outcomes.  The 
anti-discrimination measures originating in the 1960s are often referred to as equal opportunities 
policies, an imprecise term for what could more accurately be called access equality.  The point is 
frequently made that equal access to jobs and education will do nothing to change inequality in 
outcomes.  Equal access to housing will lead to outcomes reflecting unequal economic resources.  
The point was understood closer to the heart of Labour's policy making in Michael Young's52  
dystopian satire The Rise of the Meritocracy (1958) which presents social mobility leading not to a 
more equal society but merely changing those benefiting from inequality.53  Nonetheless, when 
applied to women and racial minorities, the term equal opportunities has an important meaning 
that no additional inequalities are suffered by these groups as a result of discrimination. 
 
Equal opportunity need not imply a different distribution of inequality, but rather more egalitarian 
outcomes.  Ronald Dworkin argues persuasively in Sovereign Virtue (2001) that if equality of 
opportunity is thoroughgoing, it will not merely remove external barriers to equal opportunity 
such as discrimination, but also tackle the impact of social disadvantage and more intrinsic 
obstacles to equality of opportunity.  These include biological, societal or cultural factors that can 
                                                     
51
 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), p12. 
52
 1915-2002.  Sociologist and social reformer. 
53
 Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961 [1958]), pp97-99, 174-183. 
15 
 
affect the life chances of an individual.  Someone born poor or blind will have their opportunities 
limited by this and not simply, or even mainly, by discrimination.  It is just as unfair that someone 
born poor will have fewer opportunities than someone born into a group that suffers 
discrimination.  A true equality of opportunity will tackle both discrimination and the bad luck of 
birth and background.  To create a genuine equality of opportunity requires intervention to 
counteract these sources of unequal opportunity and will tend to create more equal outcomes 
mediated only by individual preference.54  Michael Young anticipated Dworkin's point and in his 
The Rise of the Meritocracy speaks through a new socialist-feminist movement, the 2009 Chelsea 
Manifesto in seeking: 
to give a new meaning to equality of opportunity.  Thus, they should not mean equal 
opportunity to rise up the social scale, but equal opportunity for all people, irrespective of their 
'intelligence', to develop the virtues and talents with which they are endowed ... schools 
should have enough good teachers so that all children should have individual care and stimulus 
... by promoting diversity within unity.
55
 
 
Thus, there are two forms of equality of opportunity.  One, access equality, targeting external 
barriers, legal bars and discrimination by those in positions of power.  The other seeks to 
overcome the effects of accidents of birth and other differences determining an individual's life-
chances.  To develop this further I will follow the terminology developed by Isaiah Berlin's56 
categorisation of liberal ideas of freedom into negative (the freedom that comes from being left 
alone) and positive (the freedom that comes from a society that makes sure that an individual is 
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healthy, educated and secure).57  There are obvious parallels between these freedoms and the two 
forms of equality of opportunity.  Thus I will call the equality of removing barriers to individual 
choice but leaving the distribution of resources to the resulting competition, negative equality.  
Positive equality requires some actor, most likely the state, to make some positive intervention 
that changes something to allow the individual not only choice but a more equal share of 
resources resulting from their choice.  An example of negative equality is the removal of bans on 
women carrying out certain types of work, such as night work in industry.  Positive equality would 
include giving someone struggling because English is their second language extra support to 
improve their progress. 
 
There has always been an element of positive equality in the Labour Party's thinking.  RH Tawney58 
in his Equality (first pulished1931) attacked the idea of 'equal opportunities of becoming unequal' 
whereby 'a thousand donkeys could be induced to sweat by the prospect of a carrot that could be 
eaten by but one'.  Unlike some further to the left who took this as an argument against 
capitalism, Tawney proposed not an end to the private ownership of carrots or the employment of 
donkeys by the owners of those carrots, but a social-liberal concept of positive equality leading to 
the more equal sharing of carrots.  This led to a policy of using welfare not to simply redistribute 
resources, but to equip people to compete for those resources on a more equal basis by being 
educated, healthy, sheltered and secure.59  Such social-liberalism was a common element in 
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Labour policy, being substituted for the socialisation of private property demanded by clause IV of 
Labour's constitution long before the rise of Gaitskellite revisionism.60 
 
In Britain, in the first decade of the twenty-first century there has been a notable return to 
equalities legislation.  Labour governments from the 1940s to the 1970s sought legitimacy with 
combining claims to economic efficiency with greater equality through the redistributive policies 
of welfare.61  The process that started in the 1960s has created a state that seeks legitimacy not 
only in welfare and economic efficiency, but in some forms of equality between its citizens.62  To 
this, diversity and multiculturalism have been added.  As a description, diversity can simply 
describe the situation after access equality policies have worked their magic.  So, where there is 
gender balance on a company's board, or when a housing estate has a mix of people from 
different backgrounds, one might say diversity has been achieved, but diversity is often given 
meaning in a deeper, normative sense.  This focuses on the idea of difference, not between 
infinitely variegated individuals but rather between finite social groups.  Diversity now becomes a 
policy prescription the goal of which is not the elimination of inequality, but the recognition of 
group (or collective) identities against their marginalisation and oppression.  It asserts that group 
identity is sacrosanct and respected.63  Thus the difference between groups is certainly not 
tolerated (one tolerates something which one disdains), not accepted (which suggests neutrality) 
but positively valued and celebrated. 
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This thesis cannot answer the question of 'what kind of equality state are we in?'  It will, however, 
look at the forms of equality that emerged in the 1960s in relation to women and racial minorities.  
The above analysis suggests the lines of inquiry that should be pursued.  First, there needs to be an 
answer to Sen's question 'equality of what?'  Second, the degrees to which policies pursued were 
of a negative or a positive character. Third, whether policy makers adopted notions of difference 
and diversity, and the impact this had on the pursuit of equalities policy. 
 
1.4: The public and the private spheres. 
One of the objections that critics of anti-discrimination legislation made in the 1950s and 1960s 
was that it encroached upon personal choices.  For example, the right-wing Conservative MP, 
Ronald Bell,64 speaking in the Commons in opposition to the 1965 Race Relations Bill argued, 'it is 
not within the proper function of the State in ordering the affairs of those who live within it'.65  To 
be consistent Bell also opposed the Equal Pay Bill in 1970 arguing that the state was wrong to 
interfere in the private sphere, where women's labour was worth less than that of men and 'the 
market mirrors the truth'.66  Bell was proposing the classical liberal view that the state was best 
advised not to interfere in the naturally harmonious workings of private relationships. 
 
Those who favoured greater equality needed a different view of the state.  Labour's revisionist 
right theorised a middle way between accepting the operation of a privately owned economy and 
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the demands of the left who sought to abolish the private sector.67  Anthony Crosland's68 The 
Future of Socialism (1956) developed the idea that the state can regulate the economy and use 
welfare to create greater social justice, but it was Anthony Lester who sought to push this idea 
further into the realm of non-economic forms of equality.  In a Socialist Commentary article of 
1965 Lester argued: 
Once we admit the private sector is here to stay, and that a socialist government properly 
delegates rights, powers, and privileges to private institutions, we have to be sure that those 
rights, powers and privileges are exercised in the public interest.  By 'public interest' I mean to 
refer to broad socialist concerns with equal opportunities, individual choice, planned 
environment, and increased national wealth increasingly widely distributed ... One searches in 
vain current traditionalist and revisionist literature for guidance about specific ways of 
regulating the activities of private institutions in the public interest. 
Lester proposed to use the state to regulate more areas of private conduct.  Governments had, 
however, been hesitant to do this 'not only because of an inhibition about intervening in the 
private sector on this subject, but also because of an inadequate analysis of the means of 
intervention at its disposal.'  Lester looked to institutions in North America as his models.69  Like 
Crosland's regulatory state, this implied a state different to both that of left wing socialists who 
sought to abolish the distinction between the public and the private, and classical liberals who 
believed that the state should be kept out of private affairs. 
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Thus, in order to understand the progress towards women's and racial equality, it is necessary to 
analyse the relationship between the public and private spheres.  There are many problems such 
as public/private split, not least that the state has often taken a very keen interest in what is 
supposedly private and the role of morality in imposing public standards on private behaviour, 
particularly in relation to gender.  This is further complicated by the idea of civil society.  Civil 
society has been used as a synonym for the private sphere,70 but here it is taken to mean an area 
of public life outside of the state where a private persona is maintained in the public realm.71  Civil 
society thus could be considered to include economic activity by employers, workers and the trade 
unions representing them and professional bodies exercising quasi-state power.  In this thesis I will 
refer to the narrowly defined public sphere of the state, a more broadly defined public sphere that 
includes civil society particularly employment, and a narrowly defined private or domestic sphere. 
 
Legislation that made women more equal from 1870 focused on equality in a narrowly defined 
public sphere of the state.  It was legal and political rights that were won in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  But it was the broader public sphere, civil society, that became the 
focus of feminist campaigns from the 1920s, particularly women's unequal pay and employment 
opportunities (see section 4.1).  With race, Cedric Thornberry,72  an academic lawyer and ally of 
Lester, argued in 1964 that while the law could straightforwardly deal with discrimination by 
public bodies, the private realm was more difficult to deal with.  He therefore suggested that the 
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next target should be the quasi-public sphere of shops and financial services.73  Thus, the object of 
campaigners was to create more equality in civil society, and this required defining it as a public 
space. 
 
Local government, while clearly part of the state, had a civil aura too.  Its original powers were not 
derived from the central state and this was expressed in an acceptance of its autonomy from the 
centre and its association with voluntary work carried by socially minded citizens.  Such voluntary 
efforts are important to this thesis, constituting a liminal area between the private sphere and the 
state.  Voluntary sector activities delivered public welfare services that the state declined to 
provide, often because they intruded into the private sphere or upon individual morality.  In so 
doing voluntary organisations could act as transporters taking areas of private life into the public 
sphere.  There has been a resurgence over the last twenty years of interest in the history of the 
voluntary sector,74 and particularly the role of voluntary work in bringing women into the public 
sphere,75 but this focus has faded from the historiography on race.76  The salience of the voluntary 
sector in this period can be seen in the formation under the Conservative government in 1964 of 
the National Advisory Council for Commonwealth Immigrants specifically to liaise between central 
government and local voluntary groups concerned with the welfare of immigrants. 
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The boundaries between the public and private are not fixed.  They move not only over time but in 
other contexts such as class and gender.  What is public at any moment is thus an empirical 
question.  An outline of what is public in the 1960s (including the more clearly public areas of civil 
society) would include the state, politics and commerce, employment and public entertainments.  
All housing, not just council provision, also had the character of a public transaction mediated 
through an impersonal public market, although this was differentiated by race and gender.77  The 
purely private sphere was increasingly behind people's front doors although some business and 
workplaces maintained much more the character of a private relationship than a public space, and 
some pubs serving defined communities had the feel of down-market private clubs.78 
 
The division between the public and the private sphere has often been used in analysing women's 
equality (see section 4.1).  Women's move into paid employment, education and politics was not 
necessarily associated with a change in relations in the private sphere, where for much of the 
twentieth century the idea of women's different role as mother and housewife dominated over 
any notion of gender equality in the home.  Feminist writers have developed the analysis that 
liberalism underpinned this inequality since it is based on a distinction between the public sphere 
of political action and a private sphere of individual choice.  This placed women's unequal 
domestic position outside of political discourse.  In this light the second wave of feminism can be 
understood as an attempt to overcome this division by insisting 'the personal is political'.79  While 
this is a powerful analysis, it underestimates the degree to which the boundaries between the 
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public and private can move within a liberal polity, as shown by the post-war welfare state.  
William Beveridge, who was no feminist, supported the established social role of women, 
financially dependent on men and responsible for domestic labour.80  Nonetheless, as care of the 
sick and elderly was taken out of the hands of the women in the family, the boundary between the 
public and private moved.  Furthermore, the principle of the welfare state allowed for its 
boundaries to be expanded.  What had been personal was drawn into the public sphere of state 
policy. 
 
Thus, the existence of the welfare state helped to raise questions about women's roles and 
showed that policies for freeing women from some of their domestic burdens were possible.  
Michael Young, for example, wrote in 1952 that while full employment and the benefits system 
had put more money into the pockets of husbands, many failed to share this with their wives.  He 
believed this to be the concern of the state which could remedy the problem by paying benefits 
directly to women.81  In the same year Richard Titmuss82 gently berated the first wave feminists of 
the Fawcett Society for not having given prominence to the demand for 'the social freedom of 
working-class women to control their own fertility' and went on to suggest that opening up 
employment opportunities and creating more equal family roles was the concern of social policy.83  
Boundaries were more fixed when it came to race.  Young noted at the time of the 1958 Notting 
Hill Riots (essentially a white riot that attacked black people), 'here was a new strand in politics 
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that had not been prepared for by Beveridge.  Not one of the "Five Giants" is "racial prejudice"'.84  
That state action could shift the public-private boundary is one of the foci of the current research 
alongside underlying concepts of equality that this demonstrated.85   
 
The division between the public and private spheres has not previously been used to explore racial 
equality.  In this thesis such an analysis will be developed.  In the early 1960s Sheila Patterson 
wrote about the laissez faire period of immigration when there was neither control of 
Commonwealth immigrants entering Britain nor any policy for meeting their needs or dealing with 
the tensions their arrival triggered.86  Ambalavaner Sivanandan has added that this was also a 
period of laissez faire racism where society was restructured by an un-coordinated racist response 
to immigration.87  The 1960s saw both coming under a degree of state regulation.  The dominant 
aspect of this was the introduction of controls of black and Asian immigration in the Conservatives' 
1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.  More positively, particularly under the Labour governments 
after 1964, attempts were made to integrate immigrants into society and lessen racism through 
some co-ordinated policy.  The idea of the equality state was germinating. 
 
Political theory reflected this state of affairs.  In Britain the theoretical underpinning to state 
intervention was provided by TH Marshall's88 view of social rights.  In 1950 Marshall predicated a 
social liberal theory of citizenship on three categories of rights: civil rights such as religious and 
political freedom; political rights of access to representation; and social rights ensuring  'a 
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modicum of economic welfare and security ... the right to share in full the social heritage, and to 
live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.'89  While civil 
and political rights require mainly negative equality by applying the same legal and political 
standards to all without discrimination (the only positive measure Marshall thought necessary was 
payment of MPs to allow working class political representation), social rights require a more 
positive approach and some redistribution of wealth, although Marshall's goal was not egalitarian.  
Rather, his aim was a society unfractured by class realising a liberal goal stretching back to JS Mill, 
who argued that equal political rights for the working class depended on 'the degree to which they 
can be made rational beings' through other liberal reforms.90  These social rights had been 
implemented in the welfare state.  The question in 1964 was the degree to which they be 
stretched further, to create a society that was not fractured by divisions of sex and race. 
 
1.5: Historiography. 
There is too huge a range of secondary material touching on this thesis to adequately review here.  
One work which cannot go unmentioned is Arthur Marwick's The Sixties, one of the motivations 
for this research.  His argument is that the ideas that changed social life in the 1960s started in 
small minorities and moved through popular movements to the general population (the 
permeation thesis).  Marwick includes a few Delphic comments about the importance of 'secular 
Anglicanism in high places', but he does not analyse how these minority movements became 
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realised in government policy.91  This research is intended to fill that gap and, in part at least, to 
test that thesis. 
 
Everything else I will categorise into three broad currents.  These are, naturally, over-
generalisations and many works combine features of more than one current while others do not 
easily fit in any.  Nonetheless, these categories do reflect the historiography and are a useful guide 
to navigating the terrain.92  The first current is of rightist critics who see the reforms of the 1960s 
as an unnecessary imposition on society by elitist politicians whose actions undermined the moral 
fabric of society.  Second, liberal optimists, for whom the reforms were in some degree a 
successful liberalisation and created a more equal society.  The third and dominant current, radical 
critics, suggest that the reforms were either illusory or entirely undermined by other policies.  
Often applying Foucauldian or structuralist methodology, the radicals suggest that while overt 
state power was relaxed, a more covert and dispersed form of regulation of private life was 
implemented.  Stuart Hall, for example, argues that the reforms of the 1960s in reality saw 
regulatory authority dispersed to a decentred 'micropolitics of power.'93 
 
The rightist critics are a weak current in the historiography, and tend not to be academic histories 
but popularist polemics.  Peter Hitchens' The Abolition of Britain (1999) fits this mould well, seeing 
Roy Jenkins as a lynchpin to Britain's moral and thus existential decline.94  A more academic 
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version of the same thesis is presented in the work of Christie Davies.95  It is possible to construct 
what a rightist view on racial equality might look like.  First, policy on race reflected misplaced 
liberal guilt after Nazism and colonialism alongside political pressure from ungrateful immigrants.  
Second, this led to the creation of a 'race relations industry', a self-justifying bureaucracy that 
caused the racism that it purported to eliminate.  Third, the political establishment were unwilling 
to represent the views of the white majority.  Last, the effect of this was to undermine British 
culture and the historical continuity of stable communities.96  Rightist critical work on women is 
almost entirely absent, save a few scattered remarks about contraception leading to moral decline 
and some religiously inspired works against abortion.97 
 
Liberal optimists are only a little stronger in the historiography.  Peter Richards98 and Andrew 
Holden99 have both offered positive accounts of change in the period related to changing morality.  
In the area of racial equality, the account contained in EJB Rose et al's Colour and Citizenship 
commissioned by the Institute of Race Relations in 1962 fits the liberal optimist mould, and does 
not simply contain a history of the reform process but is part of it.100  Similarly, Michael Banton, 101 
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an actor in this story from the time of his 1954 proposal for the Labour Party,102 argues that 
immigration controls were economically motivated and integrationist policy a separate realisation 
of loftier ideals.  He believes Roy Jenkins addressed the anti-immigrant climate, making use of 
'sentiments of common citizenship and human equality which had been subordinate to short-term 
interests.'103 
 
More common are liberal optimists' analyses of women's changing position in society.  Hera Cook 
has offered an insightful history of contraception and women's sexual autonomy.  She rejects the 
radicals' 'grim narrative of shifting control', seeing instead in the 1960s 'well intentioned progress 
towards the light.'104  Audrey Leathard, studying the campaign for the wider availability of 
contraception, sees progress driven by a humanist and less class-oriented left which ultimately 
carried on 'the tremendous undercurrent of social change which gathered force in the sixties 
[which] dramatically jolted traditional ideas and transformed public outlook'.105  Hindell and 
Simms' history of abortion law reform supports Marwick's permeation thesis, suggesting that the 
values of a small layer of committed reformers can, by degrees, become those of society when 
accommodated by liberal tolerance in government.106  BH Lee's Divorce Law Reform in England 
professes neutrality but exudes an aroma of liberal progress. 
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The bulk of the historical accounts of racial equality come from radical critics.  Although this school 
encompasses a diverse set of views, a composite picture of their views on race may be 
reconstructed.  First, the motivation of immigration control was racist and possibly a deliberate 
attempt by the political elite to divide and rule.107  Thus, second, racism was constructed by the 
government108 or, at best, it reinforced existing popular perceptions.109  Third, this racism tended 
to neutralise any positive anti-discrimination and integration measures110 or, alternatively, such 
policy was too weak to be effective.  Fourth, the organisations that government created ostensibly 
to promote equality were 'buffers' which dispersed political pressure for change.111  Fifth, race 
relations policy was a continuation of Britain's colonial policy.  An imported colonial workforce was 
controlled by colonial methods.112 
 
The radical critics have particular strengths.  One is the consideration they give to the process of 
racialisation.  Since race is a social construct it makes little sense to leave unanalysed the process 
of its social construction.  Radical critics highlight the role of state actors in this process, and 
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particularly the ideological impact of immigration controls.113  However, as Robert Miles highlights, 
such processes 'cannot be determined abstractly ... but are a matter for historical investigation'.114  
There are no convincing historical accounts of this process.  Instead, there is a tendency to 
emphasise the negative actions of government as if public opinion were an automatic reflection of 
these115 with scant regard being given to the views of those who framed anti-discrimination 
legislation that this would offer public opinion a positive lead.  In this thesis the working 
hypothesis is that there was a two-way relationship of government action and public opinion at 
times conflicting with each other, at times mutually reinforcing.  Policies for racial equality may 
have been an attempt to create a more liberal climate, although both the sincerity and success of 
such attempts are the subject of this research, not an assumption behind it. 
 
On policy relating to women, too, the radical critics tend to dismiss the 1960s reforms as neither 
liberalising nor the result of changed underlying attitudes.  Jane Lewis sees them as a change in 
the regulation of women's lives away from traditional morality towards control by professionals.116  
Works on abortion law reform are dominated by radical critics with analyses of overt state 
regulation being replaced by new and pernicious forms of regulation, so what was once illegal 
became patholigised.  Barbara Brookes suggests that the weakness of the feminist voice and 
strength of medical opinion led to abortion being transformed by the 1967 Act 'from an important 
female-centred form of fertility control into a medical event, closely monitored by the State.'117  
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On divorce, Carole Smart is another who draws on Foucault to suggest that the reforms in divorce 
law 'legitimated an increased surveillance over families'.118  
 
Not all analyses can be easily shoehorned into these categories.  On race, the work of Zig Layton-
Henry and Shamit Saggar, while accepting the reality of the reforms on racial equality, uses some 
of the material generated by radical critics to develop a highly critical view of its limits.  Tim 
Newburn and Jeffrey Weeks, while firmly grounded in the radical critics' camp, suggest a moral 
pluralism increasingly developed through the 1960s in some areas.119  Lewis too (in her more 
recent work) sees divorce reform representing one step towards treating partners in marriage 
more equally.120 
 
A further feature of the historiography on women relevant here is a division between 
discontinuists, who see a hiatus in the feminist movement between the final victory of the suffrage 
movement in 1928 and the rise of the second wave of feminism at the end of the 1960s, and 
continuists, who highlight some developments spanning those forty years.  As a discontinuist, 
Sheila Rowbotham ends her history of the battle for women's equality in the early 1930s when 
'the last great feminist wave of the late nineteenth century finally faded.'121  The discontinuists' 
case is strong and dominates the historiography.  Even continuists recognise that post-1928 was a 
fallow period but they view the emergence of the second wave as not entirely sui generis.  
Amongst the continuists Olive Banks points to first wave feminists having an impact on the equal 
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pay campaign in the 1960s,122 and Martin Pugh highlights the role of female Labour MPs who 
never considered themselves feminist but bridged the divide between the first and second waves 
of feminism.123  Elizabeth Wilson similarly points to the labour movement as the repository of a 
strand of welfare oriented feminism, for example Leah Manning's124 campaign for women's freer 
access to contraception.125 
 
This debate on continuity raises a number of issues.  Particularly, if the discontinuists are right and 
there was not feminist pressure from below on the 1960s reforms affecting women.  As, Jeffrey 
Weeks has argued, this might imply that such policies were less focused on promoting women's 
equality and instead tend to a self-contained solutions to specific problems such as large families 
or the dangers of backstreet abortionists.126  Thus, the archives of first wave feminists’ 
organisations will be studied in detail. 
 
1.6: Methodology and sources. 
Britain is not unique in having developed equality and diversity policies, they are a common 
feature of modern liberal democratic states.  These policies take different forms.  In Canada the 
existence of English and French speaking groups alongside first nation peoples has led to policies 
some describe as being communitarian127 while France's policy is viewed as assimilationist.128  
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There is a case for looking at these policies in a comparative perspective to understand why 
equality and diversity have emerged at different times and in different forms in various states.  
This thesis, however,  looks at the UK alone and  to understand how these equality policies 
emerged, shaped by the choices of the actors involved. 
 
The approaches to women and race within the historiography has differed.  With race much of the 
writing is within the bounds of political history, focusing on government action.  The writing on 
women has centred on women's experience.129  Sheila Rowbotham's A Century of Women (1999) 
is typical in eschewing the use of official documentation in favour of women's voices.  The reasons 
for the dominance of such an approach are not only important for the historiographical context of 
this thesis, they are in some part, its subject.  Women's increased, although by no means equal, 
access to university education in the 1960s was one factor leading to the second wave of 
feminism130 and the academic positions that some feminists achieved131 have been one way in 
which women have been able to write their own history.  There was no opening up of higher 
education for black and Asian immigrants or their children in the 1960s.  Their history (at least 
until recently) has been written by sympathetic white radicals, although there are exceptions such 
as Ron Ramdin and A Sivanandan working outside of academia.  The focus of writing on racial 
equality has been minorities' treatment by the white political establishment, so standard political 
history exposing that has served this purpose well.  Thus there is far less emphasis on subjective 
experience in the writing on race.  In distinction to this, second wave feminists of the late 1960s 
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were less interested in government policy and more concerned with raising the consciousness of 
women about their position in society. 
 
What unites the writing on race and women is that it is politically engaged.  The three perspectives 
in the historiography, rightist, radical and liberal, are divided by their normative approaches.  The 
radicals' writing dominates the historiography, and feminist writers in particular have been 
purposefully polemical132 focused on identifying the historical us in opposition to them.133  There is 
a danger here of history falling into relativism, only reporting the experiences of its subjects.  Such 
an approach is supported by the postmodernist historian Keith Jenkins, asserting that history is 'a 
discursive practice that enables present minded people(s) to go to the past, therein to delve 
around and reorganize it appropriately to their needs', with the purpose of making 'emancipatory 
material differences to and within the present.'134  This approach is rejected here, instead this 
thesis is based on the idea that there is an historical truth based on a unity of diverse experiences 
which is, in some degree, knowable. 
 
Of course, history from below is a valuable approach, but not the only approach.  If political, social 
and economic power is monopolised by men drawn from the upper stratum of society, it is quite 
right to ask about other lives.  Nonetheless, a bottom up approach cannot be assumed to have 
greater explanatory power.  It is not necessarily the case that, in Rowbotham's words, women's 
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activity was like 'yeast that rose through culture before it reached politics.'135  As all brewers know, 
top-fermentation with the yeast acting from the top of the liquid, is possible too.  Elite-centred 
approaches cannot be dismissed a priori since it is possible that a section of the political class may 
have been in advance of public opinion and the pressure from below largely illiberal.  Factions 
within the political class may have canalised and ridden the pressure from a minority in society to 
win reforms.  In other words, causes may be more complex than a choice between 'above' and 
'below'.  Ultimately, my methodology is that of Fernand Braudel's total history.  Although it has 
been argued this is an unobtainable ideal,136 history is not the work of one person but a 
synthesising, collective and ongoing effort.  Here, I am doing only part of the job in analysing (from 
above) the policy making process. 
 
Although this thesis is fundamentally about policy making and thus focuses on those involved in 
that process, this includes pressure bubbling up from below in some organised way, via interest 
groups.  So, the most important archives that are used are government papers deposited in the 
PRO.  Those histories that have looked at this have tended to concentrate only on papers from the 
Prime Ministers' and Cabinet offices.  Here there will be particular focus on the greater quantity of 
papers from those departments concerned with these areas of policy making.  The purpose of this 
is not only to approach as closely as possible the immediate impetuses of these policies, but to 
examine the conflict between ministers and ministries as a gauge of different understandings of 
equality and to examine where departments were bearers of outside pressure, notably with the 
Ministry of Labour closely reflecting the interests of the TUC. 
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The second group of archives considered are those of the Labour Party.  Again, it is important to 
dig below the top level documents of party conference reports, the Labour Party's National 
Executive Committee, the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Parliamentary Committee (the 
shadow cabinet), to include the papers of the party's research department and the full range of 
files of the national party held in the Labour History Archive and Study Centre.  Some papers of the 
Communist Party archive have been considered too since the Communists were influential in the 
unions, and supported both equal pay and racial equality.  Along with this a limited range of labour 
movement related press has been considered, particularly Tribune, New Statesman, Fabian 
publications, the revisionist journal Socialist Commentary and the Communist Party's journals, 
Labour Monthly and Marxism Today and a selection of its daily press The Daily Worker and later 
The Morning Star.  Space has not allowed consideration of the important dimension of local 
parties and of Labour controlled local councils which probably constitute the biggest limitation to 
the current research. 
 
The trade unions play an important role here particularly in relation to the formation of policy by 
the government.  Although in the 1960s the shift to the left in the unions was not often expressed 
in Labour Party structures, the Trade Union Congress (TUC) was willing to assert the collective 
interests of trade unions to the government.137  Most studies of the TUC have looked largely at 
only top level documents, General Council minutes and annual Congress reports.  Here, papers 
down to the office level have been studied, a rich and underused resource since the office staff 
displayed assiduous memo-writing matched only by an ethos of filing everything down to the 
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wildest of green-inked letters.  The TUC is a very useful secondary archive, containing a rich seam 
of documents of organisations whose own archives are lost, such as CARD. 
 
The last major source used is the papers of campaigning bodies.  Papers of those arguing for 
greater equality have been considered, including many first wave feminist groups operating in the 
period, particularly the Six Point Group and the Status of Women Committee.  The Equal Pay 
Campaign Committee in the 1950s have also been considered.  Archival material of non-feminist 
women's groups have not been considered, although some did attempt to represent women's 
interest, none expressed a clear conception of women's equality as such.  The Abortion Law 
Reform Association's and the Family Planning Association's archives are also considered.  The 
papers of the campaigns for equal pay and divorce reform in the 1960s have not been preserved, 
nor have many of the organisations concerned with racial equality, including the Campaign Against 
Racial Discrimination, the West Indian Standing Conference and the Institute of Race Relations.  
The Movement for Colonial Freedom along with the closely allied Fox-Pitt papers have been 
considered and through this some of the work of the other campaigning groups can be 
understood.  Archives of the quasi-governmental bodies, the National Committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants, the Community Relations Commission and the Race Relations Board 
have also been considered. 
 
Most of the press considered here is the press of record, particularly The Times and The Guardian 
mainly as a context for reading campaigning groups archives and government papers.  The popular 
press, which possibly shaped and was shaped by public opinion, is only considered episodically.  
Although a study of the opinions of the popular press would be interesting, it is not part of the 
current research.
38 
 
Chapter 2: Racial equality and anti-discrimination legislation. 
The 1964 to 1970 Labour governments are remembered for many things.  There are excoriating 
histories of the unfulfilled promise to forge Britain in the white heat of scientific revolution which 
led only to a humiliating devaluation of the pound in 1967, and failure to reform industrial 
relations with the withdrawal of the proposals in the White Paper In Place of Strife in the summer 
of 1969.1  Some histories are more generous, adding that these governments also oversaw 
liberalisation in censorship, abortion, criminal justice and sexuality2 and a time of liberation and 
greater personal freedom.3  Few histories dwell on Labour's innovative policies on racial equality, 
and with good reason.  The two pieces of anti-discrimination legislation passed by these Labour 
governments, the 1965 and 1968 Race Relations Acts, were flawed and limited, but were 
nonetheless the genesis of the equality state. 
 
This chapter will first examine the ideas on which these policies were based developing through 
the Labour Party and campaigning groups from 1945 to 1964.  These created, in some part, the 
basis for the 1965 Race Relations Act passed while Sir Frank Soskice4 was Home Secretary.  This 
looked set to be a very limited and even tokenistic reform before campaigners succeeded in its 
amendment.  After Roy Jenkins became Home Secretary at the end of 1965, a campaign for a new 
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Race Relations Bill was launched.  This eventually led to the 1968 Race Relations Act, offering 
legislation of greater scope, although this too had its limitations. 
 
2.1: The development of policy 1948-1964. 
2.1.1: Campaigning groups. 
It is only with somewhat arbitrary hindsight that the point of mass black and Asian immigration to 
Britain is pinpointed to when 492 black Jamaican immigrants disembarked from the Empire 
Windrush at Tilbury Dock in the summer of 1948.5  There was already a small population of visible 
racial minorities in Britain, although its numbers are hard to gauge,6 and governments of all stripes 
were keen that it did not grow.  As early as April 1945 under the wartime coalition, the Ministry of 
Labour was making efforts to persuade demobilised black servicemen and wartime workers to 
return to their countries of origin.  Although the 1948 Nationality Act gave all Commonwealth 
citizens the right to live in Britain, it was not intended to encourage black and Asian immigration.  
By 1950 the Cabinet was already considering if anything could be done about immigration, but 
relations with the Commonwealth came first.7  The government did as little as it could to cater for 
the welfare of the new arrivals, and by 1950 had closed down the remaining welfare provision 
which had survived since it was created to support immigrant labour during the war.8 
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It was thus fitting that the first post-war campaign for racial equality in Britain, Racial Unity, was 
founded in 1951 by the Prime Ministers' sister, Mary Attlee,9 who had spent a lifetime in South 
Africa as a missionary.  Peggy Cripps,10 daughter of Labour's recent Chancellor, was co-secretary.11  
Professing a 'Christian ethic', the organisation aimed to use education to reduce feelings of racial 
superiority and bitterness.12  The group struggled to develop a role, carrying out limited work in 
Brixton on discrimination with the local MP13 but when the Labour Party forwarded a case of 
discrimination to the campaign in 1953 they did nothing to follow it up.  By 1954 Racial Unity was 
reduced to discussing issues of Christian concern loosely grouped around racism and colonialism14 
and it limped on to 1960 doing little more than organising English classes for immigrants in 
Oxford.15 
 
Thomas Fox-Pitt16 was Racial Unity's Secretary in 1953.17  He was a retired colonial administrator 
who had exasperated the Colonial Office, in one instance organising a unionisation drive in the 
Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt.  In response to the UN Conference of Non-Governmental 
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Organisations' call to voluntary groups to co-ordinate pressure on governments to end 
discrimination, in early 1956 in conjunction with the Quakers and the Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom Fox-Pitt organised a meeting proposing the establishment of a 
National Council of Race Relations, but that initiative left little trace.18 
 
A third and more durable campaigning group was the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), 
formed in 1954 with Fenner Brockway19 as the active chair.  Although Brockway was far from being 
a Communist fellow-traveller, the Labour Party's hesitancy in supporting national liberation 
movements drew him and the Communist Party together to form the MCF primarily to support 
independence struggles in the British colonies.  The MCF London Area Committee called the first 
conference dedicated to issues of racial discrimination in Britain in 1955 but apart from hoping for 
better treatment of immigrants little policy emerged.  The only upshot of the conference was a 
delegation of trade unionists and community leaders to the London County Council.20  On this 
foundation the MCF called a national conference21 out of which came the National Council Against 
Racial Discrimination in 1957.  Chaired by the Labour MP Maurice Orbach,22 the campaign declared 
that it was to push for comprehensive legislation and to co-operate with bodies helping the 
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settlement of immigrants.  The campaign failed to gain any independent existence beyond the 
MCF and by January 1958 had ceased to function.23 
 
The 1945-1951 Labour governments' concern over black and Asian immigration was continued by 
the Conservative administration when returned to power in 1951.  With the levels of immigration 
rising, a bill to restrict immigration was drafted in 1955, but the over-riding concern in the Cabinet 
was to maintain good relations with the Commonwealth and the bill was never brought forward.24  
Although not taking steps to control immigration, the Conservatives, as with Labour before them, 
did nothing to promote the welfare of immigrants who arrived in Britain.  There had been several 
riotous attacks on black and Asian people in Britain since 1948,25 but the clearest signs that there 
were some sections of the public hostile to immigrants were the riots in St. Ann's, Nottingham, 
and Notting Hill, West London, in August and September 1958.  As Edward Pilkington has shown in 
his history of the riots, immigrants had been drawn into inner city areas by the demand for their 
labour, and forced by discrimination into the worst housing.  In both St Ann's and Notting Hill high 
concentrations of black immigrants abutted deprived white working class areas.  The results were 
explosive.  In both cases the riots were essentially racist attacks by elements of the less 
respectable local white working class on black people, and, to a degree, of black people defending 
themselves.26 
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In the wake of the riots, the MCF sought to build its anti-racist campaign afresh through a series of 
meetings with local Labour parties and trades councils around London.  In September 1958 the 
MCF held a public meeting with Paddington South Labour Party, and its MP, Ben Parkin.27  (The 
Labour MP whose constituency included much of Notting Hill, George Rogers,28 had responded to 
the riots by calling for immigration control.)29  Other similar meetings in London followed,30 raising 
the profile of the issue of racial discrimination in the London labour movement at least.  Building 
on this, in early 1959 the MCF started working with the exiled US Communist Claudia Jones31 who 
was active in Notting Hill.32  The murder of Kelso Cochrane, an Antiguan immigrant, in Notting Hill 
in May 1959, pushed the issue of race back into the political arena.  The police publicly stated that 
they believed the murder to be unconnected to race, contrary to the widely held view of local 
black people.33  In response to the murder, immigrant and non-immigrant based groups formed 
the Inter-Racial Friendship Co-ordinating Committee which paid for Cochrane's funeral.  This 
became a demonstration of solidarity.34  Attempts by the MCF to use this as a springboard for a 
national campaign failed35 and by the end of 1960 the MCF was again left with no campaign for 
racial equality.36 
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While the campaigns against racism and to promote the interests of black and Asian immigrants 
faltered, those for the restriction of immigration had some success.  The Conservative MP Cyril 
Osborne37 had been campaigning for the restriction of immigration since 1952 and was joined by a 
small band of Conservative backbenchers with some support in their party, and a smaller group of 
Labour MPs who had little support in theirs.  After the 1958 riots, their cause gained support.  The 
Birmingham Immigration Control Association, formed in 1960, showed that the issue could win 
popular support.38  By mid-1961 it became clear that there would be legislation restricting 
Commonwealth immigration,39 leading the MCF and the National Campaign for Civil Liberties to 
launch a campaign against control with a meeting in Central Hall Westminster in November 
1961.40  The Conservatives' Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was published in November 1961 to 
limit primary immigration from the Commonwealth to those with Ministry of Labour issued 
vouchers related to potential employment.  The MCF sought the backing of unions and the Labour 
Party for its campaign against controls, but with little response.41  So, seeking to emulate the 
peace movement, they embarked on a grandiose plan to distribute a million leaflets42 and march 
from Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square.  Their resources allowed only a print run of 50,000 leaflets 
and they struggled to distribute even these and the demonstration attracted only 2,000 people.43  
In the Autumn of 1962, the emphasis of the campaign shifted focus to Brockway's Commons anti-
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discrimination bills44 with half-a-million signatures being collected in support of his 1962 bill45 
although this might have reflected the greater reach of the Jewish Board of Deputies which was 
also involved.46  Despite further plans little else was done before the 1964 election.47 
 
There has been a long history of black and Asian people organising in Britain.  In the interwar 
years, Harold Moody's48 League of Coloured People  had sought to speak for racial minorities in 
Britain and campaigned for racial equality in the 1930s but did not long survive its founder's death 
in 1947.49  In most cases such organisations offered little to new immigrants.  The discrimination 
and marginalisation that they faced led to the establishment of community based organisations, 
which in the first instance tended to be localised and oriented to self help.  From 1958 there was a 
burgeoning of local political organisations such as the Notting Hill based Coloured People's 
Progressive Organisation.50  In the same year the West Indian Federation's office in London helped 
establish the West Indian Standing Conference to provide some national leadership for Caribbean 
immigrants.  None of these had an impact on national politics in this period.51 
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2.1.2: Development of policy in the Labour Party. 
From the very earliest days of mass immigration in 1948 some in the Civil Service had recognised 
the extent of discrimination, believing legislation should be considered for housing and discussion 
with the TUC for employment.  The idea received scant support from ministers in Clement 
Attlee's52 government.53  Beyond government, the Labour Party first started to formulate anti-
discrimination policy in 1949 with an NEC paper by the pioneering academic Kenneth Little (who 
ran the academic programme on race relations in the UK),54 although at this stage he rejected 
legislation as impracticable and undesirable.55  There was support for legislation on Labour's 
backbenches from where Reg Sorensen56 introduced his 1950 Colour Bar Bill which sought to 
create a summary criminal offence of racial discrimination in hotels, eateries and places of 
entertainment with a fine of £5 for the first and £25 for subsequent offences.57  It progressed no 
further than a first reading since the Labour government, not wishing the embarrassment of 
calling for a vote against it, ensured the bill received no more time.58 
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The Labour Party did not consider the issue again until 1954 when Labour's NEC Commonwealth 
Sub-committee considered papers from Little and the Labour MP and former Solicitor General, Sir 
Lynn Ungoed-Thomas.59  Little reversed his previous opposition to anti-discrimination legislation 
although what he suggested was legislation with only declaratory effect.  He reasoned that since 
most discrimination was by private individuals criminal sanctions were needed with the goal of 
'stirring the national conscience and of creating a new standard of public behaviour in relation to 
coloured people.'  Ungoed-Thomas rejected this approach as unfocused, arguing that immigrants 
needed enforceable individual redress if they were to feel that they were equal citizens, implying 
legislation with limited but enforceable scope.  Labour's NEC Commonwealth Sub-committee took 
Little's declaratory line.60  More focused policy would have been difficult to develop since the TUC 
were unwilling to discuss employment, and claimed that any problems of discrimination were 
being solved by immigrant workers joining unions,61 a position which blocked Labour Party 
developing policy on discrimination in employment for the next thirteen years. 
 
With an election looming, the issue was considered again in 1955 by John Hatch62 in the Labour 
Party's research department.  Hatch argued for a cautious approach including negotiations with 
the Jamaican government (which had commissioned a report on discrimination against its émigrés 
to the UK) on lessening racialism, talks with the TUC (they declined again) and a conference of 
local authorities and representatives of immigrants to discuss their problems (which appears not 
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to have been called).63  Although the issue was absent from the party's 1955 manifesto,64 Hatch's 
paper was circulated to candidates as speakers' notes on the issue.65  After the election the NEC 
planned a pamphlet, A Multi-racial Society,66 but there were insufficient resources to produce it.  
When Brockway announced his 1956 Private Members' Bill (the bill was similar to Sorensen's 1950 
bill but also covered employment) the NEC Commonwealth Sub-committee did no more than note 
it.67  Thus, without any countervailing pressure from the Labour Party, union leaders met with the 
Ministry of Labour and agreed to oppose the bill's provisions against racial discrimination in 
employment.68  As a contentious Ten Minute Rule Bill it made little parliamentary progress.  
Brockway's second, 1957, bill was also short-lived.69 
 
Labour's Assistant Commonwealth Officer, Eric Whittle,70 produced a research paper in 1957 
highlighting discrimination in housing and employment.  Whittle developed a policy based on 
American institutions promoting civil rights, particularly the New York State Commission Against 
Discrimination,71 created in 1945 as an administrative agency to enforce civil legislation against 
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discrimination in employment.72  In opposition to this, Hatch reasserted his limited proposals of 
only outlawing discrimination in public places73 and it was this which formed the basis of the final 
policy paper in 1958,74 issued after the Notting Hill riots as a policy statement by the party's NEC.75  
Brockway's bills continued on the 1956 template through 1958 and 1959.76  The unwillingness of 
the TUC to engage in any dialogue led to Brockway's sixth, 1960 bill being shorn of its employment 
clause,77 while his seventh included a new clause outlawing incitement to racial hatred.78  
Although a figure of standing in the party would occasionally publicly back Brockway, the 
parliamentary leadership remained neutral79 until 1962 when, for the first time, members of the 
front bench were allowed to support Brockway's bill.80 
 
The Labour Party's opposition to the Conservatives' 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (see 
chapter 3) led them to refocus on developing a positive policy on prejudice and discrimination.  
Labour's NEC Home Policy Sub-committee meeting of April 1962 adopted a policy based on 
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Whittle's 1958 proposals for comprehensive anti-discrimination measures81 and called on the 
Conservative government to outlaw incitement to racial hatred and discrimination.82  From 
becoming Labour's leader in early 1963, Harold Wilson83 was to prove to be sympathetic to 
legislation with a wider scope than just public places, and when he took over the leadership of the 
party there was more progress towards the party accepting comprehensive legislation.  As 
Brockway's ninth and final bill was sucked into the parliamentary quagmire in February 1964,84 
Harold Wilson promised that a Labour government would take over the bill with only 'minor 
amendment'.85  Tony Benn86 reported that Wilson had been convinced of the need for legislation 
after a community boycott of buses in Bristol after white workers blocked the recruitment of a 
black conductor the previous year.87 
 
The promise of legislation led to a much greater focus on what form it might take.  Reflecting the 
view of Labour's home affairs spokesperson, Soskice, who was noncommittal on legislation, two 
academic pro-legislation lawyers, Cedric Thornberry and Andrew Martin,88 prepared a draft bill 
limited to creating a new criminal offence of racial hatred and anti-discrimination measures only 
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applying to public places with prosecution resting with the Attorney General.89  This attenuated 
proposal was included in Labour's manifesto.90 
* 
Both Labour and Conservative governments had seen mass immigration from its earliest years as a 
problem.  Their considerations of this had been kept firmly behind closed doors where the need 
for good Commonwealth relations did not allow them to solve their perceived problems with 
immigration controls.  Neither Labour nor Conservative governments gave much thought to either 
the welfare of immigrants or measures to lessen racial prejudice and discrimination.  The Labour 
Party beyond the government and, after 1951, the opposition front bench, had a more positive 
attitude.  Following the Notting Hill riots of 1958 there was a divergence between the 
Conservative government, which moved towards controlling immigration, and the Labour 
opposition, which was willing to consider measures to combat discrimination. 
 
There was conflict within the Labour Party over how racial equality should be promoted.  This was 
not simply between those who were concerned about the electoral implications of being seen to 
be pro-immigration, but was tied up with other issues.  First, those who were more cautious 
tended to favour declaratory legislation which would make some forms of discrimination a 
criminal offence but mainly as a statement of public policy.  Against this, the position favoured by 
Whittle was that there should be meaningful and swift redress of the kind that would be supplied 
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by administrative agencies and civil law.  Second, the more cautious line was to outlaw only those 
forms of discrimination that were already in the public sphere.  In his 1954 paper Kenneth Little 
was clear that legislation should relate only to what was public, but it was hoped that such 
declaratory legislation would carry all before it.  The more radical approach suggested by Whittle 
would push the state into what were previously considered private relationships with an 
administrative agency acting free from political control and armed with civil powers.  In both cases 
the Labour Party leadership tended to the more cautious line.  Unsurprisingly, for an initial move, 
both policies were confined to negative measures of equality, focusing on removing barriers to 
access.  Thus Labour came into power with only a weak programme of measures.  Those who were 
more concerned about the future shape of society looked for civil measures to drive changes 
further into the private sphere, examining forms of market-based interactions in employment and 
housing.  These reformers still needed to win the party to their position. 
 
2.2: Labour in power: Soskice and the first Race Relations Act 1965-
1966. 
Those who believed that caution needed to be exercised on issues of race only had their views 
strengthened by the defeat of Labour Foreign Secretary presumptive, Patrick Gordon Walker,91 in 
his Smethwick seat in the 1964 general election.92 This came after a long campaign by local 
Conservatives focusing on his alleged culpability for mass immigration led by their leader on the 
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local council, Peter Griffiths,93 who went on to become the Conservative candidate.94  This was 
encapsulated in the slogan 'If you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour' which was used as 
early as March 1964 with Griffiths' tacit support.95  The tensions that underlay the Smethwick vote 
were not unique although Labour did not suffer damage beyond Smethwick.96  
 
Some on the right of the party, including the new Home Secretary, Soskice, believed Smethwick 
showed that the party should act to neutralise the perception that they favoured uncontrolled 
immigration.97  Wilson did not show such caution when in the Queen's Speech debate he branded 
Griffiths a 'parliamentary leper'.98  Nonetheless, Wilson did go on to show more regard to illiberal 
public opinion when he drove a three-pronged approach consisting of immigration control, the 
integration of the immigrants (considered in the next chapter) and anti-discrimination measures of 
the more cautious type. 
 
2.2.1: The' package deal'. 
There was a pressing need for policy to create greater racial equality and to reduce the tensions 
that were expressed in the racism seen in Smethwick, but Soskice was very cautious in his 
approach.  He should have been a colourful politician.  His father, a Russian Menshevik, fled from 
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the October Revolution; Soskice worked for the Special Operations Executive in the Second World 
War;99 and he was a descendent of the painter Ford Maddox Brown.  That he was a lawyer 
specialising in hire purchase agreements paints a drabber, but more accurate, picture.  Although 
loyal to Gaitskell, he was no revisionist, but was, as Tony Benn recorded in 1965, 'impossibly 
reactionary'.100  In February 1965 the New Statesman labelled Soskice the most unpopular man in 
government whose chronic indecision was exacerbated by his 'tendency to express himself at 
length'.101 
 
Although in November 1964 Soskice told the Commons there would be anti-discrimination 
legislation,102 in Whitehall he sought to meet what he perceived as the demands of post-
Smethwick public opinion by limiting immigration.  Soskice thought any positive moves 'would 
only tend to provoke indignation and resistance' and thus anti-discrimination measures should be 
narrow.103  A Home Office official committee took its lead from Soskice, reporting that law was the 
wrong instrument to educate public opinion, and minorities might take advantage of it.  Thus, they 
suggested, the law should be limited, and perhaps avoided altogether, since it would open up 
pressure for greater measures into areas that the officials viewed as those of private morality.104 
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The Labour leadership took no peremptory action on immigration and, in line with their policy 
since 1962, Cabinet agreed to seek bilateral agreements with Commonwealth states in November 
1964.105  The following January Soskice complained to the Prime Minister that this would be too 
time consuming, instead proposing a 'package deal' combining greater immigration controls with 
measures 'to integrate the coloured immigrants in a genuine sense into the community as first and 
not second-class citizens'106 although he never advanced any integrationist policies.  Wilson 
refused to be rushed107 and pushed the policy back to the Cabinet's Commonwealth Immigration 
Committee (CIC), which demanded of Soskice some firm anti-discrimination proposals and 
measures to help local authorities.108  Soskice brought forward only the existing limited Labour 
Party proposals, a criminal offence of discrimination in places of public resort, and equally 
moderate proposals on written incitement to racial hatred.109  The Cabinet discussed whether 
housing should be included and there was some unsuccessful pressure for action on 
employment.110  It was agreed that the bill would be announced in conjunction with the 
Commonwealth mission,111 although by this time Wilson was already formulating his own plans for 
a fuller package of measures.112 
 
                                                     
105
 TNA: PRO CAB128/39, CC(64)6(3), 5/11/1964. 
106
 TNA: PRO CAB21/5290, Cabinet Office Memo , 5/1/1965. 
107
 TNA: PRO PREM13/382, Minute of meeting between Home Secretary and Wilson [c 4/1/1965]. 
108
 TNA: PRO CAB134/1504, CI(65)1st, 6/1/1965. 
109
 TNA: PRO HO325/165 [draft] Memo for the Home Affairs committee, [c.9/2/1965]; PREM13/2314, 
Soskice to Wilson, 19/3/1965. 
110
 See section 2.3.2. 
111
 TNA: PRO CAB128/39, CC(65)11(5), 22/2/1965. 
112
 TNA: PRO PREM13/382, Mitchell to Lord President, 8/2/1965. 
56 
 
Law based on criminal sanctions and with limited scope would have been a statement of the 
governments' disapproval of discrimination, but would otherwise have been ineffective.  That this 
was not the Act that was passed was due to campaigners outside of government.  Lester and 
Thornberry were working through the Society of Labour Lawyers (SLL), arguing that housing and 
employment were the most pernicious forms of discrimination, but not ones that would be 
effectively tackled with criminal sanctions.  Instead, looking to North American institutions, they 
proposed a Citizen's Council with investigatory power, the right to subpoena witnesses and to use 
civil sanctions to aid enforcement.  Such a council would also promote women's equality in a wider 
scheme of equal treatment that would apply to all.113  Such a unitary equality framework was not 
enacted until the passing of the 2010 Equality Act.114 
 
Having sent his proposals to the uninterested Soskice,115 Lester took the opportunity of hitching 
his proposals to the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD).  CARD had been founded in 
December 1964 by Marian Glean116 who was involved in the Quakers' race discrimination 
committee but sought a more politically engaged body.  She had set up a meeting with Martin 
Luther King,117 who was passing through London to collect his Nobel Peace Prize, attended by 
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thirty interested activists.  Out of this, CARD was born.  Lester established a legal sub-committee 
which accepted his proposals in February 1965.118 
 
CARD's formation coincided with developments in the machinery of government.  There is no 
paper trail showing that they were linked, but circumstantial evidence suggests considerable 
choreography.  The reform centred on the creation of a junior ministerial post to promote the 
integration of immigrants and a ministerial committee CIC (IN).  The post was filled by Maurice 
Foley,119 a Labour revisionist who had won a 1963 by-election in the Midlands seat of West 
Bromwich running on a platform opposing the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.  In 1965 
Foley was already a minister in the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) and, concurrently with 
CARD's formation, he submitted a memorandum to the CIC on the integration of immigrants.120  
This found itself under Wilson's nose surprisingly quickly for a memorandum from a junior minister 
and Wilson wrote to Soskice commending Foley's proposals to him.121  Two weeks later Clem 
Leslie,122 who had retired as head of the Treasury Information Service in 1959 and was involved in 
the Institute of Race Relations, wrote to Wilson's Principal Private Secretary, Derek Mitchell,123 
suggesting the appointment of a 'dynamic minister' to deal with the needs of immigrants.124  
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Mitchell recommended Leslie's letter to Herbert Bowden,125 the Lord President of Council, 
presumably on Wilson's instruction, suggesting Foley for such a post.  Foley was appointed but 
remained in the DEA and was viewed with disdain from the Home Office.126  Soskice was keen to 
avoid 'any potentially embarrassing suggestion that he [Soskice] was the minister responsible for 
the broad subject of integration' but tolerated Foley so long as he was outside his bailiwick.127  In 
early March Wilson announced in the Commons that there would be a Race Relations Bill to tackle 
discrimination, a mission to the Commonwealth to consult on immigration and Foley's new 
ministerial brief for integrating immigrants.128  Wilson's retrospective judgement that he restarted 
the stalled process forming integrative policy without any new limitations on immigration129 
appears to have some truth in it. 
 
The anti-discrimination legislation under consideration by the Home Office not only excluded the 
key areas of employment and housing but relied on criminal sanctions.  This was a problem, Lester 
argued, since the onus of proof would be too high, the authorities unwilling to prosecute and 
juries unlikely to convict.  In early March he proposed, through CARD, a statutory commission with 
power to investigate and conciliate complaints backed up with quasi-judicial hearings with 
subpoena power and courts enforcing the rulings, with the commission also having an educative 
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function.130  Initially, the SLL did not accept Lester's proposals, thinking that the grand gesture of a 
criminal offence would carry all before it, but reversed its position on the day that the Race 
Relations Bill was published in April 1965.  This shift appears to have been eased by the desire to 
shoot the Conservatives' fox after they had announced their backing for conciliation131 (as Lester's 
package of proposals were often, somewhat inaccurately, summarised).  The SLL duly released 
their support for Lester's proposals to the press, which  highlighted the inadequacies of Soskice's 
bill132 that had been published earlier in April.133 
 
Within government it was not plain sailing for Lester's proposals.  The Lord Chancellor, Gerald 
Gardiner,134 was opposed to a commission having quasi-judicial powers and remained happier 
with the certainties of the criminal law.  Unsurprisingly, the civil law approach had Foley's support 
but in line with Gardiner's wishes135 Foley proposed to Soskice a statutory commission without 
quasi-judicial powers.  Soskice turned the proposal into a mess of secondary problems, but was 
leaning towards legislation that would contain neither meaningful powers nor create accessible 
civil channels of redress.136  CARD, on the other hand, pressed one clear demand, a conciliation 
commission with civil powers.  A press release threatened that if criminal sanctions remained in a 
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bill limited in scope they might oppose it,137 important since Labour's slim majority meant a 
handful of rebels would sink the measure.  The Prime Minister stepped in, and a few days before 
the second reading met with Soskice and instructed him to legislate for a conciliation 
commission.138  At the second reading Soskice announced his willingness to revisit the idea of 
conciliation for the anti-discrimination measures in the bill, although he stressed that he remained 
unconvinced that this would work.  The Labour rebels thus placated, the bill passed its second 
reading.139 
 
In mid-May Soskice brought an amended bill to the CIC allowing for the creation of a national Race 
Relations Board (RRB) which would establish local conciliation committees and seek agreed 
settlement in accordance with anti-discrimination measures in the Act.  The bill also contained 
incitement to racial violence provisions which remained criminal with the decision to prosecute in 
the hands of the Attorney General.  The powers proposed in the bill for what happened if 
conciliation did not succeed were weak.  The case would be referred to the Attorney General who 
alone could instigate court action and then only if the respondent was engaged in a 'course of 
conduct' likely to continue and being in the public interest for the case going to court.  Thus, there 
was no legal route for offering an individual redress of grievance.140  The Cabinet maintained that 
the measures should only apply to 'places of public resort' and resisted pressures for housing and 
employment to be included.  It was accepted that with council housing the principle of local 
democracy was paramount, it being 'objectionable in principle and unacceptable to local 
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authorities that non-elected bodies should be empowered to override the decisions of elected 
councils in the selection of council tenants.'  In employment it was claimed that existing 
administrative measures used by Labour Exchanges sufficed.141  The amended bill became the 
Race Relations Act in July 1965.  One sympathetic journalist saw the new Act as, 'a somewhat 
faltering step in the right direction, at least it's going about the wrong things in the right way.'142 
* 
To summarise: the path Soskice originally proposed was one based on criminal sanctions that were 
likely to have been declaratory but ineffective.  Worse, it would have been a dead-end in that it 
would not have created a structure that was amendable.  The reformers chose to attack only the 
nature of the powers, not their limitation to places of public resort.  This made sense since it 
created a framework that could be extended to issues that were at that stage considered beyond 
the reach of the central state, housing and employment. 
 
Civil law created a natural bridge for bringing the private into the public sphere.  Civil torts already 
contained the idea that although the state did not dictate the standards of personal conduct, if 
one individual's action led to a loss by another private individual, the wronged party had the right 
to claim damages.  Beyond creating a framework of civil law, the 1965 Act created the RRB, a state 
body given administrative powers to use these civil laws (which thus were really not civil laws in 
the hands of private individuals, but administrative laws in the hands of a state body).  This was 
the prototype agency of the equality state in Britain, the germ of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission.  The reforms in themselves were inadequate both in terms of their scope and the 
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mechanism of enforcement but they created a framework centred on the RRB that could be both a 
catalyst for further reform and the framework for it. 
 
The importance of these foundations would only become clear after 23rd December 1965 when 
Soskice was at last relieved of his duties at the Home Office by a Prime Minister who had long 
since seen him as part of the problem, not part of the solution.143  His replacement, Roy Jenkins, 
was no more a socialist than Soskice, but a much more complete liberal. 
 
2.3: Making the second Race Relations Act, 1966-1968. 
2.3.1: Roy Jenkins at the Home Office. 
Professor Harry Street144 was not alone in his belief that Soskice had damaged the liberal fabric of 
the Home Office and hoped that Roy Jenkins would restore it.145  It was clear the 1965 Race 
Relations Act was ineffective, as one early case showed.  The complaint was against Peter 
Buchanan,146 who had bought a Great Yarmouth hotel with the royalties from writing the lyrics to 
My Old Man's a Dustman.  He refused to honour a booking when he discovered his putative guest 
was black.  Buchanan declined to co-operate with the investigation and the Attorney General 
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decided not to allow the case to go to court for lack of evidence, not even being able to establish if 
the hotel was a place of public resort under the law.147 
 
The first stage in addressing the weakness of the law was to make the Home Office the 
department for dealing with racial equality by transferring Foley and his staff there.  Additionally, 
the RRB, which had been legislated for in the 1965 Race Relations Act but not yet established, was 
to become an important adjunct of the Home Office machinery on race.  When Jenkins came to 
office, the two members of the national board had been appointed.  The selection of Learie 
Constantine was an indication of a desire to fight for minority rights.  He had qualified as a 
barrister after the war and had taken up the case of Guy Baker, the refusal of whose application to 
be bus driver was the cause of the 1963 Bristol bus boycott.148  The other appointment, a 
Manchester Conservative councillor, Bernard Langton,149 appears to have been more for political 
balance than any skills he brought to the role.  The chair had not been appointed.  The Home 
Office was considering an appointment of a type that might suggest a worthy but low key 
committee; a suitable bishop was sought but none could be found.150  Jenkins wished to find 
someone who would use the post politically and appointed his Balliol friend Mark Bonham 
Carter,151 Asquith's grandson and a former Liberal MP.152  Bonham Carter only accepted the 
position on the explicit understanding that he should be allowed to campaign for extended 
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legislation.153  He established a larger and more professionalised organisation than had been 
planned, opposed his post being part-time, brushed aside civil service claims that he would be a 
figurehead role for some time, and rejected the appointment of a 59 year-old principal to be the 
lead civil servant, demanding a younger appointee wishing to make their name.154 
 
Lester wrote to Jenkins soon after his appointment as Home Secretary describing the 1965 Race 
Relations Act as 'a shoddy job'.  Lester encouraged Jenkins to draw a line under immigration 
control and focus on integration: 'the future of race relations in Britain depends not on what 
happens at the airport, but on how we treat people who are already here.'  'You cannot make a 
"We shall overcome" speech,' he also advised, referring to President Johnson's speech to the US 
Congress of March 1965, 'until the Ministers of Labour and Housing allow the necessary policy 
changes to be made.  LBJ's speech was, after all, a promise of imminent civil rights legislation.'  
Thus, the main task was to win round other government departments.155 
 
The memory of Smethwick in 1964 meant that any open commitment to changing legislation had 
to wait until the next general election, which was held in March 1966.  This not only provided 
Labour with a much more comfortable majority but the issue of race did not re-emerge.  Andrew 
Faulds156 regained Smethwick for Labour and Gordon Walker at last won Leyton (which he had 
stood for and lost in a by-election in January 1965).157  The campaign for legislation shifted up a 
gear, two weeks after the general election when Bonham Carter agreed with the National 
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Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI) that they should pool their efforts with the RRB 
to seek amendment of the 1965 Act with an independent research project showing the extent of 
discrimination.158  Foley told the NCCI in late May that the sole reason for research was to pressure 
for new legislation and thus it must be carried out by an independent research body, specifically 
Political Economic Planning (PEP), and funded externally.159  When the research project was 
announced, Tribune commented, 'when the results of this survey are known, pressure on the 
Government to amend the Act, already mounting, will reach a crescendo of discontent.'160 
 
The RRB and NCCI agreed to collaborate on another report into the form that the legislation would 
take.  Again, this was an independent committee but one carefully chosen.  It was chaired by 
Professor Harry Street who thought the government's 1965 White Paper Immigration from the 
Commonwealth (discussed in chapter 3) was grotesquely illiberal in its tightening of immigration 
controls and favoured the strongest possible anti-discrimination legislation.161  The other two 
members were lawyers, Geoffrey Bindman,  legal adviser to the RRB, and Geoffrey Howe,162 who 
had then briefly been a Conservative MP and was involved in the Conservative Bow Group which 
was liberal on social issues and supportive of anti-discrimination legislation.163 
 
For Lester the object of the campaign was not so much to change public opinion or build a political 
consensus but to overcome the obstacles within government, particularly the Ministry of Labour 
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which in conjunction with the TUC opposed anti-discrimination legislation in employment.  The 
government's own record as an employer was no model of inclusivity.  In the summer of 1966 
Foley started to investigate the employment of minorities in the Civil Service and nationalised 
industries and serious problems were uncovered including in the Royal Mint164 and the military.165  
There was, in effect, a colour bar in the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Technology and the Atomic 
Energy Authority.  This was argued for on security grounds, an unsigned memo explaining the lack 
of minorities in many areas, there being: 
special difficulties about the employment of coloured staff in the defence departments 
because of the difficulty of making appropriate vetting enquiries; the risk of dual loyalties; the 
risk that, as members of minority groups subjected to racial tensions, they may be open to 
pressure from those who would subvert them.
166
 
Thus to be white was a prerequisite for loyalty.  The Treasury favoured a tokenistic recruitment of 
'half a dozen thoroughly reliable coloured people' to show that there was no bar,167 although there 
is no evidence that even this was pursued. 
 
The campaign for legislation continued in the run up to the publication of the PEP report in April 
1967.  In December 1966 Maurice Orbach moved a Lester-drafted168 Ten Minute Rule Bill to 
extend the 1965 Act to housing and employment.  This was an inside job, Foley having told Orbach 
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a few months previously to co-ordinate his action with the NCCI and other reformers.169  Foley had 
been publicly committing to legislation since September 1966 when he had told a NCCI conference 
that the 1965 Race Relations Act was not adequate and that pressure was building for change.170  
In Parliament he responded to Orbach's bill by promising that if the PEP showed the need, the 
government would consider legislation.171 
 
There were reports that resistance inside government was widespread,172 a view supported by 
David Ennals173 (who had replaced Foley as Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office in early 
1967174) but little evidence in government papers can be found to support this view.  The Ministry 
of Labour was clearly opposed to anti-discrimination legislation being extended to employment 
(see section 2.4 below) but there was little active opposition beyond that.  Before the 1966 
election the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) under Richard Crossman,175 who 
as a Midlands MP took a cautious approach to race especially in relation to housing,176 adopted 
the position that there was no firm evidence of the need for legislation.177  When Anthony 
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Greenwood178 took over the portfolio in August 1966, and particularly with the clear evidence in 
the PEP report published the following year, the MHLG became more co-operative.179  The 
Department of Education and Science had a positive attitude (see chapter 3) while most other 
departments simply did not have the needs of immigrants on their radar. 
 
Within Whitehall, in January 1967 Jenkins started to prepare the path for new legislation 
outlawing discrimination in employment, housing and the provision of goods and services by 
establishing formal consultations with the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Labour and the MHLG.180  
Now the Ministry of Labour was joined by the law officers in questioning the scope of the bill.  The 
Lord Chancellor's Department argued in terms of there being a private sphere into which the law 
could not venture.  They held that there could be no power to act in relation to private sales or 
estate agents acting under instruction, and in rentals, the law should only apply to self-contained 
units.  The law officers were unhappy about blending civil powers with a state agency as suggested 
by the Street Report (which was with the Home Office but not published until November 1967181) 
proposing to give the RRB the power to subpoena witnesses and seek interim injunctions to cease 
discrimination.182 
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The publication of the PEP report in April 1967 was preceded by entrées.  Two days earlier CARD 
reported a wide variety of examples of discrimination183 and the day after that a pamphlet was 
released by the Bow Group which supported the case for extending legislation.184  The day after 
the report's publication David Winnick185 presented 100 signatures from his fellow Labour MPs 
calling for new legislation.186  The report itself was an unequivocal case for legislation. It outlined 
the extent of discrimination in housing, employment and financial services in dispassionate but 
clear terms.  The detail of the extent of discrimination was shocking187 and the press response was 
everything that could be hoped for.188 
 
Jenkins took the last piece of the jigsaw, the still unpublished Street Report, to the July 1967 
meeting of the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee (HAC) seeking to commit it, and thus the 
Cabinet, to legislation.  Although the HAC was enthusiastic, there remained three areas of 
reservation.  First, the Treasury did not wish the Crown to be bound; second, the law officers 
maintained, despite the Street Report, their opposition to the RRB having quasi-judicial powers; 
and last, the Ministry of Labour was unhappy with the anti-discrimination measures in 
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employment.189  Thus, although in July 1967 Jenkins was able to announce to the Commons that a 
bill covering employment, housing and financial services would be brought forward,190 there was 
still uncertainty about how effective these measures would be. 
 
The official committee established to look at HAC's reservations was conservative in its approach, 
proposing that the decision to prosecute remain with the Attorney General, no extension of 
powers for the RRB and that damages be limited to provable loss.  Worse still for supporters of 
reform, it argued that only a course of conduct be actionable, which would have left no means for 
individual redress against discrimination.191  Jenkins returned to the Street Report in an attempt to 
batter down the opposition to the proposals within government.  He insisted to Elwyn Jones,192 
the Attorney General, that damages should be allowed, 'there would undoubtedly be pressure to 
include such provisions in the Bill.  Such pressure would be difficult to resist',193 although in reality 
the reformers knew the weakness of their position, there was no mass movement behind the 
demand for their reforms.  The reformers' case was that winning confidence of complainants 
required credible sanctions behind conciliation, which meant damages should be awardable.194   
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Although the reformers won that case for a single act being actionable and damages being 
extended to loss of opportunities and hurt feelings,195 the law officers proved less tractable on 
how the law would be enforced, believing the proposals conflated in the RRB the roles of 
investigator, prosecutor and judge.196  The reformers argued for a specialist body to judge the 
cases, one with intimate knowledge of discriminatory behaviour.197  Lester's solution was specialist 
tribunals which in the hands of the Home Office became the Race Relations Courts.  These ideas 
were reported back to the Lord Chancellor, who had 'taken against Street and all his works'198 and 
by mid-November proposed that the cases should be heard in county court sitting with two race 
relations specialists alongside the judge.199  By this stage, Jenkins had left the Home Office (he and 
James Callaghan200 swapped roles at the end of November 1967 after the devaluation of sterling 
earlier that month) and resistance to the law officers faded.  In January 1968 the Lord Chancellor's 
proposals for the RRB to have no power to enforce the law were accepted.201 
 
Up until November 1967 the opposition to the Crown being bound by the law was focused on the 
Treasury who argued the RRB should not investigate what the government did nor the courts 
regulate Crown employment, and offered to make an unenforceable undertaking to abide by the 
                                                     
195
 TNA: PRO HO 376/76, Weiler to Pile, 26/2/1968. 
196
 TNA: PRO HO376/74, Pile to Allen, 21/11/1967. 
197
 TNA: PRO HO376/72,Note of meeting, 21/9/1967. 
198
 TNA PRO HO376/74 Note of a meeting, 10/11/1967; Hornesby to Howard Drake, 11/11/1967; Pile: 
Briefing for a meeting with the Lord Chancellor, 22/11/1967. 
199
 TNA: PRO HO376/19, Note of meeting with Home Secretary, Attorney General and Officials on Race 
Relations, 13/11/1967. 
200
 1912-2005.  Labour MP, Cardiff S/Cardiff SE/ Cardiff S and Penrith (1945-1947).  Chancellor (1964-1967), 
Home Secretary (1967-1970). 
201
 TNA: PRO HO376/74, Minutes of meeting at the Home Office, 3/1/1968. 
72 
 
Act, which the Home Office rejected.  The Ministry of Defence took the same position, wishing to 
have 'quotas' for minorities, in reality a maxima of 3%,202 as did the Foreign Office, which claimed 
security grounds.203  The Treasury feared the 'wild men' of the RRB might undermine national 
security.204  Here at least, Jenkins becoming Chancellor had a positive effect, and he instructed 
that the objection to the Crown being bound be dropped, arguing that it would be impossible to 
sell the Race Relations Act to the public if the government did not take its own medicine.205  
Nonetheless, this was one of the few issues in the Race Relations Bill to be discussed in full 
Cabinet,206 where in January 1968 the Prime Minster agreed that the bill should be binding on the 
Crown.207 
 
2.3.2: Employment in 1968 Race Relations Bill. 
One area of anti-discrimination legislation that was particularly problematic was employment.  The 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) opposed legislation on the straightforward grounds of the 
cost to employers and worried particularly that it would cause problems in negotiating with the 
unions.208  The CBI had no deep-seated opposition to the legislation, and when pushed, accepted 
it.209  The trade unions' opposition to the bill was both more entrenched and, from the point of 
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view of a Labour government with its ideological and organisational relationship with the trade 
unions, more important to accommodate. 
 
The relationship of the trade unions to the Labour Party and Labour governments on the issue of 
legislation is part of a larger story of the changing trade movement in the 1950s and 1960s.  The 
TUC had, of course, been central in creating the Labour Party.  The renaming of the TUC 
Parliamentary Committee as the General Council in 1921210 and the settlement that saw Attlee 
become leader in 1935 created a settlement based on a division of labour between the industrial 
and political wings.  The unions let Labour governments govern.  In return the government 
guaranteed the unions could pursue the interests of their members through free collective 
bargaining in their relations with management, although from the 1950s this settlement was 
challenged by the revisionist right in the Labour Party,211 most notably leading to the abortive 
attempt to reform the trade unions by the Labour government with In Place of Strife in 1969.  
Lester's proposal on discrimination in employment challenged this settlement in its own small way 
too. 
 
If the revisionists were challenging this settlement from the right, it was also under attack from 
the left that was emerging in the unions from the mid-1950s.  Although this left started from a 
more militant attitude to action over pay and conditions and greater autonomy for local trade 
unionists to pursue these, it also led to the assertion of the trade unions' political demands in the 
Labour Party.  The traditional right had, since the stabilisation of the party's leadership under 
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Attlee, used its controlling vote at a Labour Party conference to support the leadership, but the 
new left felt no such constraint.  The left were willing to make political demands on Labour 
governments to further their interests.  This became most clear in the 1970s, but such an attitude 
was emerging in the 1960s.  The Communist Party (CP), which had been influential on the new 
generation of new left trade union leaders who had passed through its ranks, strongly supported 
racial equality (and equal pay for women), although there is no evidence of the CP ever using its 
trade union base to promote the issue in the unions.  The CP's influence may be surmised from the 
pro-equality sentiments coming from many local trades councils, where the CP was often 
influential. 
 
It was the traditional right that dominated the TUC in post-war years and this faction showed little 
interest in racial equality.  When in 1949 CWW Greenidge212 of the Anti-Slavery Society reported 
allegations of racial discrimination in the unions to the TUC, it was dismissed as a Liberal Party 
plot.213  The same year the TUC's annual Congress saw its first motion on racial discrimination.  
Arthur Deakin,214 traditional right-wing leader of the Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TGWU), denounced the motion as the 'Moscow policy line'.215  When Racial Unity was 
established, the TUC General Secretary, Victor Tewson,216 flatly refused to sponsor the 
campaign.217  A steady trickle of complaints of racism received by the TUC throughout the 1950s 
led to no action.  When Barry and District Trades Council wrote for advice on the local Labour 
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Exchange not sending black or Asian workers to a local company who operated a colour bar, the 
TUC suggested only contacting the shop stewards in the company.218  Similarly, Marjorie 
Nicholson219 (the TUC official responsible for race) made no response to complaints about a strike 
to exclude black workers at Glow Worm Boilers in Milford.220  Despite such correspondence being 
sufficient for there to be an office file marked 'colour bar',221 the TUC repeatedly claimed there 
were no problems of discrimination in employment.222 
 
The reason for this lack of concern over discrimination was that by the early 1950s the TUC had 
come to view immigration as a threat to workers' pay and conditions.  A 1954 motion from the 
Ministry of Labour Staff Association was overtly negative about the impact of immigration on 
industry.223  Although the motion was withdrawn at the behest of the General Council, they 
accepted the motion's gist and asked the government to introduce controls on immigration to 
maintain full employment.  This was only slightly mitigated by their making it clear that this was all 
immigration, not just black and Asian.224  Unsurprisingly, the TUC only grudgingly backed Labour's 
opposition to the 1961 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill225 with a statement that accepted both the 
need for control and that immigrants caused social problems.226 
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The TUC's attitude to black and Asian people as established members of the workforce became 
more sympathetic through the 1950s.  In 1955, Congress passed a motion without debate 
opposing racial discrimination, urging that the TUC 'give special attention to the problems 
emerging in this country from the influx of fellow workers of other races with a view to removing 
causes of friction and preventing exploitation'.227  Later in 1955 the health workers' union COSHE 
wrote to the TUC asking their advice, complaining, 'we are importing coloured nurses', leading to, 
'the possibility of these coloured nurses being promoted to senior rank, when they could have 
charge of our own people.'  The TUC were forthright that this was an unacceptable attitude, 
replying to COSHE that the nurses 'have won promotion by their personal merits and labours, and 
... have overcome the additional handicap of colour prejudice', and thus, 'should be accepted 
equally with white nurses and should be accorded the same respect and receive the same 
conditions of employment.'228  Nonetheless, discrimination continued to be practised by some 
smaller and craft unions.  While larger unions did not condone colour bars, many branches 
continued to operate them.  As late as 1966, National Union of Railwaymen members at Euston, 
where the existing workforce had won particularly favourable working practices, refused to accept 
black guards.229 
 
As outlined above, the TUC refused to discuss racial discrimination with the Labour Party from 
1954, arguing that there was no problem.  There was clear evidence that such discrimination 
existed.  For example, in 1955 there was a strike by West Bromwich bus crews belonging to the 
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TGWU against the employment of an Asian bus conductor.  The TUC continued to assert that there 
was no racism in the trade union movement230 and the need for free collective bargaining in all 
areas of industrial relations.231  The TUC's thinking was again demonstrated by their response to 
the Notting Hill riots which immediately preceded the 1958 Congress.  A General Council 
statement condemned discrimination and prejudice but suggested only assimilation as a 
remedy.232  Even this was undermined by Tewson in his General Secretary's address which 
suggested the statement was 'an assurance of our interest and deep concern in this matter to our 
brothers in ... overseas territories'.  He identified the problem not as discrimination and racist 
attacks but of 'exploitation of the coloured people by their own folks.'233 
 
The MCF attempted to win the TUC to a more liberal position, but with little success.  The MCF's 
trade union committee was chaired by the union leader and Labour MP Bob Edwards234 who 
moved a motion at the 1959 Congress supporting legislation and calling for prejudice to be tackled 
through education and the media.  The debate showed no detailed knowledge of discrimination, 
focusing on Africa, anti-Semitism in the 1900s and an inter-racial friendship evening hosted by 
Birmingham Trades Council235 but the motion was passed.  The TUC acted on the education 
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elements of the motion, writing to the broadcasters236 but ignored the commitment to legislation 
by continuing to boycott the Labour Party's efforts to draft anti-discrimination proposals. 
 
The TUC maintained its position of not discussing racial equality in employment until Labour won 
power in 1964.  They were now joined in their obduracy by the new Minister of Labour, Ray 
Gunter,237 who had a background on the traditional right of the trade union movement and was 
one of those in Cabinet who unreservedly shared Soskice's views of the pressing need to placate 
Labour's white working class electorate.  In February 1965 it was proposed at the CIC that the TUC 
be asked for a statement on those trade unions refusing to admit recent immigrants, but even this 
move was blocked by Gunter.  His view was that patience was the best policy, 'in time, personal 
contacts with immigrants, at school or elsewhere, should lead to a different attitude [on the shop 
floor]; in the meantime it was an educational problem needing a local solution.'238  Thus, the 1965 
Race Relations Bill proceeded with no provision on employment. 
 
As a result there was pressure to include some administrative measures in the 1965 White Paper 
Immigration from the Commonwealth.  Gunter's policy remained that minorities would have to 
wait for their white hosts to accept them, and this was manifested in his claim to the 'growing 
success' of the ministry's Labour Exchanges in dealing with discrimination.  Since 1962 Labour 
Exchanges had outlawed the letters 'NCP' being written on vacancy cards, warning staff that an 
employer would accept 'no coloured people'.  Exchanges were allowed to stop advertising posts 
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where the employer, after being warned, continued discriminating.  The weakness of this policy is 
demonstrated by the list produced in 1965 of the circumstances where discrimination was 
deemed acceptable, rendering the policy meaningless.  This list included: the attitudes of the 
union or customer; the employer's judgement that 'the class discriminated against have been 
employed and found unsuitable'; 'the work concerned calls for a high degree of skill or specialised 
knowledge which the employer believes that members of a particular race are unlikely to possess'; 
and the 'belief that a particular job is not suitable for a coloured person'.  The ministry did state 
that discrimination motivated 'simply by prejudice' was unacceptable239 although what might 
constitute this in the light of the foregoing list is unclear.  It took some pressure on the Ministry of 
Labour to produce anything new for the White Paper, and they eventually offered up an initiative 
for 'collaboration between managers and trade unionists, especially at local level, in developing 
mutual understanding between immigrants and the host community in the work place.'240  The 
employment section in the white paper was therefore slight, comprising only two vague 
paragraphs.241 
 
It was only when Jenkins became Home Secretary at the end of 1965 that there was pressure for 
anti-discrimination measures to be extended to employment, although the Ministry of Labour 
remained an unwilling partner.  In the summer of 1966 the Home Office proposed to Gunter that 
action was needed to create greater equality in access to employment, starting with a meeting 
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with the TUC.242  Gunter countered that the existing work of the Labour Exchanges was adequate 
and, 'unless we are faced with a growing and irresistible body of evidence to the contrary, it 
scarcely seems worthwhile at this stage to yield to the pressure for action which will be highly 
controversial and of doubtful practical value'.243 
 
Without a firm proposal from the Ministry of Labour, the Home Office had nothing to discuss with 
the TUC.  In late 1966 the NCCI kept the ball rolling by calling a conference on discrimination in 
employment which they believed was supported by the TUC's General Secretary, George 
Woodcock244 (who had taken over from Tewson in 1960).245  With detail emerging of the 
conference agenda focusing on the use of anti-discrimination legislation internationally, the TUC 
staff realised that they might be put under pressure in public246 and Woodcock withdrew his 
support.  The TUC declared they would be sending no delegates247 before realising that this too 
might create bad publicity and so sent two General Council members,248 Sir Fred Hayday249 and 
George Smith.250 
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Nicholson briefed Smith to adopt an assimilationist line at the conference, that immigrants must 
observe 'a measure of conformity' in industry, while condoning discrimination in declining 
industries, where 'no-one can now expect that new entrants will be received without question'.251  
Woodcock offered contrary advice to Smith not to burn bridges pre-emptively and to confine 
himself to neutral comments about the extent of discrimination being unknown while resisting any 
firm conclusions.252  Smith, however, was part of the wave of more left wing trade union leaders.  
Although he had left the Communist Party before becoming the General Secretary of the 
Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, was still on the left.253  He was emerging as one of the 
voices in the TUC willing to consider that discrimination was real and legislation necessary, 
although he was often hesitant and fumbling in this.  At the NCCI conference he accepted that 
discriminatory behaviour existed among trade unionists at shop floor level and refused to rule out 
anti-discrimination legislation on principle.254  Although the unions were savaged in the press for 
their uncooperative attitude255 the NCCI's plans for a follow-up conference were scrapped after 
TUC opposition.256 
 
Jenkins had sought to use the Labour NEC policy-making process as another source of pressure on 
the TUC from his earliest days at the Home Office,257 but a working party was only established in 
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early 1967 under the maverick liberal-left Labour MP Tom Driberg.258 Its explicit purpose was to 
gain trade union support.259  For the first time the TUC agreed to discuss the issues inside the 
Labour Party with Nicholson and Smith representing the TUC alongside pro-legislation trade 
unionists.260  The working party emphasised the use of civil procedures on the North American 
model261 but Nicholson, unimpressed, countered that voluntary methods based on union-
management committees should be used.  To tackle discrimination on appointment, she proposed 
pre-entry closed shop agreements, although she knew that where such agreements existed they 
led to total exclusion of immigrants.262 
 
What lay behind Nicholson's views was that the benefits of trade union membership could not be 
given to everyone, rather they had to be earnt by loyalty to the labour movement. She told the 
committee, 'it is difficult to see why any special benefits should be accorded to persons who have 
not met their full obligations.'263  The working party was keen to find a compromise and agreed 
that union-management committees could be fitted into a legal framework but by June, Nicholson 
felt that the TUC was being bounced into an agreement and refused to sign the report.  Instead 
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she submitted a note of dissent, arguing that minorities should not have any special institutional 
arrangements since this would retard assimilation.264  By this stage the TUC's discussions with 
government had progressed to a point where Nicholson was out of line.  When she complained 
that her note of dissent was not appended to the final report, George Brown265 (as the Deputy 
Leader of the party) reported back to the NEC that he had spoken to the TUC at a high level and 
they did not want a minority report.266 
 
A further front of pressure on the TUC was applied with a RRB seminar in April 1967 with the 
members of the Street Committee and representatives of the NCCI.267  As the lead civil servant on 
race in the Home Office, Jack Howard Drake268, put it, this was 'designed as something of a 
propaganda exercise' directed at the participants, the TUC, CBI and Ministry of Labour.269  Through 
this a compromise was beginning to emerge, initially with Frank Cousins,270 the leader of the 
TGWU, and the Midlands industrialist Oscar Hahn271 proposing a system based on joint union-
management committees in each workplace.272  The TUC was willing to consider legislation if it 
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incorporated such voluntary machinery273 with special tribunals for areas not covered by 
workplace grievance procedures.274  Hayday suggested an orderly retreat at the April 1967 General 
Council, arguing that legislation on employment was now inevitable and all that they could do was 
to ensure that it was in a form acceptable to the TUC.275  Thus, the TUC formulated a proposal for 
a two stage process, a joint trade union-management system to be implemented first and, only if 
this failed, to be replaced by a statutory system.276 
 
This was unacceptable to Bonham Carter who supported the union-management system carrying 
out the first stage of a conciliation but insisted that this should be in a legal framework allowing 
oversight from, and appeals to, the RRB.277  He believed (accurately) that it would lead to more 
trade unionists taking an interest in anti-discrimination practice as had already proved the case 
with local conciliation committees, thus creating a societal force for reducing discrimination.278  
This movement towards acceptance of legislation by trade unions was strengthened by the 
conference of the country's biggest union, the TGWU, voting to support it in July 1967.  This was a 
surprise to Nicholson, who had to ask Michael Thomas of The Times' labour staff for details.279  As 
far as Jenkins was concerned, the battle with the TUC was over and on the morning of the 
announcement of legislation in Parliament in July 1967 Jenkins called on Woodcock with a fait 
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accompli that it would cover employment.  Woodcock acquiesced.280  The proposal for union-
management committees in a system overseen by the RRB was acceptable to the Ministry of 
Labour so long as the RRB had an employment committee with the appropriate corporatist 
character, which was encapsulated in the bill.281 
 
At the September 1967 TUC Congress two motions supporting legislation were debated.282  
Although the negotiations with government were moving into the details of legislation, the 
General Council did not want their hands tied283 and attempted, unsuccessfully, to persuade the 
movers to remit.284  In the ensuing debate the General Council members looked weak and 
complacent, Fred Hayday telling Congress, 'work began many years ago on the shop floor, as well 
as at higher levels, and the difficult situations resolved by common sense run into thousands', 
whereas using the law would 'separate people out from the work force, and our emphasis is upon 
integrating people within the work force'.  Supporters of legislation, for the first time, presented 
lucid arguments, a paper trail pointing to Bonham Carter's involvement.285  For the General 
Council, George Smith called for the composite to be remitted, and the Chair announced this had 
been done by acclamation,286 much to the chagrin of the movers who thought Congress had been 
denied the opportunity to vote on the motion by a bureaucratic manoeuvre.287 
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The TUC was sent a draft bill at the end of January 1968.288  Nicholson (along with the Head of the 
TUC international Department, John Hargreaves289) continued to oppose any legal framework, 
counterpoising the view that the unions should assimilate immigrants into a united working 
class,290 but for the leadership of the TUC it was enough that the government agreed that the 
voluntary machinery be used first, and that the RRB appeal panel be tripartite, with management 
and union nominees under the experienced independent chair,291 Roy Wilson.292  The April 1968 
General Council meeting accepted the bill, albeit with no enthusiasm.293  The TUC attempted to 
amend the bill in committee, but with Barbara Castle294 having taken over Gunter's portfolio (and 
the Ministry of Labour being absorbed into the new Department of Employment and Productivity 
(DEP)) just before the bill's second reading in April 1968, legal regulation now had a willing 
advocate.295 
 
There are a number of reasons why the TUC were opposed to legislation on discrimination in 
employment.  There were certainly some who were straight-forwardly racist.  For example in 1967 
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Bill Carron296 of the Amalgamated Engineering Union asked, 'how can the country afford what we 
are doing for those who are not British born and who are dipping their fingers into the social 
services?'297  Arguably, this represented what many others thought, but were too guarded to 
articulate.  Many other unions' leaderships, particularly those on the left, were more robustly anti-
racist.  Most notably, the TGWU had a leadership which was willing to confront racism in some of 
their own branches and were amongst the advocates of legislation.298  The most developed pro-
legislation position was that of Clive Jenkins299 of the white collar union the Association of 
Supervisory Staff, Executives and Technicians.  Jenkins was unusual in supporting legislation to 
outlaw racial discrimination in employment as part of his wider view that legislation strengthened 
the unions' position, rather than relying solely on free collective bargaining.300  The move to the 
left in the union leaderships signalled a shift away from this reliance and increased demands on 
the Labour Party to act more in concert with the trade unions in meeting their demands. 
 
The traditional right in the trade union movement continued to oppose anti-discrimination 
measures in employment.  At its most basic their fear was that newly arrived immigrants would 
undercut the pay and conditions of existing workers.  Thus the TUC did not wish to implement 
anti-discrimination measures since it would rule out what they viewed as the reasonable refusal to 
employ immigrants, and that, 'alleged cases of discrimination which might be attributed to colour, 
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race, ethnic or national origin may be due to many causes' such as, 'a legitimate desire to maintain 
hard-won standards'.301  Thus, equality could not simply be granted to immigrants, they had to be 
integrated. By integrated the TUC meant that they had to be members of unions and not undercut 
union rates.  For example, it was suggested in a TUC meeting in 1966 that, 'even when the unions 
were involved it might be impossible for them to regard immigrants as having full equal rights in 
employment with other members at least for a probationary period after their entry into industry.'  
Thus immigrants' rights were entirely secondary to those of the established workforce which had a 
right to 'protection against an unwanted influx of recent immigrants or aliens.'  This was only 
slightly leavened by the view that this was temporary since 'a man must not be regarded as an 
immigrant forever.'302 
 
As Miles and Phizacklea have suggested, this fear of immigrants undercutting pay and conditions 
led to the TUC's view that immigrants needed to be integrated into a united working class.  
Further to this, the rate of that integration was dictated, in the TUC's view, by the needs of the 
existing organised working class. 303  This was a demand that minorities take their place at the back 
of the queue.  This was also expressed in the TUC's trenchant opposition to any form of affirmative 
action for immigrants.  For example, when the DEP produced pamphlets introducing various 
aspects of employment in Britain to immigrants from the Indian sub-continent, the TUC 
questioned why they were not also issued in English for the benefit of the settled population.304  In 
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a similar vein the TUC representative on the Central Training Council opposed language classes for 
immigrants because they were not available to all.305 
 
The same thinking led the TUC to complain that it was not fair that minorities should be protected 
from unfair dismissal on the grounds of race since the rest of the workforce had no similar 
protection for non-racially motivated dismissal.306  To this was added the concern that if minorities 
were protected by non-union bodies they might look to these, not the labour movement, to 
advance their interests: 
As immigrants become settled and their children are born and grow up as part of the British 
population, their need for special services and machinery should wither away.  But racial 
distinctions will still continue, and if special machinery of legislative measures were established 
for a section of the community on the basis of race, these will be permanent and their mere 
existence will emphasise and perpetuate the distinctions between citizens.
307
 
The TUC also feared that 'there are some groups of immigrants who by reason of their own 
exclusiveness are in danger of setting themselves permanently apart'.308  Many immigrants were 
enthusiastic trade unionists, the India Workers' Association(s) actively recruited to trade unions.309  
Nonetheless, it was the dominant view in the TUC that ceasing to be an 'immigrant' and becoming 
an assimilated worker worthy of protection, 'could only be established over a period by securing 
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the acceptance of immigrants as members of unions and the industrial community on the basis of 
their full participation and absorption.'310 
 
Thus, two factors motivated the traditional right in the unions.  First, that it was the right of trade 
unions alone to represent the interest of workers in relation to their employment.  Second, the 
trade unions represented the existing working class, and immigrants could undermine those 
interests.  Immigrants only gained rights over time as they became assimilated members of a 
unitary working class.  The result was that the TUC opposed anyone else representing minorities, 
but would only represent them itself if they were assimilated members of a united working class.  
Ultimately, this was weakened by a shift to the left in unions such as the TGWU.  This led to a 
section of the leadership being more sympathetic to the idea of racial equality. 
 
2.3.3: The progress of the second Race Relations Bill after Jenkins. 
In November 1967 the Labour government devalued the pound.  This had no direct impact on anti-
discrimination legislation which, unlike equal pay for women (see chapter 4), implied no great 
government spending and had no great repercussions for the costs of exporting industries.  It did, 
however, lead to Jenkins moving to the Treasury, while James Callaghan moved in the opposite 
direction to the Home Office.  Crossman recorded in his diary that Callaghan felt unencumbered 
by liberalism as Jenkins had been, and approached a Race Relations Bill with a 'heavy heart'.311  
While Crossman's views should always be taken with a pinch of salt, Callaghan favoured only 
moderate legislation and in his memoirs he emphasises the value of not marching too far ahead of 
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public opinion.312  As Callaghan settled into his brief, his voice was more distinctly his own and he 
was noticeably cooler towards the legislation.  He told The Sunday Times in January 1968 that the 
law 'will have less emphasis on the enforcement side than on the declaratory nature of the Act 
itself'.313  Strengthening the enforcement machinery was one of the reformers' key demands, just 
as they might have been considering their end game to tighten legislation, the ground was cut 
from under their feet. 
 
The chances of strengthening the bill were also weakened by events outside of Parliament.  The 
bill was given its first reading on 8th April 1968.  Four days earlier in the USA Martin Luther King 
had been assassinated.  Rioting followed in Washington and Baltimore which affected the 
sensibilities of the Conservative right on race; Enoch Powell, for example, assiduously monitored 
racial politics in the USA.314  The Conservative leadership had given the impression that they would 
be supporting new legislation, but after a meeting of backbenchers and reports from the whips 
that eighty of their number might break ranks on the issue, the leadership declared that they 
would be opposing the second reading with a reasoned amendment.315  This only appears to have 
emboldened the Conservative right, most notably Powell attacked the bill in his 'Rivers of Blood' 
speech three days before its second reading on 23rd April316 (see chapter 3).  One effect of this was 
to put the Conservative leadership in a more uncomfortable position while not offering Labour any 
political openings.317 
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There are other reasons why the campaign to amend the bill was unsuccessful in 1968, unlike 
1965.  First, unlike Soskice's proposals of 1965, it already was the reformers' bill.  Second, in 1965 
Labour had a small majority, and the reformers had the good fortune to be supported by the 
Conservative leadership, making a positive amendment to Soskice's bill a real possibility.  In 1968 
the reformers stood for strengthening the bill, the Conservatives for weakening it, and anyhow 
Labour had a large enough majority to withstand a small rebellion.  Third, in 1965 CARD was part 
of a clear united front in backing Lester's reforms, but since then the anti-racist forces had 
fragmented.  CARD itself had been taken over by Maoists,318 with Lester working through a new 
organisation Equal Rights,319 while some minority groups were seeking to create more radical 
autonomous organisations.320 
 
It was clear that by the time of the second reading debate the government had no desire for 
tougher measures.  David Ennals thought that Callaghan should be pushing for improving the 
legislation, but Callaghan was uninterested in doing so.321  The shortcomings of the bill were 
widely criticised from bodies ranging from the Church of England, through to the West Indian 
Standing Conference to the Communist Party.  Amongst these bodies there was a degree of 
consensus that RRB needed the enforcement powers that Street had suggested, the compromise 
with the TUC weakened the bill and that the exceptions in the bill, for example for the police and 
merchant navy, should go.322  Campaigning around these issues was limited, although Bonham 
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Carter pushed at every opportunity as did the NCCI.  With the broad alliance for strengthening the 
bill that existed in 1965 gone, it was largely the province of left wing Labour MPs such as Stan 
Orme323 and David Winnick.324  The campaign did stretch onto the Conservative front bench albeit 
in the form of the increasingly semi-detached Edward Boyle325 (shadow education spokesperson) 
who was in contact with Bindman and put the case for the RRB having subpoena powers to 
Quintin Hogg326 (the shadow home affairs spokesman) but without success.327  There were some 
important technical amendments to the bill in committee, particularly one ensuring that the 
Crown would be bound,328 but the underlying weakness in the legal powers remained.  It received 
Royal Assent in the summer of 1968. 
 
2.3.4: Beyond the 1968 Act. 
As Bonham Carter later attested, Home Secretary Callaghan did not see the Act as the basis for 
further positive action.329  What the two Race Relations Acts had created was a framework of 
negative equality, at best dismantling barriers but doing little to positively assert greater access to 
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life chances.  There were some successful results of these laws, for example it allowed the RRB to 
tackle discriminatory practice in public housing.  Legal action (or the threat of it) was successful in 
ending Wolverhampton Council's policy of a longer waiting time for those born outside of the UK 
and Ealing Council's refusal to put an old but not fully naturalised Pole on to its waiting list at all.330  
(The issue of housing will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter.) 
 
In employment, progress was more limited.  After a year of the 1968 Act being in operation, 396 
employment cases had been completed but only 2.5% had led to discrimination being found.331  
Unless one believes that the vast majority of complaints were vexatious, the Act was not offering 
redress.  The DEP explained that in many cases no discrimination had been found on the basis that 
the employers concerned already had a large number of immigrants in their workforces,332 an odd 
judgement since, other than in cases of engagement, it was only those companies that employed 
minorities that could discriminate.  It was well known at this time that the problem of 
discrimination in employment was not simply a matter of finding a job, but treatment when 
appointed and the restriction of minorities to menial grades. 
 
Positive measures were even more limited and there was little success in creating a culture of 
equal opportunity in the workplace.  Although both the CBI and the TUC had trumpeted the need 
for voluntary agreement to promote fair treatment in employment instead of legislation, with the 
law on the statute book they lost all interest in discussing this.  Both declined to become involved 
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in the NCCI's initiatives to develop fair employment practices in June 1968.  The NCCI worked 
instead with the British Institute of Management and the Institute of Personnel Management.333  
The Community Relations Commission (which replaced the NCCI at the end of 1968) attempted to 
take this forward, and proposed a pamphlet to promote equal opportunity in employment.  It was 
clear on its broad goal, 'the establishment of the concept of equal opportunity on merit, though, is 
not enough: positive steps to promote integration are required'.  Policy to achieve this was 
absent.334  The draft was rejected as a disappointment.335  There were a few isolated initiatives in 
the DEP under Castle.  For example, in late 1969 training courses were proposed for its 
Employment Exchange staff not only including awareness of the Race Relations Act and how to 
deal with discrimination, but also the cultural, religious and social background of immigrants.336  
On the whole the issue of integration in employment was left to the entirely negative measures of 
the 1968 Race Relations Act, with little being pushed to create any positive focus for integration in 
employment. 
 
Without any great pressure from the government, the TUC continued to reject the idea that there 
could be equal opportunities before full 'integration' (by which they meant assimilation).  At a 
1970 DEP meeting, Hargreaves argued for the TUC that an equal opportunities policy was not 
possible, 'there was no such thing as a culture free selection test … this was a matter of 
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integration.'337  The 1969 Select Committee on Race Relations’ report on minority school leavers 
showed that a considerable amount of discrimination existed and that the Youth Employment 
Service was poorly equipped to deal with it.338  When presented with this, the TUC could find 
nothing better to criticise than the idea of equal opportunities.  They rejected the idea that public 
employers let it be known that they would consider minority candidates on the basis of merit since 
this would, in the TUC's eyes, constitute preferential treatment.339  
 
Many unions felt the imposition of a legal framework and oversight from the RRB would nullify 
hard won collective agreements and withdrew from the existing voluntary machineries.  This 
included those in shipbuilding and engineering, construction, and mining.340  After a year, the 
voluntary machinery was being used in less than a quarter of cases, and these almost exclusively in 
the public sector.341  Against this negative attitude from many unions, in 1968 the MCF again 
attempted to win the trade union movement to a more robust position in support of anti-
discrimination measures.  On this occasion, however, their focus was more on rank and file trade 
unionists.  Fortnightly meetings were set up to start to build the nucleus of a cadre on the issue.342  
In late 1968 they worked with the London Co-operative Society343 to form a group focused on 
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trade unions344 drawing in Keith Morrell,345 industrial officer for the CRC, and others who had been 
some of the isolated voices in the unions against racism in the sixties.346  The result was a 
conference, Trade Unionists for Race Relations, in October 1969.347  This was the first attempt to 
directly relate immigrants' organisations to the trade union movement, although many already 
had a positive attitude to immigrants joining unions.  This was to grow into one of the forces that 
began to radically change the position of the trade unions in the 1970s, but had little influence in 
the period under study. 
* 
The 1968 Race Relations Act was thus a limited success.  The campaign run by Jenkins and Bonham 
Carter to reform the legislation was both a master-class in how to create pressure for change and 
a demonstration of the limitations of such a campaign.  While the PEP Report in particular created 
an unanswerable case for reform in employment and housing, it proved difficult to establish an 
equal force for strengthening the powers for enforcing these rights where the arguments were too 
technical to be the subject of a high profile campaign.  Thus, where there was pressure for lesser 
powers, from the government's law officers and the trade union movement, the reformers had no 
great countervailing force to deploy.  The law did push negative equality further than before, into 
employment and housing.  As discussed in the next section, this was an important development in 
the emergence of the equality state. 
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2.4: The personal becomes political. 
What one can lose if focusing on the limitations of the anti-discrimination legislation enacted in 
1965 and 1968 is the fundamental shift it achieved.  It pushed the state into new areas of policing 
behaviour that opponents of legislation thought should remain in the private sphere.  The first 
debate on race discrimination in Parliament of any scale was on Brockway's bill in 1956 when the 
Conservative Ronald Bell, a consistent opponent of reform, argued that landlords and 
restaurateurs were private individuals with the right to take their own decisions since these were 
not public matters.348  Conversely, in moving his 1958 bill, Brockway told the Commons that the 
areas covered in the bill were based on 'a clear line between what may be regarded as personal 
relationships and public relationships'.349  Thus, one aspect of the argument for legislation was an 
attempt to redefine the boundaries between the private and the public. 
 
The view that racial discrimination was a private matter was voiced by the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Sir Joseph Simpson,350 who wrote to the Home Office in late 1964 to oppose 
legislation: 
whatever the nature of the ensuing regulation, [it] will be widely resented by large sections of 
the public ... Long before the influx of coloured immigrants into this country discrimination on 
account of race, social standing and mode of dress had been established practices in clubs, 
licensed premises, hotels and boarding houses, and similar places.  This has been accepted ... 
it has never caused a public outcry or serious unrest. 
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Simpson saw British society as one in which people knew their place and discrimination reflecting 
this was a matter of consensus: 
The ordinary white citizen generally accepts his place in society and makes no attempt to gate 
crash places where he would not only feel out of place but is clearly unwelcome.  Not all 
immigrants have the ability to do this and for the most part they are hypersensitive over race 
and colour.
351
 
Simpson's view was of a civil order in Britain structured by class, and even places that were 
superficially public were fundamentally part of this private ordering.  Anti-discrimination 
legislation was an attempt to overturn this civil order. 
 
Soskice's reluctance to legislate can also be seen in terms of his understanding of the boundaries 
of the public and private spheres.  In the second reading of the 1965 Race Relations Bill his view of 
what was public included only public order (and note, he was specifically addressing the anti-
discrimination measures in the bill, not the incitement provisions).  He told the Commons: 
the Bill is concerned with public order.  Overt acts of discrimination in public places, intensely 
wounding to the feelings of those against whom these acts are practised, perhaps in the 
presence of many onlookers, breed the ill will which, as the accumulative result of several 
such actions over a period, may disturb the peace.
352
 
For Soskice, the point was not to facilitate personal redress for discrimination from another 
private individual, but the consequence of this for order in the public sphere.  Thus, the bill was 
limited to places of 'public resort', where discrimination was not only injurious to an individual, but 
open for others to see.  It says something for the campaign to reform the bill that by the third 
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reading debate Soskice's understanding of what was public had expanded.  Now he argued that if 
someone, such as a publican, was dealing with the public then 'he must not, as a matter of 
consistent conduct, exclude ... certain sections of the public because of their race, colour, and so 
on.'353  Those who wished for greater reform thus needed to extend the boundary of what was 
public.  For example, in the debate on the 1965 bill, the Liberal MP Jeremy Thorpe354 argued: 
I should like 'public resort' to mean public resort, without limitation, and one would rely on 
the findings of the courts and on the precedents to indicate what the particular places might 
be.  We would then bring in shops and various other places which are equally places of public 
resort. 
Similarly, he thought that the bill should be extended to employment but only in public sector and 
publicly owned enterprises.355 
 
In 1968 Bell was again complaining that the new bill 'would make very deep and damaging 
encroachments into the proper sphere of personal decision.'356  Similar, if more moderated, 
arguments were heard from the front bench Conservatives in opposition to the 1968 Race 
Relations Bill.  The Conservative deputy leader Reginald Maudling357 believed that it intruded too 
far into the private sphere and 'will lead to great troubles ... where it infringes on really deeply felt 
personal interests or personal matters.'358  It was clear that this private realm was shrinking.  
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Another centrist Conservative, David Renton,359 moved an amendment that those offering services 
on a 'personal' one-to-one basis such as driving instructors should not be covered by the bill.  
These moves were unsuccessful, indeed a government amendment outlawed discrimination by 
organisations like trade unions, making it clear that this left only 'private' organisations such as 
clubs where discrimination was beyond the reasonable reach of the law.360  Thus, one of the 
successful processes that created the 1965 and the 1968 acts was shifting the border between 
what was considered to be the actions of a private individual and what was in the public sphere 
and thus the object of legitimate government action. 
 
This began to establish one of the characteristics of the equality state, allowing the state to take 
sides in relation to an individual's behaviour in public in response to complaints from aggrieved 
individuals.  This parallels the expansion of rights suggested by TH Marshall with civil and political 
rights being joined by social rights.  Prior to the 1960s reforms equality meant civil and political 
equality, the same rights to vote, to hold property and have a legal persona.  The anti-
discrimination legislation of the 1960s asserted that the public sphere included further areas, 
fundamentally economic transactions including employment; the selling and letting of housing; 
and the provision of goods and services.  These were no longer seen as transactions between 
private individuals but something pursued in a public market place.  Just as the state assumed the 
right to regulate the market, as Anthony Lester put it, in the public interest,361 so it assumed the 
right to make people act in a non-discriminatory way. 
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2.5: Conclusion. 
Campaigning for racial equality in Britain always had a Labour accent, although not a working class 
one.  From 1948, years before the earliest campaigning groups formed, the policy-making 
machinery under Labour's NEC gave anti-discrimination measures consideration, and support for 
limited legislation was party policy from 1958.  The campaigns formed from the 1950s were closely 
associated with the Labour Party although they had limited impact on the trade union movement, 
where the traditional right had an agenda dominated by working class unity and free collective 
bargaining.  The creation of the equality state remained a Labour issue.  The campaign for reform 
leading to the 1960s legislation was of Labour Party and left-aligned intellectuals.  
 
Despite some imaginative thinking in the party's research department in the 1950s, policy in the 
minds of the party's parliamentary leadership and the NEC was dominated by a cautious approach 
of declaratory legislation limited to clearly public manifestations of discriminatory behaviour.  The 
development of policy was also stymied in opposition by Soskice, and his belief in doing little was 
only strengthened by the result in Smethwick in the 1964 general election.  Against this, 
campaigners for change were few in number and carried little social weight.  What is perhaps 
surprising is not that the reform they won was limited but, given the obvious electoral dangers of 
pursuing such measures and the opposition of the TUC, that it happened at all. 
 
The form of legislation that the reformers won based on civil, not criminal, law was in no sense a 
defeat.362  The campaigners' focus on conciliation backed by civil sanctions was drawn from North 
America and was a tool for creating a situation where the state was able to regulate areas of 
                                                     
362
 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration, p50;  Saggar, Race and Politics in Britain, p79.  
103 
 
conduct previously considered private and beyond legitimate state action.  The use of civil law was 
the key to this, which is why the reformers concentrated on this aspect of the 1965 Bill rather than 
its highly limited scope,363 and its weakness lay in the failure of the government to enact adequate 
civil sanctions.  As one key CARD campaigner, Dipak Nandy364 (who went on to found the 
Runnymede Trust), wrote at the time, 'sanctions without conciliation are undesirable; conciliation 
without sanctions is impossible.'365 
 
Roy Jenkins' arrival at the Home Office marked a sea-change in the campaign.  The RRB was not 
allowed to become a government body filled with standard figures.  Rather, through the 
appointment of Bonham Carter, it became an activist and highly political agent for change.  A 
campaign to extend the law was organised by Bonham Carter, the main elements of which were 
the PEP and Street reports, but which reached into the Labour Party and the Bow Group 
(analogous to the revisionists in the Labour Party, this was a rather thin layer of intellectuals in the 
party without roots).366  The object of the campaign was to extend the law to cover employment, 
housing and goods and services, and to create stronger civil sanctions with which to enforce these.  
Its success in achieving the first aim of extending the scope was undermined in the legal 
machinery of enforcement which had neither sufficient investigatory powers nor legal sanctions.  
The campaign was directed much more at winning over others in government than public opinion. 
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One notable feature of the creation of these anti-discrimination measures is that it brought into 
the public arena a number of behaviours that had previously been considered private.  The actions 
of publicans, private employers or housing landlords were previously regarded as personal 
preferences.  By being subject to the law these actions were brought into a broader public realm in 
which the state took the right to shape with the goal of lessening inequality.  Maybe for this 
reason the measures remained negative. Private individuals were told what they could not do, not 
what they should do.  Not even the mildest of positive steps, for example developing fair 
employment policy, were taken. 
 
It is possible to see the 1968 Act as a castle suspended in the air, created through the will of 
determined campaigners but ultimately without foundations in the wider state or civil society and 
thus having limited impact.  Perhaps more accurately, the legislation should be viewed not as an 
event but part of a process of the creation of an equality state.
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Chapter 3: Creating an integrated society? 
If we do not have strict immigration rules, our people will soon all be coffee coloured.1 
(Sir Frank Soskice, Home Secretary 1964-1965) 
 
 
Coloured people have been held responsible for the defects in society which their presence 
has exposed.  So every manifestation of prejudice has been met by a call for restricting 
coloured immigration; and every restriction by a call for more.  At every step, prejudice has 
been encouraged.  Though there is immigration control there is still no immigration policy … 
The issue of coloured immigration has usually been presented out of context - and with the 
illusion that ours is a unified society, without habit of social segregation.  Hence the 
rejection of coloured people as intruders.  Hence also the pious exhortation for integration.  
Integration into what?  A whole industry of race relations has developed so that, 
apparently, far more concern is shown for the colour problem per se than for the much 
greater and indeed related problems of deprivation in Britain.2 
(Ruth Glass,3 May 1968) 
 
The previous chapter examined how the Labour governments 1964-1970 developed a limited 
range of anti-discrimination measures, enforced by conciliation backed up with inadequate civil 
sanctions.  The campaign to win these reforms succeeded in moving the frontier of what the state 
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would police to include some forms of racial discrimination which had previously been considered 
matters of private conduct.  These were now matters seen as being in the public realm, thus 
legitimising state action in a new space referred to here as the equality state. 
 
If politicians had given little thought to the idea of anti-discrimination legislation before 1964, 
there was even less thinking directed at what integrating immigrants into British society might 
mean.  Even as immigration increased in the early 1950s, no government developed even practical 
measures to ensure adequate housing and welfare services in the areas where immigrants 
settled.4  If this lack of policy was based on anything other than apathy tinged with antipathy to 
new arrivals, it was an assumption that newcomers would assimilate with little intervention and 
adopt the culture of the host community.5  Those who cared to look, and from the 1940s some 
did, could see that there were visible minorities, many of whom had settled after the First World 
War in towns around major ports, particularly London, Bristol, Cardiff and Liverpool, eking out a 
precarious existence beset by discrimination and poverty.6 
 
With what was to become mass immigration to Britain beginning shortly after the Second World 
War, any limited efforts at offering immigrants help coping with and adapting to their new lives 
were made by the voluntary sector and to a degree by local authorities.7  Despite increasing 
unease inside Whitehall, the state's laissez faire policy towards both immigration and immigrants 
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only changed when the Conservative government moved to limit immigration with the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act.  While the Act's overriding object was to reduce black and Asian 
immigration, it was accompanied by smaller more hopeful policy with the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Committee.  This drew on the existing work in the voluntary 
sector on immigrant welfare, an alliance continued in the National Committee for Commonwealth 
Immigrants (NCCI), established just before Labour came to power in 1964.8 
 
Little policy followed from this process, and when in the spring of 1965 the Labour government 
created Maurice Foley's ministerial portfolio to integrate immigrants, there was still no clear 
understanding of what integration meant.  The term covered a hotchpotch of unquestioned 
assumptions, ingrained attitudes and sometimes prejudices.  Only rarely did any grounded 
sociological thought surface in policy making.  Nonetheless, this thesis argues that the emerging 
integration policy had two elements.  The first sought to integrate immigrants into the existing 
public sphere, including granting the same political rights as the general population and granting 
them access to state services.  That immigrants had political rights might seem obvious, but was 
no means inevitable, as the exclusion from these rights of Turkish and other Gastarbeiter in 
Germany shows.9  In education ideas of integration focused on the acquisition of culture and 
language sometimes accompanied by a policy of dispersal that was attuned more to the concerns 
by white parents about the impact of immigrants on their children's progress in school.  Such 
assimilation was usually assumed to be unproblematic.  Only slowly through the 1960s did an 
understanding of the obstacles to minorities accessing state services, particularly housing and 
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education, begin to emerge.  This began to become embedded in a culture of teaching, social work 
and other liberal professions to give the equality state a greater reach.10 
 
This first sense of integration into the public realm of political and social citizenship will be 
examined through policy on housing, education and policing.  The 1967 Plowden Report11 into 
primary education was seminal, not only in arguing that the children of immigrants were among 
those who suffered from deprivation which needed to be tackled with targeted resources, but 
through offering a model for targeting resources in a positive programme to meet minorities' 
specific needs in other state services.  The development of the representation of minorities' 
interests through the NCCI, and the retreat from this marked by its supersession by the 
Community Relations Commission (CRC) in late 1968 will also be examined. 
 
A second use of the term integration describes policies to create what would now be called a 
cohesive society.  However imprecisely, this implied a change in private individuals' beliefs and 
practices to create a private sphere characterised by acceptance rather than prejudice and 
division.  It is a tenet of much liberal thought (and the Labour government policy here was guided 
by liberal ideas) that such sociability is the natural order of civil society, but there was a current in 
liberalism dating at least back to JS Mill that saw the state as the promoter of such a civil order.12  
The Labour governments after 1964 struggled to develop the policy tools for creating such a 
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society, but in as far as they did they again extended the frontier of the state into what previously 
was considered a private sphere beyond rightful state influence. 
 
Although immigration policy is not the subject of this thesis, it is impossible to understand the 
state's attempts to change public attitudes towards race without considering who it was willing to 
admit to citizenship.  Whatever the surrounding rhetoric, laws to restrict immigration from the 
Commonwealth were racially discriminatory in motivation and effect.13  The impact of immigration 
controls on the white public's view of racial minorities is much discussed in the historiography.  
Some radical critics see white racism being perpetuated, if not created, by actions of the state, 
particularly immigration controls.14  While most reforming optimists share the view that 
immigration policy disrupted moves to create greater racial equality, they stop short of seeing this 
as totally negating of these positive moves.15  That debate will not be resolved here, but the 
analysis of policy making will shed some light on it.  This chapter will examine Labour's hopes to 
draw a line under the issue of immigration when they accepted the Conservatives' 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act with their White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth in 
1965, and particularly the vituperative reassertion of anti-immigrant sentiment in Powell's 'Rivers 
of Blood' speech in April 1968.  The Labour government's response to this, particularly the Urban 
Programme, will also be considered.  Although this was a limited policy, it showed that the 
government was beginning to struggle with the need for a positive intervention to create the 
integrated society of their declaratory rhetoric. 
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These policy developments can be understood in terms of the negative and positive 
understandings of equality developed in this thesis.  As shown in the previous chapter, actions in 
the public sphere were subject to legal measures to promote negative equality.  Thus 
discrimination was outlawed in public places and in the provision of goods and services without 
further, positive, state effort to change the social structure, although the framers of the legislation 
hoped that this might change social attitudes.  Nonetheless, the integration of immigrants into 
society could not be legislated for in the same sense since no law can effectively demand that 
people love their neighbours.  It is a reasonable supposition that much of what the state might do 
to promote such attitudinal change requires an interventionist approach and positive measures. 
 
Positive moves to integrate immigrants into society not only raised the question of how they 
would be integrated, but what the end result of that integration would be.  The laissez faire 
attitude towards integration of 1948-1965 was premised on the idea that immigrants would 
assimilate, adopting the culture of the host population.  It did not require that the government 
have any view on the kind of society that would result.  It was more unusual for the process of 
integration to be seen as one where the host population accepted the cultural differences of their 
new fellow citizens.  This chapter will demonstrate how this latter view, beginning to be known as 
multiculturalism, became more widely held in the 1960s.  Multiculturalism has been defined in 
many ways, but at heart it implies group rights to maintain a culture with equal institutional 
protection and respect, and the recognition of diversity.  The question of how these ideas 
emerged, which has seldom been analysed in a historical context,16 will be one of the subjects of 
this chapter. 
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3.1: Laissez Faire 1945-1964. 
3.1.1: Labour Party policy on integration. 
When in 1948 the Labour Party considered anti-discrimination measures, it also considered the 
broader integration of immigrants into society.  In his 1948 paper to the party, the sociologist 
Kenneth Little argued that minorities were left as outsiders in a society characterised by 'shyness, 
aloofness and snobbishness, which the coloured person often has to encounter in nearly every 
walk of English life', and that barriers of education and culture made swift assimilation unlikely.  
Little subscribed to the Weberian view of status, suggesting that black and Asian immigrants were 
seen as low status by white people,17 and thus he proposed a remedy of raising their status by 
validating their cultural difference, for example through the school curriculum and less patronising 
textbooks 'incorporating modern anthropological ideas' as well as better reception and welfare for 
immigrants.18  There was no indication that the Labour government at that time had any interest 
in such ideas. 
 
In the absence of government provision, voluntary bodies began to offer such services.  This was 
reflected in a further paper from Little for Labour's NEC in 1954.  He commended the proposals of 
one of his students, Michael Banton, that such voluntary groups should be state aided, 'a central 
department of the government should be given a specific responsibility for furthering by positive 
action the integration of the various coloured groups in British cities in the social life of the local 
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community.'19  It was not simply the case that voluntary groups were used to fill gaps in 
government provision, but that many believed by being part of civil society they were more suited 
to influence the relationship between private individuals.  As William Beveridge had written in his 
third report in 1948, Voluntary Action, 'there are some things – not goods but services – which 
often cannot be bought with money, but may be rendered from a sense of duty'.20 
 
Policy development continued slowly in the Labour Party and unsurprisingly ended up being driven 
by events.  In the aftermath of the St Ann's, Nottingham, and Notting Hill riots of August and 
September 1958, there was concern amongst Labour's officials that the local Labour MPs, George 
Gale in West London and James Harrison21 in Nottingham, had set the tone of the debate by 
issuing statements calling for immigration control.22  The Labour Party did attempt to send out a 
more positive message.  Immediately after the riots, Tom Driberg, as the Labour Party's fraternal 
delegate to the TUC, stated that this was a problem of white prejudice23 and the party trailed a yet 
unfinished NEC statement calling for greater efforts for integration and the enactment of anti-
discrimination legislation to be released at the time of their conference in mid-September 1958.24 
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Meanwhile, the party's general secretary, Morgan Phillips,25 wrote to the party's district organisers 
for their views on Gale and Harrison's position.  The London organiser supported the local MP, 
arguing that 'gaining ... additional coloured votes could be secured only at the expense of many 
more white votes' and suggested immigration controls and the dispersal of existing immigrants, 26 
policies supported by the local party in Notting Hill.27  Labour's NEC did not concur with these 
views and adopted a draft policy drawn up by John Hatch of the party's Commonwealth 
Department, which was nonetheless the more moderate of the two on offer.28  As with Little's 
1948 paper, Hatch's policy included an inchoate multiculturalism.  It viewed immigrants as 
culturally distinct, arguing that there was 'a national responsibility to introduce an educational 
campaign which will widen knowledge of our fellow Commonwealth citizens amongst British 
people'.  Further, local voluntary groups should be encouraged 'in order to develop positive 
understanding between different minority and immigrant groups and the British people'.  The 
language of assimilation was notably lacking.29 
 
Unlike the Labour MPs representing St. Ann's and Notting Hill, the party's policy making machinery 
did not support immigration controls.  In 1954 Labour NEC's Commonwealth Sub-committee 
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dismissed fears about immigration as being disproportionate to its real rate30 and opposed to the 
unilateral imposition of controls as disruptive to Commonwealth relations.31  Even after the 1958 
riots there was very limited support in the wider party for introducing Commonwealth 
immigration controls.32  Nor did Labour's front bench in Parliament support control.  Speaking for 
the party in a debate in the Lords later in 1958, Lord Pakenham33 suggested only bilateral controls 
should be considered and then only at times of high unemployment.34  In the ensuing months a 
group favouring control emerged in the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), especially in its London 
and Middlesex group chaired by Bob Mellish35 (who continued to be a pro-control voice) but this 
was a minority view.36  In the years up to the 1961 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill the Labour 
leadership continued to defend immigration not only on the grounds of Commonwealth relations 
but on its economic benefits and importance to public services.37 
 
                                                     
30
 Commonwealth Subcommittee,' Summary of Colonial and Commonwealth events October-November 
1954', LPNEC/508/1256. 
31
 'Brief on WI Migration', 29/07/1960, LHASC/LPA, Box 'Research Dept: Race Relations'. 
32
 There were no restrictionist motions received from local parties in the aftermath of the riots, one was 
received just prior to them. Commonwealth  Subcommittee July 1958,LPNEC/634/1288. 
33
 Frank Pakenham (1905-2001).  Labour Peer, Lord Pricy Seal (1964-1965, 1965-1968), Leader of the Lords 
(1964-1968), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1965-1966). Created Baron Pakenham (1945).  Succeeded 
Earl of Longford (1961) 
34
 'For Lord Pakenham, Racial discrimination', LHASC/LPA, Box 'Research Dept: Race Relations'; HL Deb 
19/11/1958 v212 c636. 
35
 1913-1998.  Labour MP, Rotherhithe/Bermondsey (1946-1982).  Joint Parliamentary Secretary of State,  
Housing and Local Government (1964-1967), Minster of Building and Public Works (1967-1969), 
Government Chief Whip (1969-1970, 1974-1976). 
36
 Parliamentary Committee, 5/11/1958, LHASC/LPA/PC. 
37
 For example, 'Brief on WI Migration', 29/07/1960, LHASC/LPA, Box 'Research Dept: Race Relations'. 
115 
 
When Eric Whittle in Labour's research department surveyed opinion in local parties in 1957 he 
did find some racism.  Elsie Boltz, secretary of Vauxhall Labour Party complained: 
the coloured people who come to live in this borough, appear to have no desire whatever to 
be clasped to our white bosoms, nor to be welcomed with open arms to either family or social 
life.  They form their own settlements, have their own amusements and social life, and are on 
the whole, unfriendly and unresponsive to approaches ... There is resentment expressed that 
coloured people can come to this country and immediately obtain benefits provided by the 
Welfare State to which they have made no obvious contribution.
38
 
This response has been used as evidence of widespread racism in the Labour Party,39 but it was 
atypical.  Most respondents were unengaged with issues around immigration and a few took a 
more positive attitude.  Hampstead and Norwood parties in London had made efforts to recruit 
minorities to the party and worked with immigrant organisations.40  There was no strong anti-
immigrant feeling articulated through most local Labour Party branches. 
 
By 1960, and with immigration rising, there were signs that the Labour Party's leadership was 
feeling pressure to accept immigration control.  In January 1961 Labour's NEC Commonwealth 
Sub-committee thought it worth reconsidering their opposition to restriction,41 but was 
successfully persuaded against this course by the party's research staff who argued that the only 
motivation for control was racist and social pressures could be relieved by attending to housing 
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and dispersal.  In the Shadow Cabinet too, there was pressure to move away from such blanket 
opposition to control.  At this time anti-immigration sentiment was being crystallised in Parliament 
by the Conservative backbencher Cyril Osborne, for example his Commons calling on the 
government to introduce controls of February 1961.42  James Callaghan, then Labour's colonial 
affairs spokesperson, raised the possibility of immigration control measures similar to that of 
other white Commonwealth states in the Shadow Cabinet, but failed to find much support.43 
 
The emerging divisions in Labour's leadership were emphasised when the Conservative 
government brought forward its Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in October 1961, with the 
Shadow Cabinet having a 'very long discussion' and the debate continuing at a PLP meeting.44  
Here three positions emerged.  The left-wing MP Anthony Greenwood, who had resigned from the 
Shadow Cabinet over Gaitskell's opposition to unilateral nuclear disarmament, led those 
demanding continued outright rejection of control.  A small group pushed for accepting the case 
for control, while the party leadership were concerned that overly strident opposition could cost 
the party votes and argued for opposition to the bill with a reasoned amendment requiring control 
be through agreements with Commonwealth governments.45  This last position won.46  So Labour's 
objection was formulated in terms of how immigration was to be controlled, not to the principle of 
control.  From the bill's second reading Gaitskell led the party in the attack on this basis.  Thus, 
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Labour sought a form of control that was not based on a 'colour bar' and suggested that the 
government was not doing enough to alleviate the 'deplorable social and housing conditions' in 
which immigrants found themselves.47  Labour's careful and contingent opposition to the bill was a 
success.  A healthy flow of supportive motions from constituency parties followed48 and The Times 
reported that Government had received 'a verbal lashing from Mr Gaitskell of a kind that has not 
been heard in Westminster for some time'.49 
 
Public opinion moved during the passage of the bill, with support for the controls falling from 76% 
to 62%,50 but the continued majority for the Conservatives' proposals troubled Labour Party policy 
makers who felt it showed the continued truth of Anthony Richmond's view, 'that apart from a 
fanatical colour prejudiced minority, there are a large number of people who are slightly 
prejudiced or suspicious of newcomers'.  The Labour Party's response to this was to seek ways of 
positively influencing this weakly prejudiced group.  Proposals included a media driven education 
campaign to lessen 'friction' resulting from misunderstandings and 'government effort to 
encourage racial integration, particularly by advice and financial assistance to local bodies.'  
Labour hoped that the national and local voluntary groups would survey the extent of 
discrimination, work with local education authorities to promote tolerance through education and 
provide advice to immigrants.  This optimism was not accompanied by any consideration of 
creating powers to compel unco-operative local authorities to offer immigrants welfare services 
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nor was the possibility considered that friction might result over competition for scarce resources, 
particularly housing.51  The state was not seen as the body that could, or should, drive a change in 
public attitudes. 
 
Another practical proposal adopted by Labour in 1962 was that local parties should seek to recruit 
more black and Asian members.52  Labour's record here was positive if slight.  In 1952 the Labour 
Party established their British-Asian Socialist Fellowship for colonial students, in part to counter 
Communist 'friendship' societies.53  This and other overseas fellowships grew into the British 
Overseas Socialist Fellowship (BSOF).54  It was only in 1962 that this was used to campaign 
amongst settled immigrant groups in Britain, with party officials meeting with Indian and Pakistani 
members of the BSOF55 to produce mother tongue leaflets highlighting Labour's opposition to the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act and calling on immigrants to join unions and register to vote.  
Local parties were exhorted to investigate cases of discrimination and hold mixed social events to 
build membership.56  The party produced a pamphlet, The Integration of Immigrants – a Guide to 
Action, which encouraged Labour led councils to work with voluntary groups and appoint liaison 
officers, and for local parties to work with immigrants.57  The impact of recruiting more black and 
Asian members into the party was potentially significant not only for political participation and 
representation.  The role of local Labour parties in relation to local government has not received 
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great attention.  Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to assume that since most immigrants lived 
in areas with Labour controlled local authorities, black and Asian people becoming involved in 
local parties may have helped in moving towards more equal local authority resource allocation 
and local initiatives to meet minorities' needs on the same basis as the white working class whose 
interests were already articulated through local parties and the councils they controlled. 
 
After Harold Wilson became Labour leader in early 1963 there was renewed pressure to accept 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, not least from Patrick Gordon Walker, Labour's foreign affairs 
spokesperson.  He was under sustained pressure in his Smethwick constituency which he, 
justifiably, feared he might lose because of local Conservative campaigning on immigration.58  
Many Labour MPs were hesitant to join Wilson and his deputy leader, George Brown, in continuing 
opposition to the Act, which needed to be renewed in a Commons vote each year.  This led to the 
establishment of a working party of Labour's Chief Whip, Edward Short,59 Gordon Walker and the 
party's home affairs spokesperson, Sir Frank Soskice, to consider this issue.60  A compromise 
emerged, another reasoned amendment making Labour's support for control contingent on 
Commonwealth governments' agreement.  This time, control was explicitly linked to the need for 
legislation against discrimination (limited to public places), tougher laws on incitement and help to 
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local authorities.61  The Labour leadership's unease with maintaining a liberal stance on 
immigration was becoming clear. 
 
This formed the basis of policy for the party's 1964 election programme,62 although some negative 
policy on immigration was developed as a reserve measure to be used if necessary.  In April 1964 
the Society of Labour Lawyers was asked to look at powers to deport aliens63 and the research 
department produced a negative paper on health checks for immigrants.64  It was decided not to 
include either of these issues in the manifesto, but to keep Labour's campaigning options open by 
making immigration the subject of a major speech.65  This was delivered by Wilson in Birmingham 
on October 6th 1964 sticking to the Commonwealth agreement line but showing Labour's 
leadership's desire to appease public opinion on the issue by pledging that the rate of immigration 
would not increase.66  Thus Labour fought the 1964 election on a platform that was far from 
outright opposition to immigration control.  Their anxiety on this issue helped to eclipse any policy 
to aid the integration of immigrants into society. 
 
                                                     
61
 Parliamentary Committee, 18/11/1963, 31/7/1963 and Memorandum on immigrant policy, 18/11/1963, 
LHASC/LPA/PC; Home Policy Subcommittee Sept 1963, LPNEC/769/1313; Tony Benn, Out of the Wilderness, 
pp76-77. 
62
 RD.581(rev) December 1963, LPNEC/772/1478. 
63
 SLL, Agenda for Executive Committee, 27/4/1964, LSE/SLL/11. 
64
 RD 790, 'Health and Commonwealth Immigrants', LPRes/188. 
65
 Organisation Subcommittee, 31/8/1964, LPNEC/789/990. 
66
 Leaflet 'Harold Wilson on immigration' Speech Birmingham, 6/10/1964, LPNEC/798/271. 
121 
 
3.1.2: The institutions of integration c.1954-1964. 
The institutions which focused on the welfare of immigrants in the 1950s were a patchwork 
of voluntary groups and municipally funded liaison officers, one of the earliest being 
appointed in Birmingham in 1954.67  The umbrella body for these voluntary groups was the 
National Council for Social Service (NCSS).  Their London Council attempted to create a 
more co-ordinated effort by calling a conference, 'West Indians in London', in 1956 which 
drew delegates from local government social services, voluntary and church groups and a 
few immigrant groups.  Problems in housing were recognised, although the trade union 
denial of any problem in employment was aired without challenge.68  The voluntary help 
that was offered tended to be tea and sympathy, although increasingly local authorities 
were playing a more structured welfare-rights role.  Attempts to educate the host 
community to be more tolerant were limited.69  By the late 1950s the Conservative 
government, while maintaining a position that there should be no special facilities for 
minorities, were encouraging local authorities to offer voluntary groups grant aid.70  Central 
government also relied on voluntary action, for example, the government's Labour 
Exchanges relied on voluntary agencies to provide immigrant workers with loans for travel, 
help with accommodation or educational opportunities.71 
 
                                                     
67
 'Coloured man’s "Consul"', The Times, 20/1/1965. 
68
 West Indians in London: Report of a Conference at County Hall, 28/6/1956, LHASC/LPA, Box 'Research 
Dept: Race Relations'. 
69
 Rose et al, Colour and Citizenship, p383-4. 
70
 Rose and Levy, 'The Local Committees', p334-354. 
71
 CIAC(62)7, MRC/TUCA, MSS.292B/805.92/1. 
122 
 
The first central government body to consider the interests of immigrants was the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council (CIAC) established in 1962.  Its origins lay in 
an amendment to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill proposed by the Conservative Bill 
Deedes72 (then on the backbenches) to create a statutory body to advise the government 
on the welfare of immigrants, which he withdrew after the Home Secretary undertook to 
establish a similar body.73  The nature of the CIAC can be seen from its membership.  Its 
chair was Lady Reading74 the founder of the Women's Voluntary Service, and she was 
joined by Sir George Haynes,75 director of the NCSS, Sir Harold Banwell,76 chair of the 
Citizens Advice Bureaux and scion of liberal philanthropy, Adrian Cadbury.77  None were 
immigrants and they were committed to voluntary rather than state action.  The 
committee oversaw an annual report dedicated to a single subject, which at least 
highlighted issues around housing, education and the employment of school leavers in an 
assimilationist framework.78 
 
The leadership of the voluntary sector in the NCSS wished to see the CIAC to develop away from 
being as a body which would advise government to become one that would mediate between the 
government and local voluntary effort.  To achieve such a body, in early 1963 CIAC asked 
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interested parties what voluntary, local authority and central government could do to 'assist 
immigrants to adapt themselves to British habits and customs'79 leading CIAC to conclude that a 
new body was needed to co-ordinate voluntary effort,80 and they were able to win the 
government's agreement for its establishment.  The National Advisory Committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants met from the beginning of 1964.81  The 'advisory' was spurious since 
the body's main function was co-ordinating local voluntary committees, generically known as 
Voluntary Liaison Committees (VLCs), and was soon dropped, leaving it as the NCCI.  It brought 
together the voluntary sector in the form of the NCSS and the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) 
(represented by its chair, Philip Mason,82 and the journalist Jim Rose83 who had just been 
appointed by the IRR to run its study into minorities in Britain published as Colour and Citizenship 
in 1969), local government representatives and a brace of MPs.  Nadine Peppard,84 who had been 
working for the London NCSS's Immigrant Advisory Committee was recruited as a full time 
specialist in voluntary work for immigrants.85  In the following months there was some co-option, 
particularly of individuals from minorities.86  Beyond the disbursement of funds, the committee 
had no clear role but began to grope towards one, establishing a framework for integration based 
on the voluntary sector working in association with local government. 
* 
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To summarise, before 1962 the government developed little policy on immigrants and 
immigration.  The Labour Party, however, had begun to develop meaningful policy in three areas.  
The first was the integration of immigrants into society which was mainly based on the assumption 
of assimilation with immigrants adopting the culture of the background population.  Against this, 
there was already an emerging multiculturalism in the Labour Party where the cultural difference 
of minorities was assumed as the basis of, not an obstacle too, integration.  The second area was 
immigration control.  Here the leadership of the party were already, by 1962, accommodating to 
pressure for controls.  Some in the party opposed these controls, but more influentially others 
wished to accept the Conservatives' policies.  Third, there was an acceptance that integration was 
best through voluntary groups working with local government to cater for immigrant welfare and 
foster good relations in local communities.  There was little discussion of giving such groups 
powers that would ensure that public bodies did more to cater for immigrants' needs.  When 
Labour won power in 1964 there were both limitations and potential in the situation they 
inherited.  The limitations dominated the policy under Labour's new Home Secretary, Frank 
Soskice. 
 
3.2: Soskice and the White Paper. 
3.2.1: Soskice, the White Paper and departmental policy. 
Labour's divisions on race and immigration continued when they were returned to power at the 
October 1964 general election.  The heart of the conflict on immigration was between 
restrictionists, who thought that public opinion could only be satisfied by limiting immigration, and 
those who more optimistically believed that the government could lead public opinion and 
counter prejudice, although their ideas on how this might be done were fragmentary.  The 
Cabinet's Commonwealth Immigration Committee (CIC), chaired by the Lord President of Council, 
125 
 
Herbert Bowden, initially took an optimistic view when it demanded that Soskice should present a 
paper on the contribution that immigrants had made to the labour force.  Soskice, a restrictionist, 
refused.  His concern was only with black and Asian immigration, he ruled out considering 
immigration from Ireland, of non-Anglophone Europeans and working visitors from the white 
Commonwealth.87  Soskice's view was that the government was being too slow to introduce new 
restrictions: 
I do not believe that public opinion, including the majority opinion among our own 
supporters, will be content with this.  The country has been taking in coloured immigrants 
faster that they can be assimilated … I think that the Government should take, and should 
manifestly be seen to be taking, all reasonable measures to bring the flood under control.
88
 
An earlier draft memorandum added, 'we think public opinion is right'.89  The government 
resisted such demands for early changes to immigration law, rather seeking bilateral talks with 
Commonwealth governments.90 
 
Soskice continued his restrictionist crusade in January 1965 by proposing a White Paper to 
announce tightened immigration control, sweetened with some unspecified proposals on 
integration, but other senior ministers questioned the need for this unless public pressure 
mounted.91  Nonetheless, the idea took root and a White Paper was in train by March 1965,92 the 
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difference with Soskice's plans being more presentational than substantial.  Particularly, Wilson 
devised a mechanism for retreating from the party's previous opposition to immigration control 
without bilateral agreements, the Mountbatten Mission.  This was a tour of Commonwealth states 
led by Lord Mountbatten93 to discuss immigration, its terms of reference placing emphasis on 
dealing with evasion of controls more than the level of immigration.94  While the Mission was still 
abroad, the Cabinet agreed to cut the number of vouchers issued under the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act from 20,800 to 7,500 per annum95 and Wilson decided the Mission's report would 
not be published.96  A Cabinet committee chaired by the PM was convened and met once to 
consider Mountbatten's report, agreeing its receipt should be announced to Parliament as being 
'urgently studied by ministers' and then to proceed with a White Paper.  This urgent consideration 
consisted of two scheduled meetings of the CIC which reasserted the policy already agreed.97  
Soskice thought this inadequate, and demanded steps be taken to reduce the number or even halt 
dependents entering Britain, and wished to have powers to deport an immigrant found to be a 
'lay-about' within five years of entry.  This illberality reportedly shocked the Cabinet which 
rejected Soskice's proposals.98  
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The White Paper was not only to announce a reduction in immigration, but was also to contain 
proposals to integrate immigrants.  Soskice frequently declared such measures part of a package 
deal with immigration control but the Home Office never developed integrationist policies.  
Rather, under Soskice, the Home Office mainly showed antipathy toward black and Asian 
immigrants.  One Home Office memo from 1965 stating that immigrants': 
living standards were lower than ours and our people found some of their habits offensive ... 
Immigrants brought with them disease ... many of the immigrants, who were predominantly 
male, picked up venereal disease.  Their children, too often unable to speak English, created 
difficult problems for the schools in the immigrant areas, slowing down the progression of 
others.
99
 
What integration policy was developed came from the Cabinet Office, particularly under the 
influence of a civil servant, Jack Howard Drake, the Assistant Secretary supporting the CIC.  In late 
1964 he wrote around departments to officials asking them to bring proposals to help integrate 
immigrants forward, the paucity of the replies suggesting that there was little existing policy.100   In 
response Maurice Foley, the Department of Economic Affairs' representative on the CIC, produced 
his January 1965 memorandum.  This sketched the first outlines of an integrationist policy, 
including financial help for local authorities, encouragement of voluntary committees, more 
English teaching, and that the Ministry of Labour should seek discussion with the TUC and CBI on 
employment.101  Foley's proposals helped gain him the portfolio for their development and 
became the basis of the integrative section in the White Paper.102 
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When Foley's integration portfolio was created in March 1965 he set about trying to create a 
coherent policy from the scraps that existed.  He called a meeting with the expertise as it was, 
John Syson (editor of the Fabians' international journal Venture), Nadine Peppard (NCCI), John 
Lyttle (Labour Party Commonwealth Department) and Nicholas Deakin103 (IRR/Nuffield Survey of 
Race Relations).104  The consensus from this group was to encourage a voluntary-local 
government nexus and a renewed appeal went to departments to develop policy.105  The 
response on employment was considered in the last chapter.  Other departments, Health and the 
Ministry of Defence in particular, showed little desire to even consider that there might be a 
problem. 
 
3.2.2: Education. 
The most developed response came for the Department of Education and Science (DES) which had 
some policy prior to Labour coming to power.  In 1963 the Conservative Minister of Education, the 
liberal Sir Edward Boyle, responded to white parents' complaints (particularly from Southall)106 
that some schools were becoming dominated by a sizeable minority of immigrants' children by 
proposing that these children be dispersed to other local schools.107  Additionally, a subpanel of 
the Schools Inspectorate was established which met twice a year to consider the education of 
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immigrants' children and although these discussions were routine, it established an infrastructure 
for the consideration of policy.108 
 
With Labour in power it was recognised that the policy of dispersal was not enough.  From the 
immigrant's point of view, the main problem was that many were forced into decaying inner-city 
areas with ageing schools.  Inequality in housing accentuated the uneven distribution of welfare 
resources.  Labour's new Secretary of State for Education and Science, Tony Crosland, despite his 
status as a key thinker on Labour's revisionist right, thought that there was no mechanism for 
targeting resources in a way that would address their problem.  He stated, 'it is not possible (even 
if it could be done without increasing racial prejudice) to carry out within current policies major 
replacement or improvements of such school buildings',109 emphasising that assimilation was to 
the back of the queue.  Thus, instead of any positive programme, the advice on dispersal was 
reasserted in DES Circular 7/65, the clumsily named 'Spreading the Children'.110  Although it was 
stated that local authorities should act only in the interests of immigrants, there were no means 
by which the DES could enforce this.  In fact, most councils chose not to do this on the basis of it 
being a costly way of risking a backlash from white parents in nearby neighbourhoods to which 
minority children would be dispersed for schooling.111  More significantly, alongside this, the first 
positive policy was introduced, raising the teacher quota (the number of teachers the government 
would fund) in areas of high immigrant population.112 
                                                     
108
  TNA: PRO ED158/158, Education of Immigrants sub-panel, 7/10/1964 (and onwards).  
109
 TNA: PRO CAB134/1504, CI(65)7, 04/02/1965. 
110
 TNA: PRO ED147/594, Circular 7/65. 
111
 Power, Immigrants in School, pp8, 32; Tomlinson, Race and Education, p30. 
112
 TNA: PRO CA134/1504, CI(65)3
rd
,  9/02/1965 and CI(IN)(65), 10/03/1965;  Immigration from the 
Commonwealth, Cmnd. 2739 (London: HMSO, 1965) , paras. 39-49. 
130 
 
3.3.3: Housing. 
Housing was thus the fulcrum around which policy could have moved.  Smethwick, where the 
shortage of housing had been the main issue on which Peter Griffiths and the local Conservatives 
had mobilised support, showed the electoral dangers of this policy area for Labour.  That there 
was no equality for immigrants in housing should not have been news for the Labour government.  
A civil service committee in 1948 highlighted discrimination in private lettings and considered 
legislation but this was rejected by ministers.113  In 1963 the CIAC reported on the poor conditions 
immigrants faced and proposed slum clearance114  but no targeted action followed, and most 
councils gave a low priority to clearing immigrant dominated slums. In March 1965 the Milner 
Holland Report on housing in London showed extensive discrimination which pressurised 
immigrants into seeking inflated loans to become the landlords of overcrowded slums.  This 
concentrated minorities in what John Rex115 called 'twilight areas' of decaying housing otherwise 
populated by the criminal, the unruly, the incompetent and others forced to the margins of 
society.116 
 
If private housing was unavailable to many black and Asian people, council housing offered no 
alternative.  Discrimination was sometimes recognised,117 although its extent went un-surveyed 
until the PEP report pointed to the virtual exclusion of immigrants from council housing in some 
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municipalities.118  Most councils had local residency qualification periods, and some implemented 
longer periods for those born overseas.  As late as 1965, Ealing Council used a residency 
qualification of five years for those born in the UK, and fifteen for those born overseas before an 
individual would be placed on the waiting list.  The alternative to this discriminatory policy had 
been advocated by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) as early as 1948,119 the 
allocation of housing on the basis of housing need points, but the ministry exerted minimal 
pressure on local authorities to use this system which would offer immigrants equal access to 
housing.120 
 
The first Minister for Housing and Local Government in the 1964 Labour administration was 
Richard Crossman.  Although on the left, as Midlands MP, he had drawn the lesson from 
Smethwick that Labour's electoral base should not be antagonised with liberal policies on 
immigrants, particularly on housing.  Crossman wrote to Soskice shortly after the 1964 election 
that he saw no problem in council housing, and although he recognised discrimination was rife in 
private rentals, suggested no action.121   His first attack was only on the symptoms of 
discrimination.  Visiting Birmingham's slums in late 1964, he agreed new powers to regulate 
multiple occupancy rented property,122 this becoming the Birmingham Corporation Act 1965.  The 
Milner Holland Report had outlined how black and Asian people were forced into buying 
properties because of the lack of rental opportunities.  Attempting to deal with this by regulation, 
the report argued, was futile since black and Asian people did not have access to better 
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property.123  Furthermore, in empowering the council to decide who was a fit and proper landlord 
and designating areas where multiple occupancy would, and would not, be allowed, the Act 
opened the door to discrimination and the creation of semi-ghettos.124 
 
Housing policy was circumscribed by the primary goal of not aggravating the prejudices of the 
settled white population.  In early 1965 Crossman wrote: 'if the immigrants keep on coming at a 
rate that makes integration impossible there will be an insoluble housing problem.  I can do 
nothing to get over this without inflaming our own people against the immigrants we are trying to 
integrate.'  Practically, the policy amounted to no more than suggesting that local authorities 
should provide immigrants with advice on the obligations of landlord and tenant, 125 and some 
gentle prodding of local authorities, for example suggesting that Lambeth should offer five percent 
of new council housing to minorities after slum clearance.  This was seen as an ameliorative 
measure rather than a very limited quota in an area of high minority housing need126 and is 
indicative of the lack of policy developed by the 1964-1966 Labour government to give immigrants 
more equal access to housing. 
 
The housing policy included in the White Paper was for one group of voluntary bodies, the VLCs, 
to pressure other voluntary bodies and housing associations, to take a substantial minority of 
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immigrants.127  This avoided tackling the issue of existing discrimination and was limited by the 
MHLG's refusal to offer any funding to facilitate this policy.128  Thus, the White Paper neither 
addressed inequality in housing nor offered more than projected long-term improvements in 
housing stock as a solution.129  The MHLG were unable to develop policy on the insights offered 
by Milner Holland, Dipak Nandy of CARD asking, 'were the drafters of this White Paper unable to 
procure a copy of that report, or were they perhaps not sufficiently literate to read it?'130 
 
Housing and education were the areas where policy was most developed and at the time of the 
White Paper.  Dispersal was preferred in both areas as the central policy of government as part of 
an assimilationist approach, which was already beginning to fade by 1965.  The previously 
assimilationist CIAC recorded in their last report, 'it is natural that people who have recently 
arrived in a strange country should wish to live close to each other'.131  In part dispersal was 
driven, as it originally was in education, not by the needs of minorities but by the demands of the 
white population.  The DES policy of 'spreading the children' was demanded by white parents who 
did not want their child's school to be dominated by immigrants.  Dispersal in housing was in part 
driven by not wanting immigrant dominated neighbourhoods.  In both cases implementation of 
the policy was often blocked by other areas not wanting to be on the receiving end of dispersal.  
Similarly, taking steps to remove discrimination in access to both private and public housing (a 
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measure of negative equality) was met by government caution since it feared a racist backlash.  
More positive measures, which would have required building more housing or schools, were ruled 
out on financial grounds.  Dispersal filled the gap although often only with rhetoric and the policy 
was anyhow so contradictory that it was not, in reality, a policy at all. 
 
3.3.4: The NCCI, local funding and the White Paper. 
At the NCCI, Nadine Peppard had thought the 1964 election of a Labour government created a 
more positive environment for the voluntary efforts of the NCCI and VLCs.132  Peppard drew up a 
new programme of work, including a national conference for local groups and an investigation into 
discrimination in employment with the IRR.133  She  believed that voluntary action was the only 
suitable vehicle for changing public attitudes and thus opposed anti-discrimination legislation and 
was only won over when Lester proposed conciliation.134  On the left there was a disdain of such 
voluntarism, Richard Crossman viewing it as an 'odious expression of social oligarchy and churchy 
bourgeois attitudes'.135 
 
Fenner Brockway shared this preference for state action, suggesting that the NCCI should become 
a section of the Home Office.136  Beyond the left, a key piece of journalism from 1965, Peter Evans' 
'The Dark Million' in The Times, suggested the NCCI should be disbanded and ministers take the 
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responsibility.137  Without wishing for such a wholesale nationalisation of the voluntary machinery, 
Foley sought a powerful agency that could enforce policies of equal treatment on public bodies.  
VLCs tended to be apolitical and welfare orientated138 and local authority liaison officers' work was 
limited.139  Without any legal framework, the local committees could only gently persuade local 
authorities to offer services, an asymmetrical situation with the balance on the side of the local, 
white, establishment.  Where these bodies were strong, it was because they were allied with a 
likeminded local authority, most notably the Camden Community Relations Council.140  VLCs were 
likely to be weak in the areas where they were most needed.  Thus, Foley sought to recast the 
NCCI as a bridge between the government and local voluntary effort.  In this view, the NCCI would 
cultivate a layer of professionals in local authorities who could work with 'the leaders of the 
immigrant communities' and help articulate their views and needs.  As a first step to achieving this 
the White Paper announced the NCCI would be given the power to fund a full time post in each 
VLC at £1,500 p.a..141  The reformed NCCI, which would now entirely replace the CIAC, was chaired 
by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Michael Ramsay,142 with a budget limited to £70,000.143  The 
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ministerial distance from this was compounded by the system initially being managed by the 
MHLG which was not responsible for this policy area.144 
 
Progress towards positive help to local authorities with high immigrant populations was initially 
blocked by the Treasury, which failed to see the need for anything beyond existing services.145  In 
July 1965 the Cabinet insisted on such funding, and the principle was included in the White 
Paper.146  By September 1965 it had been codified into a scheme of grants to meet fifty percent of 
staffing (but not capital) costs relating to recent immigrants and their children.147  The expectation 
was that this would support only a few interpreters and English language teachers although most 
need was in housing and social services.148  After a long struggle with the Treasury, this funding 
was facilitated by Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act.149  Although s11 funding (as it 
became known) was criticised for its parsimony and explicit linkage to assimilation and language 
courses, it did act as a conduit for at least some funds particularly to education150 and was another 
move to a more positive approach to integrating immigrants. 
 
The White Paper, now given the title Immigration from the Commonwealth, was squeezed onto 
the Commons' order paper in August 1965 in the dying days of the session and with limited time 
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for debate151 although many Labour backbenchers were dismayed at the restrictions on 
immigration it introduced.  Unsurprisingly, CARD pilloried it for ignoring discrimination and relying 
on the 'positive promotion of goodwill' by powerless local committees,152 a view reflected by The 
Times, which accused the government of failing to give a decisive lead to public opinion against 
prejudice.153  Labour Party staff made no attempt to defend the government's policy,154 and plans 
to republish the 1962 pamphlet The Integration of immigrants were abandoned.155  For the first 
time the wider party demanded greater racial equality.  In the summer of 1965 the Labour-left 
paper, Tribune, called for emergency resolutions to the Labour Party conference.156  The resulting 
six resolutions forced the issue onto the floor of Labour's September 1965 conference, although 
the party hierarchy marginalised the debate, consigning it to the dead time at the end of Thursday 
when the conference was winding down.157  Ray Gunter chaired the session with a heavy hand, 
reportedly agreeing to call Ron Phillips, the only black delegate at the conference, but then 
reneged.  Against the convention that ministers did not speak from the floor, Gunter then called 
the junior minister for housing, Bob Mellish, to speak against the resolution.  Mellish made a 
clumsy speech, unjustly accusing the resolution of proposing to give 'these immigrants' 
preference, misrepresenting the motion as demanding unlimited immigration and ignoring 'our 
people'.158  Although local party delegates voted three to one for the critical motion, the loyalist 
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unions defeated it.159  If the campaign for greater racial equality had achieved one thing, it was an 
alliance between the left-wing constituencies and their erstwhile revisionist foes, both were 
dissatisfied with the government's policy. 
 
From the opposite perspective, Soskice believed that the White Paper was not tough enough.  He 
wished to remove the right of free entry which some East African Asians enjoyed160 since he 
believed they did not 'belong' to the UK, an idea that the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend,161 
recommended the PM reject as 'discrimination on the grounds of race and colour'.162  The CIC too 
was relaxed about this Anglophile and skilled group which would be easily integrated into British 
society.163  Soskice continued planning a new bill to put East African Asian immigration under legal 
control and tighten the rules on dependents and evasion.164  A draft was ready in September 
1965,165 but was shelved by the Cabinet.166  Soskice transferred his hopes to a Royal Commission 
but these were dismissed too.167  In November 1965 in a final cathartic kick to Soskice's 
restrictionist ambitions the Cabinet agreed to a committee to examine the administrative powers 
of immigration officers, something liberals had long demanded.  This became the (Roy) Wilson 
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Committee.168  Crossman was left wondering how long even the bad butcher (Harold) Wilson 
would tolerate Soskice's 'gross incompetence'.169  
 
The White Paper had one key objective, to remove race as an issue that could damage Labour at a 
forthcoming election.  Labour's manifesto for the March 1966 general election played down the 
issue of race, briefly calling for 'realistic controls' on immigration and the promotion of racial 
equality.  Even those who were keen on campaigning against racism were content to support the 
White Paper to prevent the issue damaging them.  Labour's candidate in Southall, the left-winger 
Sydney Bidwell,170 lost the active support that the local Indian Workers Association had given his 
predecessor, despite his strong record on racial equality as a local councillor.171  The issue did not 
re-emerge in the 1966 election and the Labour Party's NEC's Home Policy Sub-committee's view 
was that the issue of immigration had been successfully neutralised.172 
 
What had not been achieved in this first period of Labour government was any meaningful policy 
to integrate immigrants.  Despite Foley's appointment, policy was limited by the influence of 
Labour ministers who were sculpted from a white working-class communalist marble, be that the 
rough hewn Mellish or the polished Crossman.  Their main concern was to ensure that state 
controlled resources flowed to 'our people'.  The agencies of integration, the NCCCI and VLCs, 
remained embedded in a voluntary ethos with neither resources nor power.  Any integration that 
did occur was to the back of the queue. 
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3.3: Integrating immigrants: 1966-c.1967. 
When Roy Jenkins became Home Secretary at the end of 1965 the drive for anti-discrimination 
legislation was not matched by progress on positive measures to integrate immigrants.  This 
section will examine three key areas of policy: education, housing and the police.  This section will 
also analyse developments in the continuing role of the NCCI and the local committees. 
 
3.3.1: The machinery for 'integrating immigrants'. 1966-1967. 
The NCCI remained a weak tool for driving integrationist policy.  Unlike the CIAC, the NCCI had 
been keen to have minority members on its main committee and specialist panels.  This created a 
tension between being an instrument of government policy and representing minority interests, 
most clearly in relation to immigration controls.  Here Dr. Ramsay had ruled that the NCCI should 
not challenge the government's policy.  Against this, Hamza Alavi,173 a left-wing member of the 
NCCI, argued, 'public attitudes towards immigrants and their role and place in the community are 
directly influenced by the debate on immigration control'.174  By the end of 1965 Ramsay was 
forced to accede to pressure from his committee to demand a meeting with Wilson.175  An official 
in the Home Office expressed well these contradictory pressures on the NCCI, advising Jenkins: 
several members of the Committee were reluctant to accept membership because they were 
worried that by so doing they would be identified with the government policy on controlling 
immigration from the Commonwealth … [but] there is a danger that the Committee will come 
to be regarded as a pressure group opposed to immigration control, and that the very real 
contribution which it is already making and can continue to make in the future to speeding up 
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the processes of integration - which is what it was set up to do - will be overlooked.  Although 
the Committee must obviously preserve its image with the immigrant communities as a 
progressive body if it is to retain their confidence, and although it has a legitimate interest in 
immigration procedures, it will not be in its own interest to become identified in the public as 
nothing more than a group of people who are 'against the Government' on behalf of coloured 
immigrants.
176
 
This tension was to remain a feature of the NCCI until it was superseded by the Community 
Relations Council in 1968. 
 
The NCCI continued to struggle to find a clear role.  Part of its remit was to educate public opinion, 
but as they noted in early 1966 in a review six months after being reconstituted, 'we did not seem 
to know the answer to the growing incidence of prejudice and discrimination which were forcing 
the coloured minority into the familiar role of scapegoat for Britain's social ills.'177  The NCCI 
continued by building an array of professional interest on its housing, education, employment  and 
social work training panels, although some of this work reflected the dearth of professional 
thinking in these areas and verged on well meaning amateurism.178  Nor did they have a clear 
approach to building up VLCs.  While some such as Camden Community Relations Council and the 
Oxford Committee for Racial Equality were pioneering campaigns, most remained, in Rose et al's 
judgement, guilty of 'tokenism' and were dominated by 'the prevailing view that the "problems" 
derived from the strangeness of immigrants, rather than from racialism in the host community or 
its institutions'.179 
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There were a variety of views about how the NCCI should develop.  Some believed that it could 
play the role of mobilising minority support for reform as the civil rights leadership had in the USA.  
Thus, in October 1967 the Home Office minister David Ennals (who had replaced Foley in early 
1967) told representatives of the VLCs that they were involved in a struggle to show that a 
predominantly white society could share power and influence with a black and Asian minority.  
Ennals continued: 
Voluntary Liaison Committees would be judged by their achievements, not merely by the 
number of meetings held in a year.  Success would also depend on the extent to which 
immigrants' organizations supported their work.  If they were simply a branch of the 
establishment, they would not earn, or deserve to earn, the support and co-operation of the 
immigrants' communities.  Tokenism was not enough.  Although there was an increasing 
involvement on the part of Government departments in the work of race relations, the 
National Committee and the voluntary liaison committees must exert pressure at the points 
where action seemed ineffective.
180
 
Beyond this declaration, little more was done and the VLCs were neither given powers nor funds 
to encourage this process. 
 
A second strand of thinking was that the NCCI should become a more professional body, and with 
the framing of the new Race Relations Bill in 1967 this began to dominate thinking.  This was 
driven by the feeling that the Race Relations Board (RRB) had become a professional operation 
compared to which the NCCI was an amateurish failure.  The 'Ontario option' was considered, to 
turn the RRB into a Human Rights Commission (as existed in the Canadian province), absorbing the 
NCCI's functions and ending the voluntary element.  From the left, Dipak Nandy, part of  a CARD 
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delegation to the Home Office in 1967, suggested the NCCI and the VLCs were more interested in 
organising English classes for immigrants than tackling racism, and also looked for a more 
politically accountable replacement.181  Against this, the NCSS argued that NCCI had become too 
much a creature of central government control.182 
 
Although agreeing that the NCCI was amateurish, Bonham Carter steered a middle course.  He 
ruled out a RRB takeover of the NCCI proposing a more limited body, its panels being disbanded 
and replaced with Home Office co-ordinated research, a renamed body oriented to 'community 
relations' and drawing in local groups representing minorities and the voluntary sector.183  
Alongside this, he envisaged a more professional RRB shorn of the dead weight of 'standard 
figures' acting as a leader of opinion.184  The RRB's local conciliation boards were seen as valuable 
in spreading a professionalised ethos around race relations including a leading group of 
immigrants and a layer of trade unionists and professionals, something the VLCs had not done.185  
Jenkins concurred with Bonham Carter's view,186 so although the NCCI saw its role as developing 
policy,187 Peppard and Ramsay agreed to a slimmed down NCCI focusing on supporting the local 
VLCs with a strengthened executive and a strong and activist chair.188  Thus, by the time Jenkins 
left the Home Office the shape of the NCCI's successor had taken some preliminary shape, 
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although Callaghan was to have the final hand in shaping the Community Relations Commission 
(CRC) (see below). 
 
Jenkins never warmed to the voluntarism of the NCCI.  It is notable that in his memoirs while 
praise is heaped on the RRB and his friend Mark Bonham Carter, the NCCI and its staff receive no 
mention.189  In The Labour Case (1959) Jenkins looked more to the state than to voluntary groups 
(relegated to the last paragraph of his book) for creating his vision of a civilised society.190  The 
bodies oriented to the voluntary sector that Jenkins inherited were diminished in favour of 
professionalised state bodies.  The story of how the NCCI's successor, the CRC, was eventually 
absorbed by the RRB under the name of the Commission of Racial Equality is beyond the scope of 
the current research.  But the process started under Jenkins was to lead to equality driven by the 
state, not the voluntary sector. 
 
3.3.2: Education. 
It might be assumed that integrationist measures were pursued in education because the 
responsible minister from January 1965 was the Labour revisionist theorist, Tony Crosland.  It may 
be more important that his Conservative predecessor, the liberal Edward Boyle, had initiated not 
only some thinking about minority children (as outlined above, the thinking on dispersal was of 
little value) but also initiated policy to make the education system more equal generally.  The 
publication of the Newsom Report in 1963 had dealt the first blow against the educational 
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selection at 11 which underpinned the tripartite system.191  This led Boyle to commission the 
Plowden Report to examine and counter the impact of deprivation on primary school children's 
progress,192 which was received by the Ministry of Education in late 1966 and published early in 
1967. 
 
The relevance of Plowden here is threefold.  First, the report gave some special attention to 
minority children in schools, particularly their underperformance in the tripartite system.193  
Second, it developed a notion of multiple deprivation that was to become vital for other aspects of 
integration policy.  Plowden based this on the proportion of unskilled and semiskilled workers in 
an area; larger family size; receipt of means tested benefits; overcrowded housing; poor school 
attendance; the proportion of school students with special needs; the number of single parent 
families; and the number of children unable to speak English.  Third, having identified the areas of 
multiple deprivation, it argued they should be targeted with additional resources.194  It was this 
framework, rather than any egalitarian one from within the Labour Party, that made education a 
fertile soil for the development of integrationist policy.  This was aided by there being an 
intellectual infrastructure in education in teacher training colleges, university education 
departments and the Schools' Inspectorate.195 
 
Prior to Plowden, integrationist policy in education had centred on the unpopular and ineffective 
policy of dispersal.  Nicholas Hawkes spoke for the educationalists' objection in his 1966 IRR book, 
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damning its 'emphasis on the logistical rather than the educational' and stressing instead a policy 
of deepening comprehensive education and progressive teaching methods as the best, 
educationally driven, route to integration.196  To this, reformers added that the same pressures 
that lead to dispersal also led to stigmatising some minority children, particularly Afro-Caribbean 
boys.  High profile grassroots campaigns in the late 1960s drew attention to the inappropriate use 
of special needs schooling (then styled ESN, educationally sub-normal, education) for this group.197 
 
With many black and Asian people confined to run down inner city areas, there was pressure on 
school places in often dilapidated schools.  Finding a solution to this within the government's other 
priorities proved difficult.  The CIC's successor Cabinet committee, the Immigration and 
Community Relations Committee (ICR), optimistically suggested in 1969 an answer, 'a new school 
strategically placed on the borders of these areas of concentration which can arrest this process by 
attracting children from both types of community in proportion that would probably be acceptable 
to both.'198  With limited spending available for such schemes through the Urban Programme, the 
effect of such ideas was limited. 
 
When it came to what happened in the classroom, multiculturalism was becoming more 
thoroughly theorised.  The NCCI's Education Panel was developing the idea that education should 
emphasise the validity of minority culture.199  By early 1967 their approach was of cultural 
pluralism, looking at resources that would help 'promote diversity' in schools (and they did use 
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that remarkably contemporary sounding phrase).200  Tomlinson notes that the assimilationist 
language of teaching in the early 1960s had become replaced by equality of opportunity by the 
end of the decade, but progress was slow and localised, another example of the decentralised 
nature of much social policy leading to inaction in Whitehall.  Most policy development occurred 
below the radar of central government in LEAs, the Inspectorate and so on.  Where the DES did 
take initiative it was often at arm's length, funding research bodies such as the National 
Federation for Educational Research.201  Much of the progress in schooling that had happened in 
the second half of the 1960s was driven by teachers,202 and while there were pockets of good 
practice, there were much greater pockets of bad.203  Thus when prior to the 1970 general election 
the then Secretary of State for Education, Edward Short, told the NUT conference that it was the 
obligation of schools to fight racism and prejudice, his department offered little leadership on how 
this might be done.204 
 
3.3.3: Housing. 
Housing policy had moved little while Crossman had been minister.  The situation only began to 
change in August 1966 when he was replaced by a more straightforward left winger, Anthony 
Greenwood, who had opposed the White Paper.  The extent of discrimination in housing was 
devastatingly shown by the PEP report leading to the MHLG organising a conference of local 
authorities in June 1967.  The MHLG's new openness was reflected in its acceptance of many 
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points made by NCCI's Housing Panel prior to the conference.205  Greenwood told the conference 
that there needed to be a change in policy, and particularly that councils needed to do more slum 
clearance and allocate on the basis of housing need.206  Local authorities continued to prove 
willing only to act in line with the feelings of the majority of white residents, and Greenwood was 
unwilling to challenge the principle of local government autonomy on this issue.207 
 
Without a drive from central government to open up council housing, ameliorative measures 
took on greater importance.  In its 1965 report the CIAC had pointed to the obvious measures, 
improvement grants, repair and municipalisation of slum housing.208 The Milner Holland Report 
has suggested establishing ‘areas of special control' with funding for improvements.209  Similarly, 
the sociologist John Rex210 argued for the establishment of regeneration agencies to pursue such 
a programme to improve housing in the worst areas where immigrants tended to live.211  
Crossman had opposed such policy as 'special treatment' for immigrants.212  In early 1967 the 
NCCI again suggested similar plans for areas of special housing need213 on the basis of extended 
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Section 11 funding.214  This idea was reinforced by the Plowden Report in its approach of focusing 
resources on the areas of the most acute need without specifically targeting immigrants.215  
Ultimately, local authority autonomy and the lack of funding led to the MHLG's failure to take this 
lead to develop a programme to help alleviate the problems that immigrants faced in housing.  
Even the Urban Programme simply excluded housing as too expensive to tackle.216 
 
As a result, little policy for positive equality was advanced in housing.  While the previous chapter 
has shown that the 1968 Race Relations Act did begin to remove barriers to accessing council 
housing, the MHLG did little to assist this process.  More importantly, the lack of any positive 
programme targeted at minorities in the worst housing meant that too little was done to address 
the results of previous discrimination.  Thus many minorities remained concentrated in inner-city 
zones of deprivation. 
 
3.3.4: The police. 
The problem of the police's relationship to black people received scant official recognition until 
the Scarman Report of 1982 and particularly the Macpherson Report of 1999.217  As early as 1964, 
some in Labour's ranks recognised a problem, for example the Labour MP Donald Chapman218 
took a delegation from the British Caribbean Association to the Home Office in December 1964 to 
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complain about the police's use of racist language and heavy handedness only to be met by a 
Home Office refusal to countenance any problem.219 
 
After his appointment Foley was more open to concerns.  As early as 1965 he noted that there 
were no black or Asian police officers, and he suggested efforts be made to recruit some.220  The 
Home Office's view was that there were no suitable candidates.221   Soskice suggested that it was 
unlikely that someone raised abroad could handle the relations with the public necessary for 
policing, which in some ways showed the problem.  Police constables operated with considerable 
autonomy and were recruited from the local respectable working class to police the communities 
they knew well.  Thus, the police dealt with a criminal class they recognised, even if not always 
according to the rule of law.222  Immigrants were not only outside of this established working class, 
but were the subject of some suspicion if not hostility from the working class and thus found 
themselves subject to the wrong kind of attention from the police.223  Attempts to remedy this 
through recruitment failed since by 1968 only three black or Asian officers had been appointed, 
despite 2% of applicants coming from minorities.224 
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Some attention was drawn to the problems of police racism by campaigning from Joe Hunte225 of 
the West Indian Standing Conference, who caused a stir with his 1966 pamphlet Nigger Hunting 
in England?,226 and the white liberal Derrick Sington227 (who had been in the British Intelligence 
Corps and  one of the first at Belsen on its liberation).228  Under Jenkins, the Home Office 
recognised a problem, although solutions were often presented as ones of slight adjustment.  
Thus, Howard Drake suggested early in 1966: 
as with so many other aspects of integration, the prime need here is for an efficient public 
relations exercise since so many of the difficulties which occur are the result of half truths and 
misunderstandings.  A number of police forces have already found it fruitful to appoint one 
officer with special responsibility for liaison with the coloured communities in an attempt to 
bring about a measure of mutual understanding and avoid unnecessary friction.
229
 
This led to slight ameliorative measures such as contact between the police and VLCs.230 
 
Another measure was that some awareness training for police recruits was pursued.  At a meeting 
in November 1966 with senior Metropolitan Police officers, Foley and Howard Drake presented 
the view that the key problem was of immigrants being unused to urban life or having chips on 
their shoulders, although this was possibly to avoid putting the police on the defensive.  The Home 
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Office proposed a three day training package in race relations for police recruits,231 leading at least 
to some NCCI speakers on police training courses uncovering the culture inside the police.  One 
NCCI speaker reported, 'almost every questioner, whether implicitly or explicitly, suggested that 
coloured immigration was unnecessary and undesirable, that immigrants have caused grave 
deterioration of urban conditions'.  Each of these questioners receiving enthusiastic applause.232  
Sington and Jim Rose argued for the NCCI to take up the issue233 but their demands for better 
training led to some forces stopping the training altogether.234  The issue re-emerged from the 
Home Office's Advisory Committee on Race Relations Research in 1970 when, despite 
embarrassed officials attempting to brush the issue under the carpet, an ad hoc committee of 
academics was set up to look at the issues.  Again, there was little impact on the police.235 
 
In 1967 in an attempt to have the police covered by the new Race Relations Bill, CARD produced a 
dossier of forty-three alleged cases of discrimination236 which the Police Federation attacked as 
'irresponsible and grossly distorted'.237  Any chance of progress on this ended when Callaghan 
became Home Secretary.  He had helped build the Police Federation in the 1950s238 and came 
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down quickly against the police being covered, arguing the Police Complaints Procedure and the 
Code of Conduct established by the 1964 Police Act were adequate.239  Suggested compromises 
were that the RRB be given an oversight role for racially related complaints240 and that racial 
discrimination would be written into the police disciplinary code.241  These were opposed by 
Callaghan, who took the issue to Cabinet.  Jenkins, absent from the Cabinet, sent a memo arguing 
that this must not be dropped because of the effect such a move would have on immigrant 
communities, but Wilson backed his current Home Secretary.242 
 
The failure to introduce reforms into the police might lend credence to radical theories of state 
oppression and dividing the working class, but the explanation is more prosaic.  It was chance 
that the liberal Jenkins, who favoured at least a degree of reform of the police, was replaced by 
Callaghan, not only a non-liberal but one with strong links to the Police Federation.  Nonetheless, 
failure to reform the police led to worsening relations with minorities that did not begin to be 
overcome until the 1990s.243 
* 
The above three policy areas and employment policy illustrates the limited development of the 
policy to integrate immigrants.  Immigration to the UK did not cause problems, but showed up the 
fault lines that existed.  When immigrants, like dye on a biologist's slide, exposed what existed, 
they tended to be blamed for these problems.  So when immigrants developed high rates of TB by 
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being crowded into damp slums, the Ministry of Health's response was to fall into the rhetoric of 
control by inserting in the White Paper the completely irrelevant and impractical screening of 
immigrants as a condition of entry.244  The vast majority of immigrants faced serious discrimination 
in housing, and many were trapped in low paid and unskilled jobs.  The police were not only all but 
shut to minorities, but were hostile to them. 
 
Jenkins' arrival at the Home Office did not see any decisive shift in policies on integration.  There 
were a number of factors that can explain this.  First, while the Home Office could win legislation 
prohibiting discrimination, when it came to more positive integrationist measures that required 
other departments developing and implementing policy as well as expending scarce resources, the 
task was much harder.  Second, positive integrationist policies were less obvious and harder to 
implement than negative measures.  Changing the culture of the police, for example, needed more 
than a declaratory statement.  Third, there was often uncertainty about what integration meant 
and how to achieve a more tolerant society.  Fourth, there was the weakness of central 
government control over local authority services, which were themselves much more attuned to 
the demands of long standing local (white) communities.  Fifth, many in the government feared an 
electoral backlash if they were seen to 'favour' immigrants.  These reasons notwithstanding, the 
more simple explanation was that beyond the Home Office under Jenkins, there was little will in 
the government to push for the integration of immigrants and it would take a shift in events to 
even begin to focus the collective governmental mind on these issues. 
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3.4: Crossing the Tiber:  immigration, the 'Rivers of Blood' speech and 
the government's response 1966-1970. 
3.4.1: Jenkins and the control of immigration. 
While integrationist policies were weakly developed after 1965, immigration control remained a 
central plank of government policy which continued to be developed while Jenkins was at the 
Home Office although without headline grabbing initiatives.  Nonetheless, immigration continued 
to assert itself in the public consciousness through 1967 before exploding in April 1968.  Jenkins' 
time as Home Secretary was at best a hiatus. 
 
Jenkins stated in his keynote speech to the NCCI in February 1966 that immigration control was: 'a 
distasteful but necessary duty.  My instincts are all against the restriction of free movement, 
whether for work or education or pleasure, from one country to another.'  Ultimately, he restated 
the established policy of control being necessary to promote integration and immigration should 
not be 'so high as to create a widespread resistance to effective integration policies.  Equally it 
must not be put so unreasonably low as to create an embittered sense of apartness in the 
immigrant community itself.'245  The liberalisation of controls which took place under Jenkins was 
limited to the relaxation of instructions to immigration officers and the impractical proposal 
contained in the White Paper for the registration of dependents was quietly dropped in August 
1966.246  The New Statesman exaggerated when they suggested the White Paper was 'being slowly 
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crumpled up'.247  This was rational tidying up, not a dismantling of control.  Elsewhere, Jenkins was 
less liberal.  The (Roy) Wilson Committee reported in August 1967, recommending a system of 
appeal against administrative decisions and the creation of an advisory and welfare organisation.  
Jenkins was happy to accept the proposals, but in a move redolent of Soskice, sought to encase 
the soft kernel of reform in a tougher shell of restrictionist measures.  This was consciously formed 
to allay public fears, wishing to reserve the right to act on security or political grounds and the 
continued power to summarily deport those who had broken their conditions of entry.248  Even so, 
no time could be found for the necessary legislation and backbench pressure continued for the 
report's implementation into 1968.249  
 
When he became Home Secretary in November 1967, Callaghan had more of a taste for playing to 
the anti-immigration gallery than Jenkins.  He gathered sixteen distinct points to be included in a 
White Paper but, despite Wilson's backing, 250 he had to bow to pressure from the CIC to shelve 
the plan.251  Callaghan's opportunity for a public display of toughness soon arrived. 
 
3.4.2: The death of a meritorious community. 
The Asians of British East Africa had long been the loyal servants of the Empire.  The 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, either by chance or design, allowed those who did not have 
Kenyan (or other British East African) passports after independence to keep full British passports 
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allowing them untrammelled entry into the UK.252  In 1965 Soskice had wanted to end this, but had 
found few allies.  Then, in early 1967, the Africanisation process in Kenya started in earnest, 
threatening all Kenyan Asians.253  Trend suggested that a fix needed to be sought with India and 
Pakistan (a very similar approach to that of Heath in the Ugandan Asian crisis of 1972), questioning 
the desirability of policy designed 'forcibly to keep [Asians] out and admit only Europeans'.254  
Jenkins stayed his hand,255 although a reserve policy to exclude Kenyan Asians was outlined 
including the principle of partiality, that citizenship descended down the male blood line.  No 
objections were raised inside government at this time.256  In a speech in October 1967, Powell 
started his campaign to remove the right of entry to the UK of Kenyan Asians who still held British 
passports.  The following day Jenkins told the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee that the 
possibility of ten to twelve thousand East African Asians a year would not be a problem although 
contingency plans should be formulated.257 
 
When Callaghan became Home Secretary, the chances of a liberal solution receded.  In February 
1968 Callaghan proposed to Cabinet, restrictions on East African Asians' right of entry.  This was 
opposed by the Joint Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomas, 258 and the 
Attorney General, Elwyn Jones, who argued that this would be perceived as racist, be a breach of 
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faith, unworkable and contrary to international law259 (this last point was to be confirmed in a 
1973 adjudication in a European Court of Human Rights case brought by Anthony Lester).260  
Callaghan's view was that the change was necessary to stop 'a backlash of resentment against 
immigrants' by removing passports of those 'who did not really "belong here"', and that by going 
ahead with the Race Relations Bill, 'we should be balancing against the restrictions imposed on 
would-be immigrants an assurance that we should do everything we could to ensure equal rights 
for those immigrants who were permitted to enter the country.'  The CIC was opposed to 
Callaghan's proposals to remove Asians' right to British citizenship, not only as a capitulation to 
prejudice, but an unnecessary one since the people involved were educated Anglophones.261 
 
The Cabinet were worried that parliamentary pressure would build, not least since another 
Conservative hard-liner on immigration, Duncan Sandys,262 had a Ten-minute Rule Bill down for 
28th February 1968.263  The Cabinet discussion on 15th February was unified only on the need for a 
quick decision but divided on whether it should be to put legislation in place or to announce there 
would be none.264  Further discussion was foreclosed by the Cabinet's deliberations being reported 
in the press the next day.  This was much to the chagrin of one of those opposed to the measures 
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including George Brown, who believed this to be one of Wilson's leaks and designed to strengthen 
the restrictionists' hand.265 
 
Although around 100,000 Kenyan Asians held British passports, the peak monthly rate of arrivals in 
1967 to the UK had been only 2,300 and some of these were believed to have travelled on to 
Canada.  Nonetheless, Callaghan's proposal to the Cabinet that only 1,000 vouchers per year be 
made available for this group266 was agreed on 22nd February 1968.267  The plan was to have the 
bill on the statute book by Easter.  Even through his staid Civil Service tones, it was clear that 
Trend was uncomfortable with the decision's disregard for international legal and treaty 
obligations.  He suggested to Wilson: 
the Bill would be represented as evidence that the Government have given way to right-wing 
pressure motivated by racial prejudice, you may wish to invite the Lord President ... to 
arrange for his Home Publicity Committee to consider how best the Bill, in conjunction with 
the Race Relations Board, can be presented to the public.
268
 
It was, however, too late for the measure to be cleverly gift wrapped to make it seem other than it 
was.  Callaghan announced his intention to legislate on 22nd February 1968, the only concession 
being that the number of vouchers was increased to 1,500 a year.269  The Commonwealth 
Immigration Bill was given its second reading in the Commons on 27th February270 and became law 
on 1st March 1968. 
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The 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act was a low point in British racial equality policy.  Those 
excluded would not have been difficult to 'integrate' in any other sense than being of Asian origin.  
Furthermore, it entirely cut the ground from under the feet of liberals in the Conservative shadow 
cabinet such as Iain Macleod271 and Boyle.  As Tribune commented in February 1968, when a dog is 
thrown a bone it will only keep it quiet for a while.272 
 
3.4.3: 'Rivers of Blood' and after. 
Enoch Powell delivered his 'Rivers of Blood' speech on April 21st 1968.  It was directed at the Race 
Relations Bill and through this to the presence of black and Asian people amongst the British 
citizenry.273  Its affect was more to give form to existing public opinion than to create it, but the 
storm it caused was none the less for that.  Labour seemed paralysed, and struggled to respond to 
Powell.  While the party's NEC received a clutch of anti-Powell resolutions from local Labour 
Parties,274 there was no sense in which the government was under grassroots pressure.  The TUC 
was mainly silent.  Its Assistant General Secretary, Vic Feather,275 delivered a speech on race 
relations the following weekend, but did not use the opportunity to denounce Powell or disavow 
those trade unionists who had taken action in his favour, as TGWU members already had at 
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Heathrow.276  CARD did nothing, having been taken over by Maoists in 1967, showing itself to now 
be a paper tiger.  The NCCL organised a series of meetings but without great impact,277 while the 
MCF held a counter demonstration to a Powellite rally in early July which ended violently, but this 
was slight even compared to their efforts around the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.278 
 
The government's short term damage limitation consisted of the hope that by not challenging the 
contents of the speech it would fade from the public mind.  Any related ministerial speech had to 
have clearance from the Home Secretary279 and emphasise the strictness of immigration control 
while downplaying the Race Relations Bill as conciliation based.280  When the Attorney General 
received complaints that Powell had breached the law on incitement to racial hatred the law 
officers and the PM's Office avoided giving this any publicity.  The Attorney General decided, after 
some hesitation, that there was insufficient evidence of an offence having been committed.281 
 
Initially Callaghan shaped the government's very negative response to Powell.  In interviews with 
The Observer and the BBC's flagship current affairs programme Panorama, Callaghan did little to 
assert the case for racial equality.  He explicitly used the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act as 
an example of why those striking in Powell's favour were wasting their time, the East Asian 
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immigrants were a problem that had been dealt with.  He told Panorama that the government 
would fund the repatriation for any immigrant without the resources to pay for their own 
passage,282 partially conceding one of Powell's demands. 
 
Callaghan's drift into Powell's territory was halted with the PLP and Cabinet meetings of 2nd May 
where more positive consensus building measures and money to regenerate deprived areas were 
discussed.  A line was drawn under the negative measures by agreeing there would be no further 
cut in the number of vouchers and that no steps would be taken against the flow of dependents 
which stood at 50,000-60,000 a year.  Rather, a programme to educate public opinion was planned 
including using the remaining stages of the Race Relations Bill to promote the ideal of racial 
equality.283  Wilson used a speech in Birmingham that weekend to reset Labour's response to 
Powell in a more positive way, improvising proposals for the nascent Urban Programme and a new 
Select Committee on Race Relations.  Wilson's statement that 'the battle against racialism here in 
Britain knows no boundaries, no limits'284 asserted racial equality, at least in rhetoric, in a way 
Callaghan had not been willing to do and there was at least some policy substance beneath it. 
 
The select committee had already been proposed in the second reading debate of the Race 
Relations Bill three days after 'Rivers of Blood'.  Its purpose had been to mollify opposition to the 
bill by giving the Commons an opportunity to monitor its operation.285  In his Birmingham speech 
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Wilson expanded the plan for the committee to include immigration, and later that year this was 
agreed to by the Conservatives.286  The government hoped to build a consensus on race, but 
immigration was too attractive an issue for the Conservatives to leave alone for long and in 
November 1968 they demanded a cut in the number of dependents.  When Labour responded 
that there was no humane way of so doing, from the Conservative front bench Quintin Hogg287 
attacked the select committee as a 'a cloak for inaction'.288  There was little sign that a consensus 
had been created.  Plans to educate public opinion were even more problematic since it was 
unclear what this meant in policy terms.  Crossman, now Lord President, produced a two stage 
programme.289  In the short term he believed the facts on immigration and the Race Relations Bill 
would be delivered to the public by a sympathetic press, although he appeared to lack the will to 
pursue this himself, and sought to pass responsibility to the Home Office.  Ultimately, little was 
done.290 
 
The second, longer term goal, to educate the public and reduce prejudice remained a good 
intention lacking any policy instruments for its pursuit.  Again, responsibility for this was 
uncertain.291  Despite considerable effort, Crossman failed to stimulate the Home Office's interest 
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in carrying out research.292  When the NCCI was interrogated for methods to promote tolerance it 
had developed, Government Information Officers found its operation amateurish and focused 
more on influencing the government than attempting to affect public opinion or working with the 
mass media.293  Any long term government strategy on moving public opinion fizzled out after 
Crossman was replaced by Fred Peart294 as Lord President in October 1968. 
 
3.4.4. The Urban Programme. 
The last element of Labour's response to Powell was the Urban Programme.  Its origins predated 
'Rivers of Blood' having antecedents in the Milner Holland Report on housing in London of 1965, 
the work of John Rex, s11 funding and the Plowden Report.  The most important source was the 
Community Development Programme (CDP), which grew out of Labour's criminal justice reforms 
to forestall juvenile delinquency by addressing the needs of those suffering from multiple forms of 
deprivation.  This embodied the emerging idea that not all welfare services should be universal but 
some resources should be targeted on those facing deprivation.295  Derek Morrell296 had been 
brought into the Home Office as Assistant Under Secretary in the Children's Unit by Roy Jenkins for 
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his reforming attitude297 and drove the idea of the CPD with a zeal for creating communities and 
allowing personal moral growth that raised the ire of Crossman.298 
 
Wilson had been careful to phrase the announcement of the Urban Programme in his Birmingham 
speech as a general drive to reduce poverty, stating, 'many of our big towns face tremendous 
problems whether in education, whether in housing, whether in health and welfare, even where 
there is virtually no immigrant problem.'299  Morrell too understood the political sensitivity of 
'positive discrimination in the use of resources' and the need to avoid 'provoking "backlash" 
effects from other communities or areas of need' particularly where the target area included a 
high proportion of immigrants.300  Similarly, when officials set to work on the Urban Programme 
they were very clear that this was 'positive discrimination in favour of immigrant areas ... these 
might be dressed up as urban areas of general social need'.301  Labour had long resisted any 
appearance of giving immigrants 'special treatment'. 
 
The Urban Programme also reflected the 'rediscovery of poverty', as proselytised in the work of 
the sociologist and campaigner Peter Townsend302 and his Child Poverty Action Group 
(coincidently, modelled on CARD).303  Another Labour aligned sociologist, Richard Titmuss (also an 
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NCCI/CRC member), developed this idea to suggest welfare should be more targeted on need.304  
Such ideas informed the 1967 Plowden Report into primary education which has demanded that 
resources be targeted to compensate for 'the handicaps imposed by the environment'305 and 
created an overview of what such deprivation was.  This means testing of neighbourhoods was not 
entirely new (there are antecedents from the 1930s)306 but found a new resonance in the 1960s.  
Another, and more immediate, influence was Johnson-era US programmes, such as the War on 
Poverty and Sure Start.307  
 
The programme was enacted in the 1969 Local Government Grants (Special Needs) Act and 
empowered the Home Secretary to invite selected local authorities to bid for 75% of the cost of 
projects,308 although the funding of £5 million for the first full year was considered wholly 
inadequate,309 and the expectation was that it would be used to fund relatively cheap community 
projects, such as playgroups, and certainly offered nothing for capital intensive projects like 
housing.310  The potential for voluntary agencies to deliver services locally was significant, and the 
organisations that attracted funding were often not the older style of voluntary organisations, but 
the more recent and radical breed of community groups.311  While the projects funded were 
sometimes facilities for all, often they either gave space for developing communitarian 
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organisations or were overtly directed at a minority group.  This helped foster group identity and 
local leadership.  The government was far from clear that this was the end it wanted, or whether 
by improving social mobility out of poor areas they would promote dispersal and assimilation. 
 
The Urban Programme was focussed on the delivery of limited grants to local government for 
cheap welfare and community services.  As Edwards and Batley note, 'non-service features relating 
more to the economic and social structure, like income distribution, employment, and the 
allocation of resources to housing sectors, went unmentioned'.312  Thus as John Grieve (head of 
the Home Office Research Unit in 1969) later noted the programme mobilised 'more rhetoric than 
resources'.313  Although it marked a shift away from the voluntary ethos of the NCCI to 
government funded community programmes, it also showed the lack of a social democratic 
response to the problems that Powell had exploited.  As Ruth Glass, firmly on the left, wrote 
immediately after 'Rivers of Blood', immigration was being held responsible for exposing the 
already existing inadequacies in society.
314
  Her answer was that government should make more 
of a concerted attack on poverty in general.  A similar social democratic response was proposed by 
Townsend, who from this more mainstream Labour perspective, suggested that Labour's reaction 
to immigration was inseparable from its retreat from other forms of social equality.  The 
government had failed to 'introduce any strong policy to overcome some of the housing and other 
problems which were arising in a number of our cities; it did not encourage wider settlement or 
assist local authorities to materially improve race relations'.315  The Urban Programme contained a 
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positive concept of equality, in a very weak form, that at least created a policy structure for 
delivering what Glass and Townsend demanded. 
 
3.5: Callaghan at the Home Office 1969-1970. 
As the furore over 'Rivers of Blood' died down, and with Callaghan bedding in at the Home Office, 
not only were there few new initiatives on racial equality but there was a reduction in the staffing 
of the race relations section at the Home Office.316  It would be quite possible to end the history of 
racial equality under the 1964-1970 Labour government in mid-1968, but there are two issues 
worth some attention. The development of the newly appointed Community Relations 
Commission (CRC) and continued development of immigration policy.  
 
3.5.1: The Community Relations Commission 1968-1970. 
The name 'Community Relations Board' was first suggested by the NCCI in 1967, and the idea soon 
took hold.  The term 'immigrant' was no longer serviceable since racial minorities in Britain were 
by degrees ceasing to be immigrants but their descendents.  The idea of community implied these 
children of immigrants cohered around distinct identities, community relations being rooted in the 
NCCI's view that it was its role to articulate the interests of minority communities to 
government.317  Others saw community relations as smoothing tensions between minorities and 
the white majority, and this often meant, in John Rex's words, 'discouraging practices (for 
example, kinds of cooking and late-night parties) which are offensive to the English'.318  What 
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community relations meant at the scale of national policy was unclear.  There had been no PEP or 
Street Report into community relations.319 
 
The NCCI had attempted to maintain the uneasy balance between its status as a government body 
and the need to work with minority groups.320  With Callaghan responsible for the new CRC, the 
scales were tilted more towards the government, compounded by the view that the NCCI had 
failed due to poor administration.  While Jenkins had been clear that bureaucratising race relations 
would be a hurdle to winning the trust of minorities,321 under Callaghan the search for good 
organisation became a substitute for clear purpose.  Callaghan shaped the Commission's 
membership quite differently to that of the NCCI.322  Although appointing two longstanding 
campaigners for racial equality, Jocelyn Barrow323 and David Pitt,324 the members marked 'Indian' 
and 'Pakistani' on the civil servants' short list saw community activists being replaced by 
professionals, a GP and a psychiatric social worker.  There was no-one on the committee to 
represent the interests of the VLCs, local government, IRR or NCSS.325   Unlike the NCCI, the CRC 
did not serve to link the state with voluntary action and attempts to build links with minority 
organisations were given less priority. 
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In the search for a chair, the Home Office prioritised administrative skills over expertise in race 
relations,326 before appointing the trade union leader and ex-minister, Frank Cousins, who proved 
to have neither.  Cousins initially performed his role part-time while continuing to lead the TGWU, 
the Home Office complaining he was 'elusive' and Peppard that it was proving difficult to interest 
him in the job.327  Cousins had little feel for promoting racial equality, suggesting in a meeting with 
the Home Office in early 1969 soon after his appointment that reducing the number of vouchers 
for Commonwealth immigrants further would 'cut the ground from under Mr. Powell's feet'.328  
Indeed, he saw little role for the CRC and wanted it to merge with the RRB or be absorbed by a 
government department.329  To strengthen the administration, the Home Office had appointed an 
ex-colonial administrator and UN official, John Reddaway,330 as Senior Administrative Officer.331  
Like Cousins, Reddaway came into conflict with the CRC's staff and the consensus was that he 
failed to see the political aspects of his role in gaining the confidence of minorities, working 
through the media to influence public opinion or behind the scenes to influence elite opinion.332  
This led to Reddaway's resignation in late 1969333 and Cousins taking on the job of chair full-time, 
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an outcome that no-one wanted.  Cousins found a new enthusiasm at least for the trappings of the 
office, demanding that he should be supplied with an official car.334 
 
The independence of the VLCs had been central to the NCCI's operation, but Callaghan and 
Cousins agreed that a more centralised system was necessary..335  Cousins pushed for the funded 
local officials, now generically called Community Relations Officers (CROs), to be centrally 
trained336 and wished to use financial means to politically control the local committees.337  This 
was opposed by those who prized the VLCs' independence.  Anne Dummett,338 who had resigned 
as the CRO for the local Oxford committee, believed that the CRC had failed to live up to its 
voluntary ethos and that the government had relied too much on legislation, and this had 
weakened the social movement for change.  Dummett pointed to the contradiction in the position 
of those who wanted firmer action from the CRC.  There was no strong independent force behind 
it in civil society on which the CRC could base itself nor was there a body of professional practice 
that the CRC could reflect.  So without strong backing from government the CRC was never likely 
to be in a powerful position.339 
 
The CRC, along with the RRB, was now clearly part of the state.  Its fundamental role was neither 
to represent minorities to the government nor to assist voluntary action.  This left the CRC in an 
uncertain position.  While the RRB had a clear role in enforcing the anti-discrimination measures of 
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the Race Relations Acts, the CRC's promotion of community relations both nationally and through 
the local Community Relations Councils (which it did not control) was nebulous at best.  Those 
positive tools that existed for doing this, particularly the Urban Programme, were a matter of 
negotiation between central and local government.  Without a clearly defined new role, the CRC 
replicated the functions of the NCCI particularly disbursing funds although the formulation of 
policy through specialist panels began to decline.340 
 
3.5.2: Immigration policy December 1968-1970. 
The 1964-1970 Labour governments ended as they had begun, with a Home Secretary attempting 
to satisfy public opinion with tough measures to limit immigration.  In December 1968 Callaghan 
brought forward proposals to restrict the right of entry of fiancés and the replacement of vouchers 
with temporary work permits.341  In February 1969 he proposed a series of new measures along 
with unspecified 'positive steps' in a pre-election white paper, which he proposed to call In Place 
of Prejudice.342  To add toughness to his putative white paper, Callaghan wanted to announce 
availability of money for voluntary repatriation343 to replace the existing programme.  Officials 
thought that what existed was 'a mouse of a scheme', although they continued, 'a larger animal 
would be impractical and inappropriate and that the rodent in question is at least a well-regulated, 
suitably compassionate, and thinking mouse'.344  There were concerns that an enhanced measure 
to aid repatriation would be seen by minorities as a prelude to a more general programme of 
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expulsion.345  The white paper was drafted but was thin and, officials thought, lacked purpose.346  
Wilson was lukewarm and insisted that it not only be discussed in detail by the Cabinet on an issue 
by issue basis, but that it should go to the PLP, a kiss of death.347  It was shelved in July 1969.348 
 
More liberal heads in the Labour Party were unable to create a counterbalance to Callaghan.  A 
new NEC working party on immigration was established at the time of the 1968 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act.349  This was premised on the party needing to do something positive about an 
issue that it was thought had damaged the party since 1966.  Research commissioned from Mark 
Abrams350 showed that an absolute majority of working class voters supported Powell's 
restrictionist policies, and was keeping already disillusioned voters away from Labour.351  The 
committee thus proposed to create a non-discriminatory Commonwealth based multilateral 
immigration policy that took account of the economic needs of all concerned.352  Unsurprisingly, 
formulating such a positive and planned immigration policy was too much for the committee353 
and its report became dominated by vague generalities about why immigration had happened.  It 
had no suggestions about how to counter the impact of Powell354 and the group ended up with 
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some very negative policies such as issuing work permits without the right to settlement.355  After 
falling into abeyance for some months, the study group reconvened in 1970 to consider its report, 
but its proposals were patchy and the section on integration entirely absent.356  The committee 
continued meeting after the election but for the current purposes it will suffice to conclude that it 
was unable to develop an alternative policy. 
* 
One positive aspect of Labour's last period in government was that ministers outside the Home 
Office along with the PLP stopped Callaghan producing any more negative policy.  On the whole, 
the government accepted the pressure that had been created by Powell.  Without any clear 
strategy, immigration was an issue in the 1970 general election that certainly did not benefit 
Labour and may well have contributed to their loss of power.357 
 
3.6: A melting pot or multiculturalism? 
The terms integration and assimilation were often misused within government.  There are 
frequent references to restricting immigrants to a number that could be assimilated, but this 
mainly implied not risking a white backlash.  Similarly, integrating those who had arrived often 
pointed to a series of political compromises which were concerned with not upsetting trade 
unions, school children's parents or residents.  Assimilation, however,  has a precise meaning, the 
acculturation of immigrants into the ways of thinking, behaving and living with those of the 
background population.  The alternative policy was referred to in the early 1960s as pluralistic 
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integration, what would now be called multiculturalism, and can be taken to mean that 
immigrants' ethnic distinctiveness being maintained in a way concordant with harmonious public 
life.  The government failed to develop a consistent or meaningful policy in relation to either 
between 1964 and 1970, and the term integration was often used as a fudge with no clear 
meaning. 
 
The policy developed in the Labour Party before 1964 was not straightforwardly assimilationist.  In 
1957, Eric Whittle in Labour's research department produced a paper that rejected simplistic 
assimilationist understandings of the integration, instead suggesting that immigrants would only 
selectively adopt British culture, although no policy emerged from this early expression of 
multiculturalism.358  After 1964 the Labour government often asserted assimilation as a goal but its 
policies often undermined such progress.  Most notably, the assimilationist policy of dispersal in 
housing was contradicted by a failure to end discriminatory allocation by councils. 
 
Less commonly, assimilationist assumptions were questioned.  In one example from early 1965, it 
was suggested on Foley's integration committee that immigrants would prefer to stay in 'sub-
communities within the local community', learning to fit into public life while maintaining their 
existing patterns of private, family and cultural life.  The committee suggested that this implied a 
housing policy to meet the needs of these diverse family types.359  This led Foley to propose 
immigrant-centred housing associations which would have created a separate housing 
infrastructure for immigrants, although the MHLG declined to fund such schemes.360  This incipient 
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multiculturalism was not a stable element in Foley's thought.  Around the same time, he 
presented a qualified assimilationist view to the English Speaking Union, stating that while 
immigrants might wish to keep their culture, their behaviour would be expected to conform to 
British standards and that dispersal should underlie policy in housing and education.361 
 
As non-assimilationist ideas developed, so did the identification of minorities as forming 
communities.  The journalist Brian Lapping362 wrote in 1965 of a sense of community that was in 
part a reaction to unequal treatment, 'Indians and Pakistanis are generally ready to accept what 
they find in Britain and take it philosophically, retreating into their own religious and cultural 
groups when the British are beastly'.  He contrasted this with West Indians whose higher 
expectations led them to demand equality and become more militant.363  Thus there was a view 
that immigrant descended groups by cultural retreat or through the formation of a militant 
political identity against discrimination could form distinct and lasting identities. 
 
It has been widely argued, mainly by radical critics, that these communitarian views originated in 
colonial policies of divide and rule364 but the evidence for this is weak.  The liberal-left was 
opposed to such policies in colonial administration, the Labour Party explicitly rejected such a view 
in a 1956 pamphlet, Plural Societies,365 and all sections of the Labour Party supported unitary post-
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colonial states.366  Thus, the liberal-left using colonial models of multiculturalism are rare.  The 
closest to an example of which I am aware is the writer Taya Zinkin367 who opposed the 1965 Race 
Relations Act as an intrusion into the private sphere.  She instead proposed to translate to Britain 
the provisions of the Indian Penal Code of 1917 which outlawed the promotion of enmity between 
'different classes of citizen',368 with individuals seeking protection compelled to claim membership 
of a group.369  There is no indication of any attempt to use such models in Britain.  Where ex-
colonial administrators (Sir James Robertson,370 who was deputy chair of the NCCI with 
responsibility for administration, John Reddaway who had a similar role at the CRC) were involved 
in domestic race relations there is no evidence of this leading to multiculturalism, rather their 
appointment was solely for their administrative skills. 
 
The first clear statement of multiculturalism as government policy was Jenkins' speech to the NCCI 
in May 1966.  The Civil Service draft contained an assimilationist rallying cry, 'let us all concentrate 
our energies on the immediate problem which is to help immigrants from the Commonwealth who 
have come to make their home here to adapt themselves to life in this country'.371  On seeing the 
draft, Lester was forthright that if Jenkins made this speech 'he will lose the right to be regarded as 
liberal and creative on race relations' and insisted instead the challenge should be 'to the native 
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British community of treating Commonwealth immigrants ... as their equals.'372  He enclosed a 
copy of his forthcoming Socialist Commentary article, arguing that while civil society should not be 
nationalised, it could be regulated to attain racial equality and integration through anti-
discrimination measures.373 
 
Lester's proposals stopped short of a clear statement that integration could be multicultural.  
Sheila Patterson in Dark Strangers (1963) had drawn on the Canadian experience where the issue 
was not of recent immigration but the existence of French and English speaking groups as well as 
increasingly politically assertive first-nation Canadians.374  Patterson suggested that pluralistic 
integration was an inevitable stage of integration and could become a stable feature of society.375  
This was developed closer to the heart of policy making in Nicholas Deakin's February 1965 
Socialist Commentary article where he had suggested: 
the adaptation of an incoming group of migrants to permanent membership of the receiving 
society, and acceptance by that society of the group as a lasting entity, which includes making 
allowance for certain distinct and persistent religious and cultural patterns.  The necessary 
precondition is that the majority are prepared to accept the newcomers on an equal footing 
in the economic, civic and social sphere.
376
 
Deakin outlined the policy implications of this, particularly that free access to housing was more 
important than dispersal.  Trailing Jenkins' speech, Philip Mason of the IRR used the term 
multiculturalism in a paper for the NCCI in April 1966 to describe integration where the 
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descendents of immigrants would be, 'included in our society, accepted legally, ecumenically and 
socially, but not assimilated in the sense of having lost their identity, their cultural difference and 
their relations with each other.'377  The juxtaposition of such integration and assimilation was 
suggested to Jenkins by Foley a few days before the speech.378  So Jenkins told the NCCI that, 'I 
define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity 
accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'379 although beyond this 
details of policy were vague. 
 
One of the few areas in government to develop an overtly multicultural policy was education, 
elements of which were being developed prior to Jenkins' arrival at the Home Office.  While the 
DES's input into the 1965 White Paper was for assimilation based on dispersal, an April 1965 
memo from Crosland was pragmatically multicultural in identifying children by their cultural 
background.  It suggested that all children should learn about this as the basis of tolerance, 
although this sat alongside his view that the children of immigrants should be assimilated.380  
Across most other government departments the assumption that assimilation would occur 
without great efforts on their part remained. 
 
When Callaghan arrived at the Home Office, assimilation was reasserted.  When Trend suggested 
that the successor Cabinet committee to the CIC should be called the Committee on Immigration 
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and Assimilation, the new Home Secretary acquiesced.381  It was civil servants in the Home Office 
who pointed out that this was not the government's policy,382 the committee eventually being 
named the Immigration and Community Relations Committee.  Callaghan's first speech on race 
after becoming Home Secretary to the NCCI in early April 1968 was devoid of meaningful content 
other than vague aspirations, such as that of 'bringing the races closer together'.383  Foley's 
successor, David Ennals, was also doubtful that plural identities were compatible with a modern 
state.  When the West Indian Standing Conference suggested that immigrants maintained a strong 
identity with their homelands, Ennals countered, 'those who have settled here and claim all the 
rights of citizenship must accept that they are first and foremost citizens of Britain, whatever their 
country of origin.'384 
 
Beyond a description of society of culturally diverse groups, multiculturalism may also imply a 
degree of representation based on such groups.  Patterson suggested that the interests of 
immigrants would initially be articulated through community based social and welfare groups.385  
To a degree government policy fostered this view through the VLCs, and then s11 funding, 
encouraging the creation of funded voluntary groups which identified with recent immigrants.  
These sometimes came to be the rough and ready instruments for representing minorities.  For 
example, the Notting Hill Neighbourhood Project started as a playgroup, mainly for the children of 
immigrants.  By the end of 1966 volunteers at the project were compiling a dossier of complaints 
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against the police, and to a degree played the role of an autonomous black organisation.386  
Reflecting a society composed of identifiable communities, in 1966 the NCCI established a 
Community Relations Panel.  It consisted of 'English' representatives (community workers and a 
smattering of clergy), and representatives from local and national Indian, West Indian and 
Pakistani groups.387  This amounted to a policy of indentifying groups in society and creating a 
leadership to represent these groups’ views. 
 
By 1967 multiculturalism was being explicitly articulated through the concept of ethnicity.  The 
NCCI understood its purpose as encouraging distinct 'ethnic groups' to become part of society 
without losing their own identities, and to encourage the host population to accept these 
culturally different groups' rights to follow their own customs.  Their efforts to integrate 
immigrants were thus limited to encouraging first generation immigrants to adapt themselves to 
English ways but without losing their own beliefs and values, mainly through learning English if 
necessary.  With the second generation there was some ambivalence as to whether they would 
continue to be members of culturally defined communities, but the NCCI suggested that 
subsequent generations should be encouraged to respect the culture and tradition of their parents 
without any pressure to assimilate.388 
 
The pressure from within the NCCI to develop minority representation increased, and by the end 
of 1967 one member was unsuccessful in demanding that all the black and Asian members form 
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their own sub-committee.389  The NCCI also discussed (without reaching any conclusions) 'In 
Defence of Black Power' by David Danzig, a Jewish-American academic and civil rights activist.  He 
argued that black power was the assertion of a black collective interest and that quotas and 
positive discrimination were the way forward for black Americans, conceived of as a group, 
allowing them their fair share of the resources.390  This process of radicalisation was also seen 
outside of the NCCI.  Following the 'Rivers of Blood' speech autonomous black and Asian 
organisations grew, with the creation of the Black People's Alliance at the end of April 1968 
attended by delegates from twenty organisations with the requirement that they have only black 
and Asian members.391  Jim Rose had already counselled the NCCI that lines of communication 
needed to be kept open with the more radical groups on the ground and that this meant 
toleration of VLCs when they came into conflict with local and central government.392 
 
By the end of the 1960s the view that building community structures could help minorities was 
being more widely aired.  Thus, Deakin opposed dispersal on the grounds of it disrupting the 
growth of culturally distinct communities.  In a 1969 paper for the Labour Party he listed the 
advantages to concentrated communities, 'their supportive value to newcomers, the basis they 
provide for communal institutions and the provision of various services and their function as bases 
for the penetration of political institutions of the majority society by minority group leaders'.393  
Within government, hesitation over dispersal was often the result of more pragmatic concerns.  
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An official working party, which was formed in 1969, concluded that dispersal might stop 
immigrants becoming 'withdrawn from the mainstream of the community' but would cause 
greater white resentment if immigrants were actively encouraged to new areas.  The committee 
suggested it might be better to examine the obstacles to voluntary mobility,394 but initiatives to 
achieve this were shelved to avoid competition over increasingly scarce housing in early 1970.395  
Nonetheless, gradual dispersal through individual action was becoming the accepted policy goal by 
1969, for example the Cullingworth Report of Central Housing Advisory Council on the allocation 
of social housing assumed such a process.396 
 
Multiculturalism had its opponents, amongst them the TUC.  Their expert on race, Marjorie 
Nicholson, opposed the idea at the time of Jenkins' 1966 NCCI speech on the grounds that it was 
reminiscent of the multi-racialism that had been used to represent different racially defined 
groups under colonial rule in Africa.397  The TUC also expressed an assimilationist view on the 
purpose of the CRC, worrying that the idea of community relations implied 'the community as an 
aggregate of more or less separate interests, divided one from the other in such fields as 
employment on the basis of race and origins, a conscious effort being made from the top 
downwards to mould relations between them.'398   Nicholson held that assimilation was central to 
the trade union movement which needed: 
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to build an integrated and united workforce seeking the solution to its problems through the 
trade union movement.  In this context ‘race relations' is a concept of limited relevance, since 
many of the practical problems of immigrant workers are capable of solution within an 
industrial context to which – in the last resort – race and colour are themselves irrelevant.
399
 
This led to the TUC’s refusal to deal with problems with cultural difference.  When confronted with 
issues of religious observance, for example, they simply asserted that Sunday was the rest day for 
everyone.400 
 
With the NCCI's replacement by the CRC in 1968, Rose's warning of not alienating black and Asian 
leadership was lost.  The new body was less critical of government and articulated minority 
interest less.  Black and Asian community politics grew, but was increasingly distant from 
government agencies.  Similarly, there was little central government development of any 
integrationist policy after 1968.  While many in government were reflex assimilations, their fear of 
the reaction of the host community made them de facto multiculturalists.  There was enough 
institutional backing for such multiculturalism in education policy and urban regeneration to begin 
to give this some social form. 
 
3.7: Conclusion. 
Labour's strategy on integrating immigrants was summarised in Roy Hattersley's401 1965 aphorism, 
'I believe that integration without limitation is impossible; equally, I believe that limitation without 
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integration is indefensible.'402  Thus, Labour's approach had two elements.  The first was to 
assertively control black and Asian immigration most notably through the reduction of vouchers 
announced in the 1965 White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth and the 1968 
Commonwealth Immigration Act.  Neither of these were in any sense moderate compared to what 
had gone before.  These were accompanied by a second element, a series of policies to promote 
an integrated and harmonious society, the anti-discrimination measures discussed in the previous 
chapter, the strengthening of the NCCI, the support of the local VLCs and some policies across 
government.  The public reaction to Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech suggests that this strategy 
was a failure.  There is no way of knowing if more liberal immigration controls would have sent out 
a different message, or if more thought through policies to reduce racial prejudice and 
discrimination would have worked, but from the perspective of 1970 Labour had failed to achieve 
its aims. 
 
It was not immigration control but ideas of racial equality that had some roots in the Labour Party.  
While the Labour Party was moving slowly towards representing black and Asian people in the 
same way as they represented the white working class in this period, the balance of opinion in the 
party was for acceptance of immigrants and some form of integration.  It is easy to find examples 
of support for immigration control and some examples of explicit racism in the Labour Party403 but 
when heads are counted these are found to be in a small minority, as when delegates from local 
parties voted three-to-one against the White Paper at Labour's 1965 conference.  As a party, 
Labour was never able to reconcile this liberalism with the anti-immigrant sentiment of a large 
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proportion of their electoral base.  Thus, it is wrong to suggest, as Hansen does, that Callaghan 
was 'returning to Labour's roots' in his illberality as Home Secretary.404  There is no evidence that 
Labour had such roots.  Rather, Callaghan gave up on the battle to win Labour's supporters to a 
more tolerant position just as Soskice had before him.  It is not so much that Labour's policy for 
greater equality was blown off course by public opinion, but that the effort to create a policy that 
met the goal of greater racial equality within the confines of electoral politics was at best partially 
successful.  Nonetheless, between 1964 and 1970 a series of policies had been developed to 
further racial equality, the clearest examples being anti-discrimination legislation, the 
development of the NCCI and the CRC and policy in education and the Urban Programme.  These 
are the origins of the equality state. 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the strongest elements of these policies were legally 
enforceable individual anti-discrimination rights.  Beyond this, between 1964 and 1970, Labour 
was to have limited success in developing and implementing ideas on the integration of 
immigrants, and the government was suffused by a vague assimilationist view.  There were some 
in government, most notably Foley, who promoted more robust polices, but these advocates 
found it hard to influence the priorities of spending departments.  There was nonetheless an 
atmosphere permissive to developing policies on racial equality created by the government that 
allowed the gradual emergence, as in teaching, of a professional ethos of rule bound behaviour 
and clear standards.  This was, however, partial in this period.  Where state agencies were 
uninterested in ideas of racial equality, most notably the police, there was little pressure for 
developing practices to promote equality. 
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This unevenness in the promotion of racial equality across state agencies was in part the result of 
institutional arrangements developed by the government.  The antecedents of the equality state 
lay in the 1950s with voluntary bodies, the CIAC and particularly the NCSS and VLCs.  These latter 
bodies operated in the context of local government, and after 1964 were linked to the central 
state via the NCCI.  This marked the beginning of the decline of voluntary effort, the government 
preference for a body they controlled being reflected in the creation of the CRC in 1968.  Thus 
what was formed was not an equality society fostered by bodies within civil society, but one that 
was an element of the central state.  Under Jenkins, this included the Home Office, but it was in 
the state's nebula of quasi-governmental bodies that were central to promoting racial equality.  
The RRB and CRC carried the burden of state policy.  These bodies remained similar to the 
voluntary effort in that they lacked strong legal powers and acted primarily through persuasion 
and created an environment permissive to the promotion of racial equality, but limited power to 
legally require it. 
 
Given the commitment to racial equality that existed in the Labour Party, it is the government’s 
weakness in developing such policy which needs to be explained.  Several factors were at play.  A 
major one was that some in the government took the view that Labour's white core voters took 
priority.  Thus, positive policies in housing and employment proved difficult to achieve.  The 
dilemma at the heart of Labour's policy can be seen as a problem of labourism, that Labour's 
raison d'être was the distribution of an increased portion of the national wealth to the working 
class.  This was often mediated through definable groups at local level with party members and 
residents' associations, and at a national level through trade unions.  So labourism often implied 
that immigrants were at the back of the queue. As labourites of both right and left said, 'our 
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people' came first.  This was most starkly seen in council housing, which in this period largely 
excluded black and Asian people in many areas. 
 
Two processes might have countered this labourism and aided immigrants' needs being met on a 
more equal basis.  First, immigrants could have been integrated into labour movement 
organisations.  There were some attempts to recruit recent immigrants to the Labour Party's local 
branches, but as far as this happened it was slow and partial.405  The second way in which 
immigrants could have been represented was through new channels in a multicultural settlement.  
With the formation of the NCCI there was an effort to include those who, in some sense, 
represented minorities.  Sometimes these were 'prestige leaders', for example Learie Constantine, 
a member of the first RRB, was an atypical Trinidadian immigrant, a qualified lawyer who had been 
a government minister in Trinidad and Tobago and that country's High Commissioner to Britain.406  
The NCCI did contain some more grassroots community activists.  It also encouraged VLCs to 
develop a strong relationship with local immigrant-based groups.  There were attempts to 
persuade VLCs to draw in such activists and there was some support for building up a movement 
under this umbrella that would be a British analogue of the US civil rights movement.  To call such 
bodies 'quasi-colonial buffer institutions'407 is the triumph of labelling over analysis, but it is 
important to understand these attempts largely failed, and where the voice of minorities did come 
through these structures it was often ignored.  The creation of the CRC saw a reduction in such 
efforts.  The Urban Programme had an element in it of creating a local community leadership, but 
this too had little impact in this period. 
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Nonetheless, a form of multiculturalism did begin to emerge as positive policy.  This was expressed 
in Jenkins' promotion of the idea that immigrants could be integrated into society while 
maintaining their own culture.  Even in the 1950s the Labour Party considered policy containing an 
inchoate multiculturalism in that it assumed that immigrants would continue to be culturally 
distinct and saw the virtue of educating the host population about these cultures.  This was 
reflected in little government policy after 1964, with the partial exception of education.  With the 
Urban Programme and the growth of the concept of community relations the idea that there were 
lasting and distinct culturally defined communities began to take hold.  Added to this was the idea 
that the identification of minorities' communities who experienced deprivation would allow some 
resources to be channelled towards them.  In its very limited way, the Urban Programme started 
to direct modest funds to minorities via community based programmes, and in the late 1960s a 
community ethos began to replace the voluntary ethos of the NCCI.  In other ways, however, 
multiculturalism was a response to the failure to integrate immigrants.  Particularly in housing, 
immigrants were marginalised in the worst areas and programmes designed to alleviate their 
deprivation reflected the failure to stop this marginalisation. 
 
Most of the policies that were developed were not a response to formalised pressure from below, 
from the Labour Party or minorities themselves.  They were based in a mix of academics 
(Richmond, Little, Banton) and voluntary groups, some with assimilationist views (NCSS) and some 
more subtle (IRR).  Policy often developed in government as an empirical reaction to 
circumstances.  What was absent was any social democratic alternative with a strong conception 
of positive equality.  In her insightful analysis, Ruth Glass commented that immigrants had not 
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created problems in British society, but had highlighted those which existed.408  Twilight areas 
became more visible as minorities found it hard to find accommodation elsewhere.  Competition 
for welfare resources became sharper when it was possible to see a distinct group in the queue.  
With the very partial exceptions of s11 funding, the Urban Programme and a few other modestly 
funded schemes, the government had very little answer for this.  Assimilation was to the back of 
the queue, multiculturalism was that of the semi-ghetto. 
 
This leads to a further reason why the development of policy may have been limited.  One 
obstacle that the Labour government faced was the views of their own voters of which they had 
been painfully aware since the Smethwick result in 1964.  This was reasserted in Abrams findings 
after 'Rivers of Blood' showing immigration was an issue keeping some disillusioned Labour voters 
from returning to the party.  Labour had often suggested that a policy to address the 'slight 
prejudice' of the majority should be developed, but were at a loss to work out what such a policy 
was.  It would be consistent with the analysis developed here to suggest that the fundamental 
problem that Labour faced is that such a policy concerned not how people behaved in the public 
sphere, but how people thought, fundamentally a private matter.  The only basis for government 
policy was thus calls to educate and persuade individuals. 
 
It is easy to emphasise the weaknesses and limitations of policy developed under these Labour 
governments, that after Jenkins little new was done and that the reaction to 'Rivers of Blood' was 
weak.  All of this is true.  Nonetheless, there were a number of developments under the Labour 
government.  Looking at Jenkins' The Labour Case from 1959, the 'Civilised society' chapter 
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consisted of a classic liberalism of the state doing a little less.  In government, under the influence 
of Deakin and Lester, his liberalism developed into one of doing a little more.  The measures 
contained in the Race Relations Acts and the integrationist measures discussed in this chapter 
both required action by the state.  The negative anti-discrimination measures in the 1965 and 
1968 Acts banned certain forms of discriminatory behaviour in an extended public sphere.  The 
more positive measures were too little to ensure meaningful integration was anything other than 
to the back of the queue, and the weakness of policies to create an accepting civic culture did too 
little to ensure that this was an orderly and civilised queue.  For all these weaknesses, this should 
not be allowed to occlude that under the Labour government there had been the development of 
policies to create a more equal society. 
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Chapter 4: Women's equality in employment. 
The real problem is how to evaluate on a civilised basis the contribution which various citizens 
make to the community.  Should advertising agents receive more than teachers ...?  The whole 
problem of equal pay between men and women is part of the larger problem of society's just 
appraisal of rewards. 
Lena Jeger,
409
 1966.
410
 
 
4.1: Women's equality in the public and private spheres. 
The scene: Emily Davis411 is staying with Elizabeth412 and Millicent Garrett413 (later to be known as 
Anderson and Fawcett), sometime in the late 1850s: 
'Well Elizabeth,'  she said, 'It's quite clear what has to be done.  I must devote myself to 
securing higher education, while you open the medical profession to women.  After these 
things are done,' she added, 'we must see about getting the vote.’  And then she turned to 
the little girl who was still quietly on her stool and said, 'You are younger than we are, Millie, 
so you must attend to that.'
414
 
Ray Strachey's account of the pivotal moment in nineteenth century feminism may be apocryphal 
but summarises the story.  Women had to fight their way out of the home through education and 
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employment to establish themselves in civil society before winning admittance to the heart of the 
public sphere, participation in the political affairs of government and the state. 
 
As explained in the introduction,415 the division of social life into a public and private sphere, with 
the debatable lands of civil society between, is an imperfect but useful way of understanding 
social change.  This and the subsequent chapter will use this division to examine the policies 
promoting women's equality developed under the Labour governments 1964-1970.  Women had 
won formal equality in the narrowly defined public sphere by the 1960s.  This is not to say that 
substantive equality was won, as the continuing under-representation of women in politics attests, 
but this was not a major issue in the 1960s.  So this chapter will consider policy relating to the 
broader public sphere, specifically, employment.  Here, the most notable piece of legislation was 
the 1970 Equal Pay Act, a policy of limited scope but explicitly directed at the goal of equality.  
Other policies relating to women's equality in employment included the development of equal 
opportunity policies and the removal of legal restrictions on women's working hours and other 
forms of 'protective' legislation.  The next chapter will examine policies that might be considered 
to have impacted on the private/domestic sphere to affect women's equality, abortion, 
contraception and divorce. 
 
This division of society into a public and private sphere has been widely used in understanding 
gender and society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but less in contemporary women's 
history.  The nineteenth century saw a high level of inequality in the narrowly defined public 
sphere of the state, women had no vote and married women limited legal and property rights.  
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This was accompanied by non-legal but pervasive norms assigning women their role in the private 
sphere as wives and mothers.  This impacted on women's equality in the space between the public 
and the private spheres, civil society, the public arena of private activity, particularly employment. 
 
Even when looking at the nineteenth century, it is important to understand that the division 
between public and private is not of two separate, gendered, spheres.  As Lenore Davidoff and 
Catherine Hall have pointed out, women were never strictly confined to the private realm, and 
throughout the nineteenth century some women had been employed and politically active416  
Correspondingly, John Tosh has shown, men were not absent from the domestic sphere.417  Rather 
the question is of sex inequality in those two spheres, with men dominating the public sphere, and 
women having a clearly defined role in the home.  Amanda Vickery has questioned the evidential 
basis to the view that there was a pre-industrial golden-age of more equal gender relations,418 but 
recognisably modern household forms emerged in the nineteenth century based not on a family 
economy but a separation of home and workplace.  The ideology of the male breadwinner and 
female housewife was consolidated in this period419 and it is the inequalities that this gave rise to 
which are the focus here. 
 
Thus, in the nineteenth century there was a strong tendency for men to work and for women to 
be more confined to the home.  The degree to which this tendency was realised varied regionally 
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and with age and class.  More women worked before marriage particularly in domestic service, as 
did those from the poorer sections of the working class and there were regional pockets of 
working women such as in the Lancashire textile industry and Staffordshire potteries.420  The 
pressure for women to be confined to the home was initially based on social attitudes,421 but the 
public power of the state reinforced male dominance of the public sphere.  The 1832 Reform Act 
removed from single female heads of household their vote in local elections.422  Women were 
banned from working underground in mines in 1842, the first restrictions on women's working 
hours were introduced in the 1844 Factory Act423 and such restrictions continued to be 
strengthened as late at 1963.424  Maybe the last new set of legal measures that explicitly enforced 
women's subordinate role were the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1868 and 1869 which 
enshrined a double moral standard in law which established areas around military garrisons where 
the police were empowered to arrest those they deemed to be prostitutes while no similar power 
existed for their male consorts.425  These laws were reinforced by many institutions of civil society 
that excluded women from public life, exam boards, universities, professional bodies and many 
others did not allow women through the gateways they controlled.  Some of these controls began 
to gradually decline in late nineteenth century, for example with women being admitted to the 
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medical register in 1870,426 but many of these restrictions persisted into the twentieth century.  In 
the worst instance the institutions of the City of London continued to operate as gentlemen's 
clubs, with the London Stock Exchange eventually admitting women to the trading floor in 1973.427  
Particularly in white collar jobs, many employers implemented a marriage bar, terminating 
women's employment when they married even into the mid-twentieth century.428 
 
If the years 1832 to 1869 saw laws tending to push women out of the public sphere, this trend 
reversed in 1869 in some areas when women householders had their votes in local elections 
restored.429  From the 1870s women were elected as local Poor Law guardians430 and onto school 
boards.431  The Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 saw married women allowed 
limited economic independence.432  Some women had never accepted their ascribed role as the 
angel in the house.  Voluntary work offered middle-class women an acceptable route into the 
public sphere from the mid-nineteenth century433 and middle-class feminist campaigning started 
at the same time, with the Langham Place circle and Kensington Society seeking to open more 
opportunities for women by improving educational and employment opportunities.  After the 
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1860s these campaigns became increasingly focused on female suffrage.  This women's presence 
in the public sphere was doubly asserted by the political theatre of the suffragettes in the early 
years of the twentieth century.434 
 
In was not only through feminist groups that women were able to become involved in political 
activity.  Women could join the Conservative Primrose League and the Women's Liberal 
Federation, established in 1883 and 1887 respectively.435  Of greater relevance to the themes of 
this thesis, women were also involved in labour politics, for example in Robert Owen's movement 
in the 1830s.436  Women's trade unionism too has a long history.  Formed in 1874, the Women's 
Protective and Provident League had its roots in middle class philanthropy.  Becoming the 
Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) in 1891, it promoted trade unionism amongst women.   The 
National Federation of Working Women (NFWW), formed in 1906, was more based in the labour 
movement and acted as a general union for women who were not represented by the existing, 
male dominated, trade unions.  To a degree, both supported protective legislation for women, as 
did the TUC leadership.437  As Thilo Ramm has commented, when it came to women the state was 
never entirely laissez-faire438 and from the mid-nineteenth century was willing to regulate 
women's employment but not men's.  Trade unionism itself became gendered, with men 
protecting their position through free collective bargaining with employers, a freedom that was 
jealously guarded against state interference, as shown in chapter 2 in the conflict over including 
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employment in the Race Relations Acts.  While women's weaker position, either real or perceived, 
led trade unions to seek protective legislation and was thus helping make women's employment 
the subject of public policy. 
 
At the end of the First World War the NFWW merged with the National Union of General Workers 
and WTUL were absorbed as the Women's Group of the TUC General Council.  This was 
supplemented by the TUC's Women's Advisory Committee (TUC-WAC), established in 1925,439 
although the TUC did not develop a department for women, rather from the appointment of 
Nancy Adam in 1932 they employed a women's officer who sat in the TUC's Organisation 
Department.  Similarly, there was no conference for women but the Conference for Unions 
Catering for Women Workers, to which many unions sent male officials. 
 
Education also offered some women a limited route out of the private sphere.  By the mid-
nineteenth century, the view that education was more important for boys since, as men, they 
would be the link between the home and the public realm, was in decline.  Partly under the cover 
of what  John Henry Newman's440  called 'refining the intercourse of private life', from the late 
nineteenth century women began to win formal access to higher education.441  Nonetheless, 
education continued to reflect women's position in the private sphere.  Particularly, working class 
girls in secondary modern schools found their education limited to preparing them to be wives not 
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workers.442  Education will not be considered in detail in this chapter since, as Sandra Fredman 
points out, gender equality was not part of the comprehensive education agenda of the 1960s.443 
 
After the first wave of feminism won formal equality in terms of political and the legal rights in the 
narrowly defined public sphere by 1928, substantive inequality in civil society and the private 
sphere continued.  From the 1920s, many first wave feminists seemed content not to further 
disrupt the gendered nature of the public/private border they had helped to define, or at least 
believed in incremental change based on women using their votes.  Particularly, most feminists 
had no prospectus for lessening inequality in the domestic sphere.  The lack of a clear direction 
was palpable, for example Lady Rhondda,444 who founded the equal rights feminist Six Points 
Group (SPG) in 1921,445 complained that after equalising the voting age for men and women, there 
was only a 'heap of niggling little laws that now need altering'.446 
 
It is widely understood that in the 1920s the first wave of British feminism split into two factions, 
here labelled equal rights and difference feminism.447  Equal rights feminist ideas, organised in a 
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range of groups such as the SPG, Open Door Council and London Society for Women's Service 
(later renamed the Fawcett Society) looked to improve women's equality in the public sphere, 
particularly through greater employment opportunities and equal pay.  Against this, in 1918 
Eleanor Rathbone transformed the National Union of Suffrage Societies into the National Union of 
Societies for Equal Citizenship (NUSEC) which moved towards a difference feminism, demanding 
measures to support women in their role as wives and mothers. As Barbara Caine has put it, 
Rathbone: 
argued repeatedly that the old watchword of ‘equality' was becoming hampering and 
restrictive, and, moreover that it ‘has lost much of it potency for the younger generation, 
which has never known the harsher forms of inequality'.  She felt that, by contrast, the issue of 
self-determination as defined in the ‘new feminism' with its emphasis on enabling women to 
discharge their duties as citizens, provided possible avenues for new energy and new 
activities.
448
 
 
NUSEC itself was relatively short lived and, having spawned the Townswomen's Guild, it faded out 
of existence after 1945.449  The only other organisation that could be considered as difference 
feminist was the Married Women's Association.  This was hived off from the equal rights SPG in 
1938,450 indicating the difference/equal rights distinction was not always clear cut.  Martin Pugh 
has suggested that this division was more apparent than real, with Rathbone pursuing a 
programme analogous to social liberalism of positive equality for women by freeing them in 'the 
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social-economic dimension to their lives.' 451  There may be some truth to this, but there was at 
very least a strong difference of emphasis between the currents.452 
 
It was the equal rights feminists' ideas that came to the fore in 1940 with the formation of the 
Women Power Committee, which included the TUC, was chaired by the Conservative MP, Irene 
Ward,453 and even had some limited support from Rathbone.454  Their demand was that women 
should be mobilised for the war effort on the home front.  As far as they succeeded, it was largely 
women without domestic responsibilities who were drawn into the workforce during World War 
II.  This limited the impact of the war on women's employment.  The total number of men and 
women in paid employment increased between 1939 to 1943 from 19.8 million to 22.3 million, but 
women's employment only rose from around 6.3 million in 1931 to 7.5 million in 1943.  Women's 
labour was only very partially mobilised, although the type of work that women did shifted away 
from traditional women's work.455  Thus, women's equality was more weakly enhanced at the end 
of hostilities in 1945 than in 1918.456 
 
This negative attitude to women as workers continued after 1945 when, despite pleas from the 
Ministry of Labour for more women workers, the relatively few nursery places which had been 
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centrally funded by the Ministry of Health during the war were effectively shut down.457  Feminist 
ideas adopted a moderated tone emphasising women's maternal role.  Alva Myrdal458 and Viola 
Klein's459 Women's Two Roles (1956) argued women should work before and after raising children, 
with some limited state provision of childcare, but this was justified in terms of national economic 
efficiency rather than women's equality.  Similar sentiments were expressed in a difference 
feminist perspective when Judith Hubback460 stated that 'reasonable modern feminism builds on 
the diversity of the sexes' which was 'not crudely egalitarian' and accepting that women with jobs 
should put their families first.461 
 
While it is possible to build a narrative of women's gradual emancipation continuing between 
1928 and the 1960s462 there is no clear thread of increasing women's equality.  At best, progress 
was slow and uneven.  This can be seen with women's representation in Parliament. In the House 
of Commons the spikes in the graph of women's representation were the fifteen elected in general 
election of 1931, the twenty-four elected in 1945 and the twenty-nine elected in 1964.463  In 
employment the story is similar.  For the first sixty years of the twentieth century women as a 
proportion of the workforce remained more-or-less static around 30%, and only began to rise in 
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the 1960s.  As Catherine Hakim shows, this lack of progress towards equality was compounded by 
women becoming increasingly ghettoised in lower grade work, although women became gradually 
less concentrated in exclusively 'women's work' such as primary school teaching, shop work, 
nursing, lower grade clerical work and female gendered manual work.  Nonetheless, employment 
remained heavily gendered, women's pay low and their opportunities limited.464 
 
Thus, the background to women's equality was quite different to that for racial equality.  The 
position of women in the private sphere was already an issue in state policy, although the state 
tended to enforced inequality and difference not equality.  Much feminist effort up to 1928 had 
been to remove women's unequal treatment under the law and thus was largely based on 
negative measures of equality.  After suffrage, progress towards women's equality slowed, and 
there is no sense that the policies developed under the 1964-1970 Labour governments to 
increase women's equality in employment were being pushed forward by the unstoppable tide of 
history. 
 
4.2: Equal pay. 
4.2.1 The oldest pay claim in history: 1811-1964. 
The earliest known equal pay claim in Britain was in 1811 by the Society of Journeyman Tailors 
who demanded that articles made by wives be paid for at the same rate as their own work.  This 
had little to do with the rights of women, but was to stop women being 'unfeelingly torn from the 
maternal duties of a parent and unjustly encouraged to compete with men in ruining the money 
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value of labour'.465  Demanding equal pay to protect men's wages and keep women out of the 
labour market is a theme in the demand for parity.  More positively, claims for equal pay as part of 
a wider belief in gender equality were made in the 1830s by Owenite socialists but their ideas 
were largely forgotten by the time of the trade union revival of the 1860s which thought in terms 
of men being paid a family wage.466  Although the TUC passed Clementina Black's467 motion calling 
for equal pay for women in 1882, it led to no campaign.468 
 
In early twentieth century Britain the demand for equal pay was heard from middle class feminists 
and white collar trade unions, particularly teachers469 and civil servants.470 It took the catalyst of 
the First World War to move the labour movement when, in 1918, strikes were successful in 
achieving elements of equal pay on London's trams.  Elsewhere, journalists, local government and 
shop workers demanded parity too,471 although this militancy subsided in the economic slump of 
the early 1920s.472  The moves to equal pay were reflected in the Labour Party's 1918 manifesto 
for the first time promising 'equal pay and the organisation of men and women workers in one 
trade union movement', although alongside this women were presented as 'the Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer of the home'.473  It was only in the 1930s that Labour women, through the Standing 
Joint Committee of Working Women's Organisations (SJCWWO),474 demanded 'similar pay for 
similar work'475 although this appears to have been a flash in the pan. 
 
The Second World War saw a revival of the feminist movement although with limited affect.476  
The feminist Equal Pay Campaign Committee (EPCC) in was established in 1943,477 open only to 
feminist and women's organisations with non-gendered trade unions relegated to an advisory 
council.478  The campaign's major success was Thelma Cazalet-Kier's479 equal pay amendment to 
the Education Bill in 1944 which would have introduced equal pay for teachers, reversed only 
when Churchill made it a vote of confidence.480  This resulted in a Royal Commission, although one 
with terms of reference limited to considering the impact of equal pay for identical work.481 
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Labour were in power when the Commission reported in 1945 that equal pay would reduce 
women's employment.482  The Labour Party's policy from 1943 was for both equal pay and equal 
opportunities483 but there was little pressure for this policy to be acted on.  Labour women in the 
SJCWWO organised a conference with the TUC484 and planned a series of regional conferences in 
response to the Commission's report485 but when the first of these flopped the rest were cancelled 
and the SJCWWO returned to discussing the price of vegetables.486 
 
The major obstacle was that the Labour government had a class-egalitarian objection to equal pay, 
wishing to concentrate resources on the worst poverty in families with a single male 
breadwinner.487  Family Allowances, demanded by Eleanor Rathbone, proposed by Beveridge and 
introduced by Churchill's caretaker administration in 1945, were seen as the answer to this.  
Although the 1947 Labour Party conference reaffirmed policy in favour of equal pay, when the 
NEC considered the issue in 1948, support was equivocal.488  In Labour's research offices Michael 
Young and Arthur Bax489 drew up a paper which supported government opposition to equal pay on 
grounds that most women who worked had no dependents.  Thus, equal pay would redistribute 
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income away from those men with dependents who needed it most.490  Following pressure from 
the NEC491 the paper was re-drafted in early 1949 with a strengthened section on the case for 
equal pay.  Young and Bax were left to conclude that the 'problem was not simply one of equality, 
but of a clash of equalities'.492  Ultimately, Labour's NEC rejected the criticisms and continued to 
support equal pay but it was not included in the party programme in preference for the more 
pressing priorities of pensions and welfare measures.493 
 
Internationally, the UN body for labour standards, the  International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
was moving towards an agreement on equal pay by 1950.494  This created a second headache for 
the government since the ILO demanded not equal pay for the same work, but for work of equal 
value.  The effect of this would have been to necessitate an impartial system of evaluating jobs 
and setting the rates of pay which the Labour Cabinet felt alien to the keystone of British industrial 
relations, free collective bargaining.495  As one official worried, this gave the government a 
problem in communicating its position, 'such points are ... rather technical and not easily 
appreciated by the lay (feminine) mind'.496  Ultimately, the British delegation abstained in the 1951 
vote at the ILO, which nonetheless passed ILO Convention 100 calling on member states to 
implement equal pay for work of equal value.497  Under pressure, Labour's Chancellor, Hugh 
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Gaitskell, attempted to find ways to balance family and tax allowances with equal pay,498 but 
official advice was not to be drawn into such an egalitarian discourse.499  When he led the party in 
considering what it meant by equality, the results concentrated on transforming the issue of class 
equality away from ownership and control of economic power and towards welfare and education 
systems.500  Although this could have formed the basis for a positive concept of women's equality, 
comments on sex equality in the party's policy considerations were general and isolated.501 
 
In 1952 the Conservative government promised to move towards equal pay when the economic 
situation allowed.502  The trade unions had been keener on increasing their female members' pay 
than having the government give them money in the form of family allowance, and in this new 
environment broke with the feminist Equal Pay Campaign Committee.  In 1954 the unions formed 
the Equal Pay Coordinating Committee503 an act that the feminist EPCC thought was 'treachery'.504  
Despite this, in 1954 the two EPCCs organised parallel petitions,505 the feminists collecting 80,000 
signatures and the unions 600,000.  Showing that they still understood political theatre better 
than the unions, the feminists delivered theirs to Parliament in the hands of sympathetic female 
MPs in three horse-drawn carriages while the trade union petition followed in a taxi.506  The two 
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deputations were seen by ministers separately.  Rather incongruously, Cazalet-Keir was pleased 
that the Chancellor described the feminist EPCC delegation as 'hot'.507  Shortly afterwards the 
Conservative government agreed to equal pay in teaching and the Civil Service to be phased in 
over seven years and both campaigns were wound up.  It would appear that the first wave 
feminist groups were still conditioned by the suffrage mindset that equality was won from the 
government.  Having won equal pay for the main groups of female workers employed by the state, 
they had no programme for continuing the struggle among working class women employed in 
private industry.  At the same time, although the TUC supported equal pay, they had little 
confidence in approaching women as workers.  When TUC Women's Advisory Committee (TUC-
WAC) held an exhibition to appeal to women in 1962 it featured an embroidery competition,508 
with a leaflet that led with a recipe for boiled gammon. 
 
TUC women's recruitment leaflet (1962)
. 
Circular N52 (1961-62), Recruitment Leaflet 'Recipe for Good Living', MRC/TUCA, MSS.292B/60/3. 
                                                     
507
  Cazalet-Keir to The Chancellor of the Exchequer, 23/06/1954, Women's Library, 6EPC/02/2/06. 
508
 Industrial Newsletter for Women, no. 68, January 1962, MRC/TUCA, MSS.292B/60/4. 
210 
 
 
More militantly, the Communist Party began campaigning for equal pay in 1957,509 and as a result 
the issue began to emerge in the engineering unions by 1960.510  At the November 1960 TUC 
Conference for Unions Catering for Women Workers motions on equal pay were passed to renew 
pressure on the TUC and Labour Party,511 and the 1961 TUC Congress voted for the union 
movement to pursue this goal.512  However, as the TUC-WAC noted, this vote was sound and fury 
from member unions that signified little action.513  This was underscored when the TUC-WAC 
started to formulate its Women's Industrial Charter and consulted over 100 unions.  Only fifteen 
replied, of which only four raised the demand for equal pay.514  The new militancy that was 
emerging in unions from the mid-1950s benefitted male trade unionists, and led to the pay gap 
between men and women getting greater in manual grades in 1961-2.  The TUC left exhorting 
member unions to push for better pay for women in their negotiations.515  There was, however, a 
network of advocates of equal pay in the unions..  The Women's Officer of the National Union of 
General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW), Marion Veitch516 was combative on equal pay and 
pushed for the TUC-WAC to examine how equal pay was implemented abroad.517  Another strong 
advocate of equal pay was Marie Paterson,518 Women's Officer of the TGWU and member of the 
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General Council.519    Thus, by the time that Labour were returned to power the first wave feminist 
movement had no campaign for equal pay and the Labour Party had limited policy although there 
were some signs of pressure growing in the unions. 
 
4.2.2: The Labour government and equal pay 1964-66. 
Labour's 1964 election platform made no great issue of women's equality at work, or indeed 
anywhere else.  The manifesto promised women equal pay for work of equal value without further 
elaboration at the end of a short list of workers' rights.520  In office, Labour inherited a precarious 
economic situation with pressure on the pound, making devaluation a popular option with some 
but not Harold Wilson.521  Equal pay would have both increased the government's own wages bill 
and made some exports less competitive and was thus afforded low priority and there was no 
mention of it in the November 1964 Queen's Speech.522  The TUC quickly applied some pressure to 
the government via the tripartite National Joint Advisory Committee (NJAC),523 and a letter was 
dispatched to the new Minister of Labour, Ray Gunter.  Gunter's reply inevitably stated that equal 
pay would be examined in the context of the new Prices and Incomes policy.524 
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If the government had wished to proceed with equal pay, the Civil Service already had plans 
prepared dating back to consideration of the impact of the equal pay provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome from the time of Britain's application to join to EEC in 1961.  These suggested that equal 
pay, narrowly defined for the same work, would add 2.5% to the national wages bill and legislation 
could allow referral to the Industrial Court.525  Resistance from both the Treasury and the Ministry 
of Labour after the 1964 election meant the only department which supported equal pay, the 
Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), had to push for an official committee to consider the 
issues.526  The Treasury agreed to this solely to delay any decision being taken527  and consequently 
the committee established in the new year of 1965 had a time consuming remit to consider the 
definition of equal pay as well as its economic and social consequences.528 
 
Having been offered long grass, Gunter proceeded to kick the ball into it.  In May 1965 he wrote to 
the TUC, 'A full appraisal of all these matters will take time but we shall complete it as soon as 
possible'.529  The TUC's anger at what they viewed as reneging on a manifesto promise was 
reported on the front page of The Sun530 (still then a Labour aligned paper).  This had some affect.  
Harold Wilson had a longstanding desire to win women's votes to Labour, 531 and was unhappy 
with such bad publicity. Downing Street let the Ministry of Labour know that an early 
announcement on equal pay would be considered good publicity.  Their response, that equal pay 
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would be implemented in line with Prices and Incomes policy, was hardly the kind of positive 
presentation that Wilson wanted.532 
 
Equal pay lacked either internal advocates within government or strong external advocates able to 
pressure government, a situation the reverse of that in race where Maurice Foley was appointed 
as a junior minister with responsibility for integrating immigrants as a result of external 
campaigning.  Barbara Castle, appointed Minister for Overseas Development in 1964, was the sole 
woman in the Cabinet until Judith Hart533 was  appointed, also to Overseas Development, in 1968.  
Women below Cabinet rank in relevant departments were also thin on the ground.  One was 
Shirley Williams534 who, when appointed as a junior minister at the Ministry of Labour in 1966, 
made it clear to Gunter that she did not see it as her role to promote women's interests.535  The 
other was the Gaitskellite Peggy Herbison,536 the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, who 
opposed equal pay and defended the family wage as the basis of the post-war welfare 
settlement.537  The sincerity of Herbison's commitment to this cannot be doubted since she 
resigned from the government in 1967 in protest at Family Allowance not being increased.538  
Policy was thus dominated by an alliance between the Ministry of Labour and the Treasury to do 
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the minimum possible to meet political pressure.539  The only source of the mildest of advocacy for 
equal pay was from the DEA. 
 
The declining first wave of feminist groups was unable to fill the role of advocates for equal pay.  
Before the 1964 election the Fawcett Society circulated its supporters suggesting they question 
their local candidates on equal pay.540  They also contacted the TUC's women's officer, Ethel 
Chipchase,541 suggesting co-operation.542  In 1965 Muriel Pierotti543 of the Status of Women 
Committee (SWC, an umbrella body for first wave feminist groups)  wrote to the TUC seeking co-
operation on the renewed policy on equal pay after she had read about the TUC's interest in The 
Times544 but the TUC did not reciprocate these advances.  The Open Door Council's report for 1965 
shows them doing little more than writing to Foyles bookshop complaining about their lack of 
equal pay.545 
 
With the lack of pressure for action, the government's official committee continued to be a vehicle 
for delaying equal pay and minimising its potential effectiveness and cost.  The committee 
suggested that the letter of Labour Party policy would be met by merely considering the issue in 
the current Parliament.  It continued, 'there is very little sign of any deep sense of injustice among 
the mass of women wage earners over the equal pay issue, though not surprisingly the issue is 
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frequently and energetically debated at conferences of women trade unionists'.546  What began to 
emerge from the departmental submissions to the working party in 1965 was a desire to define 
equal pay narrowly, applying it only to situations where men and women worked on exactly the 
same work as men, avoiding any alternative definition of work of similar value;547 ensuring that 
any agreement was voluntary rather than legally enforceable; and that the government would not 
pre-empt any agreement by extending equal pay in the public sector.548 
 
This was reflected in the official committee's October 1965 report which suggested only token 
legislation if voluntary action failed in order to avoid the possible inflationary consequences of 
meaningful legislative action.549  Officials in the DEA thought that the report let the government 
'off the hook' and that, 'much of the report seems to be a statement of the obvious ... this is a 
vitally important subject and yet – statistics apart – you or I could have written the paragraphs in 
our baths in ten minutes.'550 
 
Even this weak report was too much for Gunter. It was stranded on his desk uncirculated for 
several weeks.  Although the chair of the official committee had told Gunter that only legislation 
would be effective,551 he reported to a Cabinet committee early in 1966 that the officials had 
argued that voluntary methods should be used, to which the Treasury added warnings of the wage 
inflation that would follow equal pay.  The First Minister of State at the DEA, George Brown, was 
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sympathetic towards equal pay and keeping a keen eye on the PLP, thought that Gunter was being 
heavy handed.  Brown demanded some demonstrable progress,552 but the Ministry of Labour 
offered only more talks that they believed could take a great deal of time without reaching a 
positive outcome.553 
 
Thus progress was, in the words of one senior DEA official, 'dead slow'.554  Trade unions, although 
favouring change, were not strong advocates.  The TUC had to wrote to its affiliates in January 
1966 'to remind their representatives to bear in mind achieving equality of treatment for women' 
in wage negotiations,555 while TGWU's HQ was sending a circular to branches castigating those 
which sought smaller increases for women than for men.556  The lack of thought about women's 
equality was part of a general lack of direction on the government's policy on equality in general.  
The Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance sought greater equality through enhancing the 
family wage, whereas if the Treasury pursued equality at all, it did so through Prices and Incomes 
policy.557 
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4.2.3: The Labour government and equal pay 1966-1968. 
The 1965 Labour conference saw five resolutions submitted on equal pay558 but this was not 
enough to have the issue debated.559  While success would not have guaranteed the inclusion of 
equal pay in the manifesto for the 1966 general election, it would certainly have strengthened the 
hand of its supporters.  Thus, although Labour had been keen to secure the votes of women, the 
1966 manifesto mentioned women only briefly, promising cervical cancer screening, and tipped its 
noncommittal hat at equal pay suggesting, 'We cannot be content with a situation in which 
important groups - particularly women, but male workers, too, in some occupations - continue to 
be underpaid.'560 
 
Some first wave feminists did attempt to create a focus for developing pressure for women's 
economic equality.  After the 1966 election the SPG's Hazel Hunkins-Hallinan561 wrote to 
Chipchase at the TUC proposing a broad united front of 'enlightened women's organisations' to 
create a Women's Committee on Equal Pay.  Hunkins-Hallinan admitted that the SPG itself was in 
no position to set up such a campaign and that the advantage to the TUC would be only in creating 
a broader united front.  Chipchase replied, on the assumption that equal pay would be enacted 
soon,562 that no such militant campaign would be necessary.563  Anyway, the TUC habitually would 
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not work with non-union organisations that they believed had no role in negotiating workers' pay 
and conditions.564 
 
Having been spurned by the TUC, the SPG dismissed the idea of the unions being able to deliver 
equal pay.565  The task of building a feminist campaign on equal pay was taken up by the umbrella 
group, the SWC, in late 1966.  From 1961 it had been chaired by the Conservative MP, Joan 
Vickers,566 considered to be an apolitical, casework centred MP who even the partisan Labour MP, 
Lena Jeger, found 'fair-minded'.567  There was, however,  some tension between left-wing 
feminists, particularly Pierotti, who stepped down as SWC vice-chair in 1967.568  Nonetheless, in 
late 1966 it was Pierotti who co-ordinated the SWC's equal pay sub-committee, although its initial 
meeting saw little agreement on what should be demanded or tactics.569 
 
The main problem was that SWC lacked the resources to mount any campaign.  Sarah 
Popplewell,570 who had been the secretary to the EPCC in the 1950s, suggested that there were 
four things that were needed: money, an organiser, an HQ and clerical staff.  The SWC had 
none.571  Thus, they lowered their sights.  First, in early 1967 they sought to extend the Fair Wages 
Resolution to cover pay for women in areas under wages councils, but the TUC again declined to 
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follow the SWC's lead.572  Second, they attempted to hitch their demands to the UN Human Rights 
Year, but again without great success.573  Last, they focused on the highly attenuated demand that 
women over 30 working for the Bank of England should have equal pay,574 but even aiming at 
what they perceived as the weakest link brought no success. 
 
Returned to power with a more comfortable majority after the March 1966 general election, the 
Labour government continued to focus on the balance of payments, which the Treasury still 
maintained would be damaged by equal pay.  In this context the talks with the TUC and CBI that 
George Brown had proposed before the election creaked into action.575  At the Ministry of Labour, 
Gunter's strategy was to rely on the CBI to 'be tough' and thus delay progress as much as 
possible.576  The CBI were happy to oblige, suggesting that in some industries equal pay could add 
up to 25% to the wages and therefore a time-consuming sectoral analysis was necessary.577  In 
advance of this process, the Ministry of Labour had a settled view that the talks should lead to a 
voluntary tripartite agreement and a narrow definition of equal pay.578 
 
By early 1967 the tripartite talks had made limited progress.  The TUC were willing to accept a 
voluntary agreement only if there was legislation that would be evoked if these methods failed.  
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Against this, the CBI were willing to block anything that might increase cost and wanted the 
narrowest definition of equal pay.579  The Ministry of Labour was happy to stand above this 
deadlock and to force no decision.  A report based on the tripartite talks was completed in March 
1967 but did little more than record the differences.580  Pressure on the pound meant that there 
was no action on this report until the devaluation of sterling in November 1967.  Roy Hattersley, 
who was now Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Ministry of Labour, met with the CBI and TUC 
in December 1967581 and new tripartite talks reconvened in February 1968, considering the impact 
of the EEC membership and timing of implementation.582  The CBI took the opportunity to push for 
a study of the sectoral cost that would cause further delay.583 
 
There were signs that women in the unions were becoming more militant.  The April 1967 
Conference for Unions Catering for Women Workers voted for breaking Prices and Incomes 
agreements under the government's National Plan on the grounds of equal pay (the 'nil norm' that 
the DEA had announced in March did not include an exemption for equal pay).584  The conference 
also called for a special TUC women's conference when the tripartite talks were completed.585  
While not agreeing to breaking incomes policy, the TUC General Council did circulate the 
suggestion that equal pay claims be given priority in pay bargaining.586 
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From late 1967 there was a steady flow of motions from local trades councils pushing for equal 
pay,587 although this may have indicated that the Communist Party were actively campaigning on 
the issue rather than any greater grassroots pressure.  By the end of 1967 the Draughtsmen's and 
Allied Technicians Association (DATA) pushed for the TUC to back industrial action in support of 
equal pay through the TUC Non-manual Workers Union Conference.588  In early 1968 GMWU 
announced that it would use industrial action to counter the CBI's delaying tactics589 and there was 
pressure from the TUC-WAC on the TUC General Council to take firmer action.590  Against this, the 
view of TUC officials was that there was little desire amongst union members to fight on the issue 
as demonstrated when Len Murray591 (then head of the TUC's Economic Department) wrote to 
Chipchase in early 1968 stating that most pay settlements, despite the TUC admonishments, were 
not advancing equal pay.592  It was becoming clear that relying on individual unions to negotiate 
deals that would close the gap between men's and women's pay was a false hope. The reality was 
that gap increased in 1967.593 
 
This lack of progress by the unions was reflected by pessimism in the feminist movement.  For the 
SWC, Sarah Popplewell had warned if the case for equal pay lost momentum the focus might shift 
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onto low pay in general.594  That a minimum wage would improve the pay of women workers, as 
well as the lowest paid men was considered by officials in the Ministry of Labour in May 1968, 
suggesting that the CBI's objections to the cost of equal pay would be undercut by a minimum 
wage of £12, which would add 3% to the wages bill.595  Something similar was argued in the 
Labour Party's Economic Brief which also showed a continued attachment to the family wage as an 
argument against equal pay: 
It is surely wrong for the needs of women workers who are not the heads of households, to 
have a higher priority than the needs of male workers who are.  Yet that is the logic of 
demanding equal pay in isolation to the broader needs for an incomes policy strategy which 
includes ‘equal pay' for all low-paid workers.
596 
This idea was raised by the TUC with the government in September 1968, after Castle had given a 
commitment to equal pay, the TUC argued, 'The claims of low-paid workers should not be 
neglected in favour of equal pay.  It would be helpful if the Government could work to the cost of 
the introduction of equal pay and a national minimum wage.'597  Roy Jenkins, who had become 
Chancellor after devaluation in November 1967, ruled out the minimum wage proposal on the 
grounds of cost, believing that equal pay was the policy to pursue.598 
 
With the TUC not pushing hard for equal pay and with the feminist movement unable to mount a 
campaign, there was a continued lack of pressure for change.  The Labour Party had established a 
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joint NEC-PLP study group on discrimination against women in 1967, but this did not begin to 
consider women's economic position until the end of 1968.  The Labour-left paper Tribune carried 
nothing on equal pay until the end of 1967 and this was in response to DATA's push for industrial 
action.599  It is likely that much of the pressure within the unions was the result of CP agitation on 
women's exploitation under capitalism which gave them a particular focus on equal pay rather 
than equality of opportunity.600  Two events in 1968 were to change this situation.  Gunter's 
replacement by Barbara Castle, and the strike by women machinists at Ford Dagenham. 
 
4.2.4: Equal pay, the Ford strike and Barbara Castle 1968-1969. 
Barbara Castle took over responsibility for equal pay as First Secretary of State at the new 
Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP) on 6th April 1968 in a reshuffle that had been 
forced on Wilson by George Brown stumbling out of government.  Brown's departure took the 
closest approximation of an ally that equal pay had seen in the Cabinet, in addition to which the 
Gold Crisis of March 1968 that had precipitated his departure meant that defending the pound 
was reiterated as the government's focus.601  In other ways, however, the result was more 
positive.  First, Castle had been a long term supporter of equal pay, which did not go without press 
comment.602  Second, the new DEP absorbed into the Ministry of Labour the DEA's responsibility 
for incomes policy, giving more weight to those DEA officials who were sympathetic to equal pay.  
Third, it removed Gunter from any direct influence.  Last, Roy Jenkins had already in November 
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1967 replaced James Callaghan as Chancellor.  Jenkins was more sympathetic to women's equality, 
and while he argued the Treasury line on the impact of equal pay he did not hold this to be an 
insurmountable obstacle.603 
 
Only in late May 1968 did industrial militancy begin to play its part, with the Ford Dagenham strike 
of 187 female machinists.  The strike was not directly for equal pay, but was, until its final 
resolution in 1983, a grading dispute albeit one that emphasised the underpayment for work 
customarily performed by women.  The work was sewing seat covers which had been graded 
lower than areas dominated by men.  After an initial one day stoppage on 29th May 1968, the 
action escalated through an unofficial walk-out into all out action by 7th June, willingly supported 
by the local reps for the National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB) which represented 170 of the 
women.  By June 13th talks between the unions and management had broken down with the 
threat of the 40,000 workers at Dagenham being laid off.604  The situation escalated on 17th June 
when the strike spread with 190 women at Ford's Liverpool Halewood plant.605 
 
Any resolution of the dispute had to satisfy three masters.  Firstly, Ford's management's concern 
was not the cost of meeting the claim itself since women were a tiny proportion of production 
workers, but the women's grading was part of a recent hard-negotiated agreement that contained 
procedures for appeal which Ford's management did not want to tear up.  Secondly, the women 
themselves were militant and would not accept the kind of compromise that the national union 
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leadership, constituted in the Ford National Joint Negotiating Committee (NJNC), might agree.  The 
women themselves demonstrated outside talks held between Ford and the NJNC to forestall any 
such deal.  One of the strike's leaders, Rose Boland,606 argued, 'we came out for an extra fivepence 
an hour.  We haven't got it and we won't be going back until we do.' 607  Lastly, Castle needed to 
ensure that production was resumed. 
 
There are two candidates for who thought that these needs could be met by making the claim one 
for equal pay.  The first is Reg Birch608 of the engineering union the National Union of Foundry 
Workers (NUFW),609 a senior official, a member of the Ford NJNC and a longstanding member of 
the Communist Party.  Birch claimed afterwards that he had pushed to make the case in terms of 
equal pay.610  Second was Leslie Blakeman,611 a Ford personnel manager.  Blakeman travelled to 
Weymouth in mid-June where the NUFW was holding its annual conference to speak with Birch, 
after which both sides used equal pay as a way of seeking a settlement.612  By making the issue 
into one of women's pay relative to men the grading agreement could be left intact, with women 
receiving a 7% increase, taking them up to 92% of the pay of men in the same grade.613  This 
amounted to an increase of 7d an hour, more than 5d the women were demanding.  As the 
Financial Times noted, 'The question of equal pay did not become an issue until [around 16th June] 
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and was never put forward by the union representing women employees [the NUVB] as a subject 
for negotiations at the NJNC although the company offered to discuss the subject back in 1967.'614  
Thus, Ford, with the agreement of some senior trade unionists, sought to use equal pay as a way 
to quickly resolve the dispute.615  That the issue was made one of equal pay by the management is 
confirmed in a terse Treasury memo which recorded that, having failed to find a settlement: 
[Castle] saw Blakeman ... he was very anxious to preserve his grading disputes procedures 
under the plant agreement and therefore suggested that the matter should be dealt with as a 
question of the differential between men and women.  The First Secretary evidently seized at 
once upon this solution.
616
 
 
In the midst of the Ford dispute but with the equal pay proposal still hanging in the air, the Labour 
backbencher Lena Jeger moved an amendment to the Prices and Incomes Bill on 26th June 1968 
to allow preferential treatment for equal pay claims.  According to Castle's own account, in a 
whispered conversion on the front bench, she asked the Chancellor: 
Would he permit me to use a carefully worded formula promising immediate discussion with 
the CBI and TUC on a timetable for phasing in equal pay?  I scribbled down a form of words and 
after hesitating and swallowing hard he reluctantly agreed.  In these ways is history made!  I 
couldn't see myself repeating that wartime incident when Cazalet-Keir defeated her own 
government on the equal pay issue and Churchill had to stump down to the House of 
Commons the next day and get the vote reversed on a vote of confidence.  This time so 
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reckless and almost anarchic is the mood of the PLP that I doubt if we could get away with it 
even if we wanted to.
617
 
Thus, Castle told the Commons that talks with the CBI and TUC would continue but were confined 
to the timing of equal pay, not whether it would happen or how it would be implemented, with 
the promise that equal pay would be in place within seven years.618  The Ford dispute pushed the 
(not unwilling) Castle off the fence, and for the first time the government sided with the TUC's 
desire for action rather than the CBI's obfuscation. 
 
Two days later, on 28th June, Castle met with the strike leaders.  Although the press were invited 
she was not convinced that the meeting would lead to a settlement since what was being offered 
(equal pay) was not what the women wanted (regrading).  So Castle took the precaution of having 
the press take pictures before the meeting started in case faces were sourer by the meeting's 
end.619  The result was the success that Castle had hoped for, with a move towards equal pay and 
the reiteration of the promise of a Court of Inquiry to look at the grading issue.  This was reported 
as a victory for equal pay.620  The strikers hesitated before accepting the deal on 9th July.621 
 
This settlement led to Treasury incandescing with anti-inflationary fury.  Officials demanded a 
'warning shot' across Castle's bows and one allowed himself to write to an official in the DEP 'in 
anger'.  The dispute soon escalated to Permanent Secretary level and only subsided when Jenkins 
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made it clear that he supported Castle.  The Treasury were equally unhappy with Ford,622 fearing 
their action might precipitate a 'rush towards equal pay'.623 
 
Even with the announcement of a renewed drive to equal pay, the pace remained slow for two 
possible reasons.  First, the Treasury still wanted to delay.624  When in July 1968 The Times 
suggested methods of implementing equal pay in other countries should be studied,625 the 
Treasury jumped on the idea, hoping this might lead to being 'locked in technical statistical 
exercise for some time to come.'626  The motivation for this remained the balance of payments.  
Although by September 1968 the balance of payments were improving (the second quarter the 
deficit fell by £51m to £30m)627 the Treasury remained nervous.628  So when the CBI insisted that a 
committee be established to consider the cost of equal pay, the Treasury offered implacable 
support.  The committee was established in September 1968 to report in the summer of 1969.629 
 
A second possibility has been suggested by Anne Perkins, that Castle became mired in trade union 
reform with In Place of Strife (IPoS) with the drive to equal pay only being renewed in the summer 
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of 1969 because of her loss of face over IPoS.630  The talks on trade union reform with the CBI and 
TUC were continuous from June 1968,631 until the white paper was read its last rights in Cabinet on 
17th June 1969.  But the timescale for tripartite talks were implicit in Castle's statement to the 
Commons on 26th June 1968, and explicit by September 1968.632  Thus equal pay cannot be 
considered to have been at first delayed by IPoS and then accelerated by its failure.  
 
That Castle was committed to legislation from the summer of 1968 is shown by her preparations 
to make a statement on equal pay to the Labour Party conference in the autumn of 1968, although 
the debate was never reached.633  Castle had a form of words and cleared it with the Treasury, 
using the continued tripartite talks to explain there would be no action before the summer of 
1969.  The Treasury wanted to ensure that any statement was wrapped up in the usual blanket of 
caution of 'our present economic circumstances', although Jenkins was relaxed in giving Castle the 
green light for a firmer commitment to equal pay but without any guarantees on the time scale.634 
 
Although the TUC leadership were willing to accept this slow pace,635 the pressure from below was 
becoming greater.  At the September 1968 TUC Congress the government's incomes policy had 
been heavily rejected, and the General Council only just succeeded in winning its position of a 
voluntary agreement against a return to free collective bargaining.636  The militancy was expressed 
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by Congress not only unanimously passing a General Council supported motion calling for the 
implementation of equal pay in two years, but also passing DATA's motion for member unions 
taking strike action in pursuit of equal pay by a large majority despite the General Council's 
opposition.637 
 
Responding to this pressure, the TUC General Council called the long promised special conference 
on equal pay for November 1968.638  The pressure in the unions was further mobilised by Ford 
Dagenham NUVB shop steward Fred Blake639 and the Labour MP Christopher Norwood640 initiating 
a trade union based campaign for equal pay, calling a meeting in the House of Commons in 
October 1968641 which launched the National Joint Action Campaign Committee for Women's 
Equal Rights (NJACCWER).  Audrey Wise,642 of the shopworkers' union USDAW, set the tenor of the 
campaign in arguing that national union leaderships were 'not really interested in activity, so we 
must increase embarrassing pressure ... so it is felt where it hurts.'  The main focus of activity was 
building for a rally in Trafalgar Square to be held in early 1969.643 
 
The NJACCWER had a broad range of affiliates including the national unions DATA, FBU, POEU, 
SOGAT and USDAW, as was the proto-second wave feminist group Mothers in Action.  Although 
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first wave feminists supported the campaign, this was largely passive.644  Trafalgar Square saw the 
planned rally in May 1969, which  was hailed as a success, but press reports suggest a modest size 
of around 1,000 demonstrators.645  The NJACCWER claimed to have forty local branches, but there 
is very little evidence of this, and at best this represented a network of 'corresponding 
secretaries'.646  After this the NJACCWER declined rapidly.647  There was acrimony at the November 
1969 AGM after many of those present, mainly second wave feminists, were excluded from the 
vote.648  Even before the passing of the Equal Pay Act the NJACCWER was fading away and 
certainly does not have the importance sometimes attributed to it.649 
 
More important than the NJACCWER was the increasing industrial militancy shown by women on 
the issue of their pay after the Ford strike.  Most threatening was the issue of equal pay in the 
engineering industry that blew up at the end of October 1968.  Here pay rates were negotiated 
between the national employers' body and nine trade unions grouped in the Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (the Confed).  The offer on the table was for an increase in 
the minimum rate for women to £15, whereas the offer for men's minimum rate was up to £19, 
which increased the differential between men and women.650  While eight of the Confed's unions 
were willing to accept the deal, the GMWU blocked it, not least since it was the only one of nine 
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represented by a woman, Marian Veitch.651  The impasse briefly threatened to lead to industrial 
action,652 but the final three year deal agreed in December saw the gender pay gap widening, 
showing much about the priorities of most trade union leaderships.653  It is hardly surprising that 
Veitch's view was: 
If the unions had really wanted equal pay we could have had it years ago ... They would glibly 
say ‘aye' whenever a resolution on the subject was put to a conference, and then do nothing.  
And afterwards, the men would laugh about it amongst themselves.
654
 
 
Elsewhere, discontent led to action.  Later in 1968 there was a strike by female lavatory attendants 
at Lucas, although this strike was quashed by their union leadership.655  January 1969 saw a strike 
for equal pay at Renolds engineering plant in Didsbury, which The Times feared 'may well signal 
the start of growing militancy by the half a million women in the engineering industry',656 with the 
strike spreading to another Renolds plant in Coventry.657  In April 1969 USDAW threatened to 
organise action amongst 180,000 Co-op workers in pursuit of an incomes policy breaking equal pay 
claim.658  The same month there was a dispute at Plessey's in Ilford which, like that at Ford, was 
fundamentally a grading dispute but with a pronounced element of equal pay.659  By June 1969 the 
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TUC Incomes Policy Committee was considering six equal pay claims, the largest two from USDAW 
and TGWU covering around half a million women workers.660  This is not to say that there was a 
united trade union movement supporting equal pay.  A TUC survey of the extent of pay inequality 
scratched the surface to reveal some antediluvian attitudes.  The leader of the Laminate and 
Coiled Spring Workers' Union wrote to the TUC General Secretary, Vic Feather, telling him, 'Your 
idea is alright for teaching bus conducting [sic] and like jobs, I could give you examples of women 
doing what can be termed means [sic] work and want jam on it ... equal pay for women in heavy 
industry is a dead duck.'661  
 
What is missing amongst the above factors is the influence of first wave feminists. When the 
Ford's strike broke out, Edith Summerskill662 had called on feminists to rally to it,663 but to little 
avail.  The SWC sent an observer to one NJACCWER meeting, but they fell out when the equal pay 
campaign claimed the SWC's support on its letterhead.664  Hunkins-Hallinan of the SPG attended at 
least some NJACCWER meetings665 but their newsletter carried scant material on equal pay.666  
None of the first wave feminist groups had any impact through 1968 and 1969.  With the 
publication of the Equal Pay Bill in January 1970, the SPG promised it would lobby effectively 
behind the scenes,667 but there is no evidence of this happening.  Similarly, the SWC's claimed 'we 
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should let the Minster know that we are watching the situation and are not satisfied with the 
progress being made'668 had little bearing on reality. 
* 
That progress towards equal pay started again in 1968 seems to have been caused by three main 
factors.  First, there had been a long process within government to delay the issue that Castle was 
able to cut through when she became the responsible minister.  Second, the trade unions created 
pressure from change, but not in a straightforward way.  Militancy amongst trade unionists in 
predominantly male grades won them pay increases.  There was less militancy amongst women, 
but where women were militant, and when their union supported them, they could win.  Third, 
the Ford strike became an equal pay strike.  This caused an increase in demands for industrial 
action amongst women that was expressed through trade union structures.  Last, the unevenness 
of this pressure from the unions and the lack of confidence by the leadership of the union in 
women's industrial strength led to an emphasis on the legislative route.  
 
4.2.5: The passing of equal pay 1969-1970. 
It was opportune that the official committee examining the cost of equal pay should not report 
until the summer of 1969.  The Treasury continued as a Cassandra voice on the effects of 
introducing equal pay, but the pressure on the pound had eased.669  The report itself was against 
meaningful policy, proposing that if there had to be equal pay legislation then it should be weak to 
the point of inadequacy.  It also emphasised women's different role in society leading to a 
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different attitude to the workplace and expressed the  fear that women might use higher pay as an 
opportunity to work shorter hours.670  Unsurprisingly, the TUC were unhappy with this report.671 
 
Officials in the DEP recognised that time was running out for legislation in the 1969-70 session, 
and to achieve anything it would have to be given the highest priority.672  With Jenkins' support, 
Castle wrote to Wilson in July 1969 urging that legislation be pushed through before the election, 
which required taking a decision before the summer recess.673  There are a variety of reasons why 
Wilson may have accepted this proposal, such as the need for a tangible policy success before the 
election or simply that he was minded to reward Castle who had shown herself to be the 
staunchest of allies through In Place of Strife.  Another official committee was set up to look at the 
issues over the summer and report in time for the PM to consider the issues before he addressed 
the TUC conference on 1st September 1969.674  Castle planned that she would make a more 
detailed announcement to the Labour Party conference later in the month. 675  In this committee 
there was pressure from the Treasury to give more weight to incomes policy676 leading to Wilson 
hesitating, wanting Cabinet backing.677 
 
                                                     
670
 TNA: PRO LAB43/544, The economic and social implications of equal pay for women, 27/08/1969. 
671
 TNA: PRO LAB8/3507, Joint study Group on Equal Pay: Note of a meeting on 9th July [1969]. 
672
 TNA: PRO LAB10/3482, [Note by Locke ], [c.04/07/1969]. 
673
 TNA: PRO PREM13/3554, Castle to Wilson, 22/7/1969, and Dawes to Smith, 23/7/1969. 
674
 TNA: PRO T328/338, Trend to Barnes, 31/7/1969. 
675
 TNA: PRO CAB128/144, C(69)113, Equal pay; PREM13/3554, Edwards  to Dawes, 27/8/1969;  
PREM13/3554, Cabinet: Equal pay: memorandum by the First Secretary of State and Sec of state for 
Employment and Productivity, n.d. 
676
 TNA: PRO CAB64/792, Interdepartmental Group on Equal pay for women: minutes, 21/8/1969. 
677
 TNA: PRO PREM13/3554,Telegram from Derek [Smith] to David [Hancock], c.01/09/1969. 
236 
 
Wilson's hesitation meant that at the Trade Union Congress in early September 1969 he made 
nothing more than the vaguest genuflection towards equal pay coupled with the demand that this 
would need restraint in men's pay claims.  The TUC had already unanimously passed a motion 
from the TGWU demanding parity.678  The discussion at the Cabinet in early September did not go 
well for equal pay, which was criticised not only on the usual Treasury grounds but also for its 
affect on income distribution and the family wage.  Proponents argued that after the failure of In 
Place of Strife the measure would strengthen the position of moderates in the TUC and would 
calm the PLP.679 
 
The Treasury had not given up it opposition.  Even at the Cabinet meeting of 22nd September 1969 
no final decision was taken.  It accepted the principles that Castle's proposed, that the measure 
would come into force in 1975 and for equal pay to be for 'the same or broadly similar work' in the 
same establishment with the implementation by industrial tribunals.680  The Treasury were still of 
the view that equal pay should be stopped and that Jenkins should have a meeting with Wilson to 
secure this.681  Jenkins did not go all the way with his officials' wishes and he continued to claim his 
prerogative to veto any announcement682 leaving the final decision in the hands of Wilson, Jenkins 
and Castle.683  Although Treasury officials hoped that legislation would be further delayed,684 
                                                     
678
 'Equal pay restraint call evokes TUC anger' and  'Firm Stand on equal pay for women', The Times, 
3/9/1969. 
679
 TNA: PRO CAB128/41, CC(69)42, 04/09/1969. 
680
 TNA: PRO CAB129/144, C(69)120, 22/09/1969. 
681
 TNA: PRO T328/339, Waas to Dowler, 19/09/1969. 
682
 TNA: PRO T328/339, Hancock to Waas, 22/09/1969. 
683
 TNA: PRO  CAB128/144, CC(69)45, 25/09/1969. 
684
 TNA: PRO T328/339, [Telegram] Barnes to Jenkins, 26/9/1969. 
237 
 
Jenkins agreed to the statement that Castle wished to make to the Labour Party Conference.685  
Thus, in her reply to the debate on trade at on 29th September 1969, Castle was able to announce 
that the government would be preceding with legislation.686 
 
The DEP were quick to draw the threads of the policy together, and the proposals were circulated 
to the TUC, CBI687 and the Parliamentary Counsel within three weeks.688  The TUC sent these 
proposals to member unions for consultation,689 and the replies were mainly supportive of the 
legislation.  Even at this stage some unions began to raise the issue that equal pay would be of 
limited use if not complemented with equal opportunities,690 but this pressure was both too little 
and too late.  The proposal for equal pay was duly included in the Queen's Speech.  Equal 
opportunities was raised when Joyce Butler691 suggested that the government adopt her Anti-
Discrimination Bill and integrate it into the legislation.692  The 1965 Race Relations Bill had shown 
that such late amendment was possible with a concerted campaign with ministerial allies, but 
there was no such campaign. 
 
Even as the bill was being drafted there was little external pressure.  The TUC brought forward 
demands for the enactment of equal pay for work of equal value, a two year phase-in period and 
equal opportunities.  It did not push these amendments hard, rather Vic Feather advised Castle on 
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how to aviod the General Council's demands.693  The pressure that Feather was looking to short 
circuit was coming up through TUC-WAC and was beginning to create a different tone on the 
General Council.  The women's committee thought that the bill was so weak and industry 
orientated that they should oppose it, but it was the wrong stage in the electoral cycle to have 
used the Conservative opposition to achieve this.694  Similarly the 1970 TUC Women's Conference 
supported a call for strike action for equal pay.695  Although with race relations legislation the TUC 
had sought to avoid legislation that might interfere with their freedoms,696 with equal pay the TUC 
pushed for the legislation to encroach further into free collective bargaining by calling for it to be 
linked to work of equal value underpinned by job evaluation, arguing (rightly) that while the 
workforce was segmented on gender lines, this would go further to achieving equal pay.697  By the 
end of January 1970 the TUC had decided that the bill was a fait accompli698 although they 
attempted to have amendments put to the bill at committee stage but with little impact.699 
The bill was given its first reading on 28th January 1970,700 with the second following swiftly on 
February 9th.  While Jill Knight and Ronald Bell on the Conservative backbenches  raised the issue 
of the family wage,701 the bill's passage through Parliament was assured through front bench 
Conservative support despite the tightness of the parliamentary timetable.  The bill passed 
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through the rest of its Commons' stages without division or controversy by 23rd April 1970.702  In 
the Lords, Lord Belstead for the Conservatives moved a number of reasoned amendments 
highlighting the need for a tighter definition of job evaluation and calling for an investigation of 
the factors limiting women's opportunities in employment, but did not force a vote on any.703  In a 
coda Castle made a statement to the Commons regretting that it had not been possible to include 
pensions in the bill, promising that the bill could be amended before it came into effect in 1975.704  
The bill received Royal Assent on 2nd July 1970. 
 
Therefore, the immediate reasons why equal pay legislation was enacted was the support that the 
policy had in the Labour Party and particularly the PLP.  This mattered little while the 
unsympathetic Ray Gunter was the responsible minister.  So the second factor that was required 
was a supporter of equal pay taking responsibility for the policy.  Barbara Castle being at the DEP 
mattered.  Third, the Ford strike may have helped tip Castle into action and certainly weakened 
opposition from other government departments, although this becoming an issue of equal pay 
and may have been an accident of industrial relations.  Fourth, while the Ford dispute was not a 
single dues ex machina delivering equal pay, it did demonstrate the increasing militancy of women 
workers and strengthened the belief that if equal pay was not dealt with then industrial strife 
would follow.  Fifth, this industrial militancy also strengthened the hand of those in the trade 
union movement who wanted legislation, a generation like Veitch too young for the first wave of 
feminism and too old for the second.  Sixth, it was important that there was an infrastructure of 
women's representation within the unions.  The existence of women's officers in some of the big 
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unions mattered, as did the TUC having its Women's Advisory Committee that gave women a 
voice.  The last  important factor was that the state was already involved in regulating women's 
employment and there was little argument heard of this being a matter that should be kept in the 
private sphere.  The main argument against the measure was economic, that it would increase 
costs for industry and damage production.  In the trade unions too, there had been a long standing 
belief that women's employment should be subject to state regulation.  Thus, while public policy 
dating from the nineteenth century underpinned women's different role in the private sphere, in 
the 1960s it proved easy to invert the principle to assert their equality in the public sphere 
 
Other factors slowed progress towards equal pay.  First, the lack of strong advocates inside or 
outside government led to the proposals on the table in 1968 being weak.  Despite Castle pushing 
for as much to be included in the bill as possible, the final bill reflected this weakness developed in 
gestation.  Most notably the bill contained no equal opportunities measures.  Second, the 
advocates of equal pay were poorly organised and weakly equipped with ideas and were thus 
unable to have any great effect on the nature of the policy.  Particularly, by the 1960s the first 
wave feminist groups, by their own admission, were unable to mount even a token campaign.  
Last, the lack of the development of any clear policy, and to a degree the traditions of first wave 
feminism, meant that the form of equality was largely negative, a policy that employers must not 
treat men and women differently with respect to pay but not requiring any more positive equality 
to promote gender equality in employment.  Most notably, beyond the law itself, no institutions of 
the equality state relating to women's employment were developed in this period.  The result was 
a weak piece of legislation. 
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4.3: Unequal opportunities. 
One of the major weaknesses of the Equal Pay Act was that it was the sound of one hand of 
equality clapping if not accompanied by measures to ensure women had equal access to jobs and 
training.  The demand for such equality (which at a minimum could have been the negative 
equality, paralleling the measures enacted in the 1968 Race Relations Act) was limited in 1960s.  It 
was still less common to hear calls for positive equality that would have allowed women greater 
access to employment by an intervention in reducing their domestic role, for example in the form 
of childcare, perhaps because these moves intruded into the private sphere.  Nonetheless, the 
need to create greater equality for women to access employment was debated in the Equal Pay 
Bill's passage through Parliament in 1970.  There was also a concurrent debate on lessening 
gender roles in education, training and employment that led to women being confined in low paid 
employment. 
 
It would be easy to see the equal rights feminists who had dominated the first wave as having 
pursed middle-class women's emancipation.  The Open Door Council (ODC) had been formed as a 
split from NUSEC in 1927 because of the latter's support for protective legislation limiting women's 
employment opportunities.705  It campaigned for women to have the same access to employment 
as men.  Similarly, the SPG took the view that women should have no special legal protection.706  
Although protective legislation mainly excluded women from certain kinds of industrial work 
(most notably night work in factories), the ODC's and SPG's main campaigns were to be in middle 
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class professions, such as the London Stock Exchange and the Anglican clergy.707  The bulwarks of 
the equal rights feminist movement had been two white collar women's unions, the Union of 
Women Teachers (1920-1961) and the National Association of Women Civil Servants (1932-1959).  
Both were wound after the marriage bar had been dropped and women in these professions were 
granted formal equal pay (although their work was concentrate in lower grades).708  By the early 
1960s the ODC was near moribund showing only occasional bouts of letter writing.709  One of the 
last major campaigns of the SPG was in the early 1960s against medical schools that set a low 
ceiling on the number of female students they would admit.710 
 
In 1966 the Labour MP Lena Jeger argued professional women did not need their interests 
furthered by the law,711 although the evidence for this is weak.  For example, in 1966 the 
Transport Holding Company (the government company for nationalised road transport and freight, 
shipping and travel agents.) reported to the Ministry of Labour there were many grades, 
particularly the more senior ones, where women were simply absent.712  Similarly, a report in the 
same year for the London Chamber of Commerce found women to be largely excluded from the 
higher echelons of management.713  Even where equal pay existed on paper for white collar 
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workers, it was undermined by gendered work.  Equal pay had been phased into the Civil Service 
by 1961, but the battle was far from won.  The general secretary of one Civil Service union 
complained in 1966 that: 
in the 'mixed grades' the equal pay is tending to settle down not as the 'men's rate' but as 
something in between what (had there been no equal pay) would have been the separate rates 
for men and women.  And in the grades predominantly staffed by women, HM Government 
insists that the principle of equal pay is inconsistent with the 'principle' of fair comparisons 
with outside rates; and that the latter principle must dominate.  So in practice, we get in the 
first case an equality at something at less than what would have been the 'men's rate', and in 
the second case we get significantly less than true equal pay.
714
  
Thus the argument that the middle classes had attained gender equality at work was false. 
 
To a degree the first wave feminists did give some consideration to the position of working class 
women too.  In 1965 the SPG embarked on the formulation of a desideratum for women's 
employment,715 and although they made little progress, they considered 'the establishment of 
crèches, nursery schools and kindergartens and play centres which will be flexible and enable the 
employment of mothers in trades, industries and professions'.716  They also attempted to 
champion equal opportunities causes célèbres such as Brenda Armstrong, a bus conductor, who in 
1967 passed her training as a driver only to face a threat of strike action by the Great Yarmouth 
TGWU busworkers' branch.  She did not respond to the SPG's advances717 although they continued 
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with a campaign for women bus drivers to be appointed, by writing to MPs, London Transport and 
the General Secretary of the TGWU, Frank Cousins.  The campaign lacked a clear focus on the 
outcome they desired other than the resolution of individual cases.  In Brenda Armstrong's case, 
the SPG did not even achieve this.718 
 
For Jeger the issue of equal access to work was essentially a working class one tied up with the 
ideology of the family wage: 
partly because women workers do not care enough.  Many of them in fact go home to a 
domestic environment secured by their husband's wages.  Some of those who do not work ask 
why the chit of a girl up the road should get as much as their husband – without his 
responsibilities. 
The problem, Jeger continued, was that equal pay was an 'orphan child' without 'equal work' 
existing first.  For many working class women their work was not the equal of their husbands' in 
terms of pay or skill.  In working class life the established fact was that families relied more on 
men's wages and this was embedded in working class culture.  This led to women viewing their 
own work as less important, and this had become institutionalised in the gendering of the labour 
market and wages.719 
 
The government showed no interesting in creating a less gendered labour market.  When Fred 
Lee720 wrote to Wilson in 1970 asking that equality of access to industrial training be included in 
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the Equal Pay Bill,721 Castle's draft reply argued that the law could not change attitudes of 
employers and women themselves, and that these were the root of the problem.722  The Civil 
Service note behind this showed a view that women were mothers and wives first, and that 
inequality in employment underpinned their domestic role: 
the tendency of married women to put home and family first and job second, and to restrict 
their hours of work, is the main factor which restricts their employment opportunities.  This is 
not prejudice against women, but a realistic assessment of their employability in a particular 
situation ... In judging applications for women for industrial training, selection panels are ... 
obliged to take into account the limited employment opportunities for women in many skilled 
trades and attitudes of the Unions concerned. 
The note continues to identify the importance of women in a gendered workforce, and worries 
that equality might undermine the supply of women for (low paid) nursing an teaching roles: 
Women who enter teaching and nursing are of the same ability levels as technicians, 
technologists and managers.  In securing an extension of the employment field for women care 
must be taken to ensure that the prospects of future generations are not harmed by a shortage 
of teachers and that there are at all times sufficient qualified and experienced nurses to 
safeguard the health of the nation.
723
 
Thus the notion that women were excluded from skilled work because of their domestic 
responsibilities was uncomfortably spliced with the idea that women were needed to do certain 
types of feminine skilled work. 
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The first wave of feminism had developed little policy to promote women's equal access to 
employment.  What did emerge came from women in the labour movement.  The Labour Party-
trade union women's committee, the NJCWWO,724 produced a report in September 1968 which 
looked at the decline in part time employment on which women relied (in part because of 
Labour's Selective Employment Tax - which from 1966 included inducement for industry to locate 
in economically rundown areas but encouraged only full time employment).725  The issues of 
education, training and childcare were also highlighted.726  The NJCWWO wrote to Harold Wilson 
about their concerns, and received a sympathetic reply that the government not only supported 
equal pay but attached no less importance to equal opportunities: 
the aim is to bring the possibilities of and the necessity for extending openings for women in 
all fields increasingly to the notice of employers' associations, trade unions, industrial training 
boards and other bodies and groups who may be able to contribute actively to the realisation 
of full equality of opportunity for women.
727 
There is no sign of this sympathy informing any government policy. 
 
Nonetheless, the existence of such goodwill on Wilson's part suggested that progress on equal 
opportunity might be possible.  Joyce Butler had raised the issue in the House of Commons in the 
form of a Ten Minute Rule bill in 1968728 which proposed not only equal pay but measures against 
sex discrimination based on the 1968 Race Relations Bill, then proceeding through Parliament.  It 
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covered appointment, dismissal and training as well as the creation of an anti-discrimination board 
to receive complaints.729  Castle was interested enough in this to have a meeting with Butler about 
her proposals and to look at kindred systems in the USA and Canada.730  Other pressure from back 
bench Labour MPs had led to the formation of a joint Labour NEC-PLP study group in mid-1967 to 
look at discrimination against women. 731  In the light of the mess that the NEC working party on 
race relations had descended into,732 George Brown sought to ensure that the TUC were fully 
involved in this working group from the start.733  Terry Pitt from the research department was 
keen to ensure that the TUC had good representation on the committee suggesting that both 
Chipchase and Paterson be members.734  One of the strengths of the working party was its ability 
to draw together a wide range of members, including the emerging small pool of experts on 
women's equality, who were often non-labour movement orientated and thus the TUC were 
unwilling to work closely with them outside of this kind of Labour Party group. 
 
The committee held its first meeting in November 1967 under the chairmanship of the veteran 
Labour MP, ex-Cabinet minister and then chair of the PLP, Douglas Houghton.735  Houghton had a 
longstanding commitment to women's rights which had developed with his involvement in the 
Inland Revenue Staffs Association which he helped found in the 1920s, and he had friendly 
relationships with the first wave feminists.  He had been a speaker at the SPG's 45th anniversary 
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dinner in 1966, where he had described himself as an 'old Six Pointer'.736  Unfortunately, Houghton 
also had a strong interest in the details of social security and taxation policy which led the 
committee to consider the detail of National Insurance and tax codes.  He was less attuned to 
broader questions of women's role and status in society.  As chair of the working party he wrote to 
the SPG in early 1968 asking for their views, although this did not bring them any great influence 
since they had little to say about the details of policy.737 
 
The working party commenced work with a consultative document sent out to women's sections 
in October 1967, and grouped women's discrimination under a broad range of headings.  
Educational, legal, social and political economic discrimination were all highlighted.  These 
preparatory materials for the group brought together some of the more forward-looking and 
imaginative thinking in this period.  Particularly the group recognised that, 'the problem is ... not 
simply one of providing "equal pay" but of raising the level of pay for certain jobs regarded as 
women's work but, which ... are of equal value to similar jobs performed by men'.  Thus, equal 
opportunities were needed to promote women's equality, although this was conceptualised 
entirely as women accessing senior roles, not the segregation of industrial employment.  
Nonetheless, there was some attempt to grope towards why such unequal opportunities existed, 
the interruption of women's careers, and men being unwilling to accept women in authority over 
them and more generally to women's position in society and the impact not just of legislation but 
the government relying on low paid women's labour in areas such as nursing and teaching.738   
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The Labour Party working party suggested that further progress towards women's equality in 
employment would require a change in the position of women in the family.  In Planning for 
Women at Work, presented to the 1968 Labour Party Women's Conference, stated: 
At school ... girls are usually expected to prepare themselves primarily for their future roles as 
housewives, via courses on housecraft, cookery and the like ... there can no longer be any rigid 
separation of roles ... between men and women ... basic attitudes, however, assume just such 
a separation ... The long-term aim of any plan for women at work must be to impart a new 
significance to women's employment.  A radical change in the attitudes of both men and 
women towards women's employment is therefore essential.  One key fact here is 
undoubtedly the family, and ... the role of the mother in influencing her daughters' attitude 
towards work.'
739 
Such a sociological understanding did not at this time form the basis for any clear policy proposals. 
 
When the committee came to consider the details of women's employment at the end of 1968 it 
concentrated on the possibility of anti-discrimination legislation.  A document produced in 
November 1968 by Anthony Lester and the academic, Margherita Rendell,740 was built on civil 
rights legislation in the USA.  As with Joyce Butler's proposals, this suggested that race relations 
legislation should be extended to embody the principle of fair treatment in general (covering all 
characteristics of an individual from gender to religion) rather than being open to accusations of 
'special treatment' for one particular group.  It was proposed that a quasi-independent body 
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should oversee this with powers of subpoena and investigation.741  Overall, the paper suggested 
an integrated approach to fairness of treatment, the unified framework that was to characterise 
the equality state by 2010, but there is no sign that such proposals were considered by anyone in 
government at this time. 
 
The study group failed to create any pressure on policy makers.  At the group's November 1969 
meeting Rendell suggested that a policy of equal pay alone: 
was inadequate and that there was a danger of channelling the issue of discrimination against 
women solely into the industrial and pay field.  It was felt more desirable that discrimination 
should not be dealt with by industrial tribunals but by the statutory machinery in the Race 
Relations Act.
742
 
The TUC had created some pressure for equal pay around ILO convention 100 (equal pay) but they 
gave far less prominence to ILO 111 (Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention) 
(1958) which dealt with discrimination in employment, including that against women743 and 
consequently the DEP gave it little consideration.744  Pressure only started coming up through the 
unions in 1969 when the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, the Greater London 
Council Staff Association and ASTMS all drew attention to the need for equal opportunities, and 
the TUC-WAC pointed to ILO 111 as offering a template for this.745  The TUC decided that it was 
too late to campaign for any major changes to the Equal Pay Bill and anyhow they had concerns 
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that an overarching Equal Opportunities Board with a remit beyond women would undermine free 
collective bargaining.746 
 
So it was that equal opportunities for women in employment failed to be subject to government 
policy making in the 1960s.  The limited development of these ideas, and absence of any 
meaningful pressure for policy promoting them, only serves to underline the lack of any of this as 
a campaign focus. 
 
4.4: Protective legislation. 
The absence of equal opportunities legislation was not the only factor limiting women's 
employment in the 1960s.  Protective legislation, too, restricted women's access to jobs.  This did 
not simply push women into the home, rather it limited women's role in industrial manufacturing 
whilst putting no limits on women in some areas of feminised employment, particularly nursing. 
 
In 1962  Lord Balniel's747 government supported Private Members' Bill proposed to empower the 
minister of Health to issue regulations limiting women's ability to return to work after childbirth748 
(the Factory Acts already restrained women from returning to work for four weeks after 
childbirth).  The debate this caused exposed not only differences between equal rights feminists 
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and the labour movement, but also within Labour's and the trade union's ranks.  The Balniel Bill 
did not pass, being talked out at its third reading by Judith Hart early in 1963.749 
 
The proposals were rejected outright by equal rights feminists who feared that the law could only 
be used to force women out of employment into the home.  Their belief in equality could admit no 
element of biological difference between men and women, so Dr Amy Fleming750 of the ODC 
argued: 
The only way to safeguard the interests of the wage-earning woman is to treat the incapacity 
resulting from childbirth similarly to incapacity for work whatever be its cause.  The same 
medical certificate of incapacity should be used in connection with childbirth as issued in 
connection with absence due to illness or accident.
751
 
The TUC General Council, and much of the leadership of the Labour Party, supported the Balniel 
Bill, and had long wished for the extension of the law to workplaces not covered by the Factory Act 
and for a longer period.752  This maternalist position brought them into conflict with the TUC-WAC 
which held that it was wrong that women should be banned from working, and instead demanded 
women should have greater maternity benefits and protection from dismissal.  This was Judith 
Hart's position too.753  It is thus notable that while the equal rights feminists had an equality based 
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entirely on negative measures, the TUC-WAC were developing a more positive policy to promote 
women's equality. 
 
Pressure for reform continued after Labour returned to power in 1964.  Consultation on 
decreasing the legal restrictions on women working was instigated in 1965 on the tripartite NJAC 
and continued to 1969.  The TUC's position was that there should be no removal of protection 
before equal pay, and even then care should be taken so that women could not be used as cheap 
labour and undercut the pay of men.  A second, maternalist, argument was used by the TUC, that 
since a large proportion of working women had families, 'in the interests of society generally, the 
State must intervene to protect women'.754  Thus, there was a tension in trade unions between 
those who linked the removal of protective legislation with equal pay and promoting women's 
equality, and those who maintained that women's position in the labour force was different to 
that of men. 
 
It is not difficult to find views of women's being different to men in the trade union movement.  In 
1969 John Newton of the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (NUTGW) told Barbara 
Castle: 
Women were biologically different, and were liable to exploitation.  Moreover sometimes one 
had to protect people from themselves.  Equal pay was payment for work done.  He personally 
would not accept the idea that the removal of restrictions on [women's] hours should be a 
quid pro quo for equal pay.
 755
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Castle was scathing of such concern for women's welfare but it would be wrong to simply dismiss 
Newton's view as antediluvian sexism.  The NUTGW had 92,000 women members756 and his views 
may have reflected the interests of his members in wishing to maintain the protection many 
women wanted since they maintained a level of domestic responsibility alongside paid 
employment.  Castle recognised this in refusing to yield to the CBI to formally link the removal of 
protective legislation to the passage of equal pay.757 
 
The division in the TUC remained.  The TUC's women's organisations wanted less restriction, while 
its male dominated General Council favoured greater limitations.  This was enough to stop 
protective legislation being repealed.  Most stayed on the statue book until the late 1980s, when 
the combination of the European Union's Equal Treatment Directive and the Thatcher 
government's desire to reduce employment protection led to a levelling down of rights to those of 
men.758 
 
4.5: Conclusion. 
What is significant is that women's equality in employment was on the policy agenda at all in the 
1960s.  Juliet Mitchell's 1966 article in The New Left Review, one of the first expressions of second 
wave feminism in Britain, sums up the feeling that the campaign for women's equality had run out 
of steam years before.  She argued, 'the wider legacy of the suffrage, was nil: the suffragettes 
proved quite unable to move beyond their own initial demands.'759  The evidence supports the 
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view that little progress had been made on women's equality after 1928, that the issues were 
considered under the 1964-1970 Labour governments marked progress. 
 
That the progress was slight is also true.  The Equal Pay Act was not only long delayed, but it did 
not come into force until 1975.  Its limited definition of broadly similar work and the lack of even 
negative measures for equal access to employment meant that there was a counter-productive 
tendency in the legislation.  This was highlighted at the time by the academic lawyer, Olive 
Stone,760 who argued that equal pay without equal opportunities 'do[es] nothing whatsoever to 
break down but serve[s] rather to petrify the present segregation of most women workers into 
menial, underpaid jobs to which there is no near male equivalent.'761  The Equal Pay Act was, 
nonetheless, a platform on which by degrees an equality state for women could be erected, with 
equal opportunities measures in employment, education and training being introduced in Labour's 
1975 Sex Discrimination Act and in 1983 an amendment for equal pay for work of equal value 
being forced on a reluctant Conservative administration by a European Court of Justice ruling.762 
 
The limited nature of the reforms was closely related to the weakness of the feminist movement.  
Claims that the first wave feminism persisted after 1945, while true, fail to convey its weakness.  
Equal rights groups such as the Open Door Council and Six Point Group were fading.  Their 
demands after 1945 were dominated by claims for equal pay in the Civil Service and teaching 
which had been at the core of equal rights feminism since the 1900s.  When formal equal pay was 
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granted by the Conservative government in 1955, a reform that did nothing to change women 
being concentrated in the lowest grades, not only did campaigning cease but much of the 
organisational infrastructure of the campaigning was dismantled.  Nor was it the case that first 
wave feminist ideas had become implanted in the Labour Party 763 There were some who had been 
influenced by these ideas, Barbara Castle and Douglas Houghton being the clearest examples.  
There was pressure from the Labour's backbenches for change, but this was not (as for example 
Elizabeth Wilson suggests) as a result of the heritage of first wave feminism.  For example, Joyce 
Butler claimed that her inspiration for her first bill on women's equality was the Queen's Christmas 
Day broadcast of 1967.764  Similarly Lena Jeger's background was not influenced by first wave 
feminism but rather by the Bevanite left.  Notably, both Butler and Jeger were involved in the 
peace movement in the 1950s.765  The mainstream labourite right (Gunter, Callaghan) were simply 
uninterested, and the revisionist right's déclassé socialism developed little policy on greater 
gender equality. 
 
That there was progress at all was also the result of pressure from the trade union movement.  A 
number of factors here combined to make progress possible.  The first was the presence of a 
cohort of women who were (like Jeger and Butler) too young to be first wave feminists, and too 
early for the second wave of feminism.766  These included three important trade unions women's 
officers, Chipchase and Veitch, born in 1916 and 1913, and Paterson born in 1934.  These women 
represented a generation whose pre-Robbins Report educational opportunities were limited, 
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whereas second wave feminists were fuelled by young women who had benefitted from the post-
Robbins expansion.767  Second, there was some infrastructure within the trade unions for 
articulating women's demands.  The TUC's Women's Advisory Committee and Conference for 
Unions Catering for Women Workers may have been imperfect tools, but they were channels into 
which women trade unionist's demands flowed.  Third, as shown by the Dagenham strike, some 
women in trade unions were themselves willing to take industrial action to further their equality.  
Lastly, there was an established ideology in the trade union movement that the law could further 
the interests of women in a way that was not accepted for men. 
 
This last point is no less real for being paradoxical.  Women's status as workers had long since 
been considered not a private matter, but something that was an issue of public policy.  Protective 
legislation underpinned women's inequality in employment.  This meant that resistance to using 
the state to promote women's equality rather than their different role did not raise questions 
about whether the law should be used to regulate women's employment, but to what ends the 
law should be used. 
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Chapter 5: Women's equality in the private Sphere. 
The key discontinuity between the first and the second wave of feminism can be summed up in 
the slogan 'the personal is political', a slogan that at least in part emphasised the centrality of the 
relationships in the private sphere for the new feminist politics.1  While the first wave of feminism 
had not thought in terms of freeing women from their role in the home, this became axiomatic for 
the second wave.  Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique2 (1963) in the USA and Hannah Gavron's3 
The Captive Wife (1966)4 in the UK both fed into the second wave by examining the limitations and 
frustrations of women's domestic role.  Although Gavron's book can be taken to indicate that such 
ideas were current in British society, there was no political movement that expressed them and 
this limited their impact on ideas of women's equality in the 1960s and it should not be assumed 
that the reforms examined in this chapter were motivated by a belief in women's equality in the 
private sphere. 
 
Here the focus will be on the development of policy in three areas relating to women's roles in the 
private sphere, abortion, contraception and divorce.  While contraception and abortion were the 
subjects of longstanding campaigns with a somewhat marginal basis in first wave feminism and 
with some relation to the labour movement, divorce was not.  Although it was axiomatic to the 
second wave of feminism that the institution of marriage was central to women's oppression, this 
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had not been a feature of previous feminism.  During the 1966-1970 Labour governments each of 
these three areas was the subject of a successful Private Members' Bill (PMB).  That these were 
considered issues for backbenchers to decide on free votes reflected their status as moral issues 
above politics, but also that they were ceasing to be so.  The relationship of these policies to the 
labour movement and campaigning groups will be analysed, as will the extent to which these 
policies incorporated ideas of women's equality and the nature of that equality. 
 
The previous chapter showed that women's employment had not been purely a matter of private 
choice, but subject to state regulation.  Similarly, women's roles in the private sphere was never 
that private, but was underpinned by public morality5 particularly through the established Church 
and the state policy that reflected this morality.  Abortion was subject to common law derived 
from canon law until the early nineteenth century,6 and the first stages of divorce were dealt with 
by ecclesiastical courts until 1857.7  In some ways the changes in women's roles within the private 
sphere have been reliant on these issues descending from the realm of sacred morality to become 
part of profane political discourse.  It is this top-down change that is the subject of this thesis.  The 
top-down development in the 1960s can be seen as the triumph of Hart over Devlin.  Lord Devlin8 
viewed morality as an externally imposed order, an unsuitable subject for political debate, 
personal freedom or democratic choice.  Such thinking was reflected in the political parties' 
reluctance to reform these areas, suspending them in a limbo where they were already legally 
regulated and denied legitimate political discussion.  This moral carapace had been challenged by 
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some feminist and sex radicals in the 1920s, but the necro-Victorian revanche which followed the 
brief threat of Bloomsbury Bohemia cast a conservative pall across British politics that was to last 
until the sixties.  By then, many in the political class (and some of the Anglican episcopacy) thought 
in more secular terms, reflecting HLA Hart's9 (and JS Mill's) assertion that the law should leave 
possible moral harm to oneself as a personal decision.10  The degree to which attitudes had 
changed in the political elite and the effect this had on women's equality will be examined below. 
 
5.1: Campaigning on reproductive rights, and abortion reform to 1964. 
5.1.1: Early campaigning on contraception. 
Contraception was outside the bounds of nineteenth century polite discourse.  The Reverend 
Thomas Malthus11 prescribed only moral self-restraint to reduce the poverty he suggested was 
caused by overpopulation, but he created an opening through which radicals, such as Francis 
Place,12 could argue for contraception.  In the 1820s Place proposed early marriage and 
contraception,13 and in the following decade the free-thinking publisher Richard Carlile14 
promoted contraception and the sexual emancipation of women, publishing a practical 
contraception manual by an American doctor, Charles Knowlton.15  These promoters of 
contraception became known as neo-Malthusians.  Many liberals may have privately supported 
contraception. JS Mill may have distributed contraception leaflets for Place in his youth, but later 
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was more cautious in his support.16  Contraception was also promoted by the early British socialist 
Robert Owen17 who, unlike Place, put contraception in the context of transforming gender roles, 
proposing free marriage, divorce and communal childcare.18  After the decline of the Owenite 
movement, such pro-contraception and feminist ideas were quiescent in the British labour 
movement until the 1920s. 
 
For many years it was radical liberals who promoted contraception in Britain.  The secularist 
Charles Bradlaugh19 first proposed a contraception campaign in 1861, but it was not until he and 
Annie Besant20 were prosecuted for republishing Knowlton's tract in 187721 that it was launched as 
the Malthusian League.  As the League's historian Rosanna Ledbetter has noted, it came to 
combine women's equality with free market liberal opposition to social welfare, putting Malthus 
first and contraception second.22  The left opposed Malthusian ideas and viewed contraception as 
a distracting alternative to welfare provision.23  Thus, until the 1920s the issue of contraception 
had no purchase in the labour movement, in distinction to France and Germany.24  Most first wave 
feminists, seeking respectability and steering clear of the question of women's role in family, 
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avoided the issue too.25  Amongst the feminist groups in the 1920s, only Eleanor Rathbone's 
NUSEC afforded contraception a high priority, alongside family allowances.  This was not to 
promote women's equality, but to alleviate the plight of working class mothers.26 
 
Change was to emerge from eccentric sources.  With her 1918 work, Married Love, Marie Stopes'27 
goal was a mutually sexually fulfilling marriage aided by contraception.28  To further this goal, in 
1921 she established a birth control clinic in Holloway, North London, the Malthusians having set 
up one earlier that year in East Street, South London.  In the labour movement, the stimulus came 
from the 1922 prosecution of two anarcho-syndicalists, Rose Witcop29 and Guy Aldred,30 for 
publishing a contraception advice pamphlet31 and Enfield District Council's sacking of a district 
nurse, who also worked at the East Street clinic, for offering contraception advice.  Local authority 
advice was vital for working class people who would otherwise not have access to affordable 
contraception, so as it became clear that councils were not permitted to fund this activity, 
campaigners who had grouped to defend Witcop and Aldred began to focus on lobbying within the 
Labour Party.32  Before the 1923 general election the Birth Control Committee was established33 
and when in early 1924 Labour formed its minority government, the committee sent a delegation 
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led by HG Wells34 and Dora Russell35 to the Minister of Health, John Wheatley.36  Their demands 
were rebutted,37 leading to Labour's 1924 women's conference passing a motion demanding that 
local authorities be allowed to fund clinics.38  This led to the foundation of the Workers' Birth 
Control Group (WBCG), under the leadership of Russell.39  The women's conference motion had 
little standing in the party and Labour's NEC declined to submit it to the party's annual conference 
on the grounds that this was a matter of individual conscience.  At the party's 1925 conference the 
WBCG won considerable support but failed to overturn this ruling.40  Labour MPs also showed little 
interest, failing to support their colleague Ernest Thurtle's41 unsuccessful 1926 Ten Minute Rule Bill 
reflecting the WBCG's demands.42  A procedural victory for the WCBG at Labour's 1926 conference 
allowed the issue to be discussed,43 but this was to prove the high point of the campaign which 
quickly declined, in part due to the mobilisation of Catholic opinion in the trade unions.44  By 1928 
the campaigners were even defeated in the women's conference.45 
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The Labour Party hierarchy's caution was motivated more by electoral considerations than 
principle.46  Despite campaigning having all but ceased, after Labour were returned to office in 
1929, with the sympathetic Arthur Greenwood47 at the Ministry of Health, a circular was quietly 
issued in 1930 allowing local authorities to offer contraception advice to married people on health 
grounds.48  Considering its aims to be met, the WBCG disbanded in 1931.49  This victory caused a 
bifurcation amongst contraception campaigners.  The more respectable focused on the provision 
of contraceptive services.  The sex radicals turned to the issue of abortion. 
 
5.1.2: Abortion law reform 1930-1964. 
Abortion was first outlawed in statute in 1803 and the law was amended several times until the 
being incorporated into 1861 Offences Against the Persons.  That this proscribed 'illegal' abortion 
was probably prolix drafting, but this created uncertainty by implying abortion could be legal if 
carried out on medical grounds.  This uncertain legal position continued with the 1929 Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act which closed a legal lacuna between abortion and infanticide by outlawing 
killing a child capable of being born alive, a point the Act set at the twenty-eighth week of 
pregnancy,50 unless it was to preserve the life of the mother.  This implied a defence of necessity 
to protect a mother's life at all stages of pregnancy and possibly on wider medical grounds before 
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twenty-eight weeks.  This confusion allowed the growth of a demimonde of private clinics 
operating on the margins of the law for those who could pay, although a number of doctors were 
convicted of carrying out abortion as an elective procedure around this time.51  A much darker 
world of backstreet abortions also flourished which were treated as entirely illegal. 
 
The networks that had been established in contraception campaigning in the 1920s aided the 
emergence of the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) in 1936.  The prime movers were Stella 
Browne52 and Dr Joan Malleson53 who were joined by Janet Chance54 and Alice Jenkins.55  Apart 
from Chance, the wife of a wealthy stockbroker and a free-thinking liberal,56 all of this group 
moved in Labour and socialist circles.57  Although Browne thought abortion was a woman's right, 
ALRA favoured 'a less forthright declaration' for legal abortion on specified grounds.58  The 
methods by which this could be achieved were unclear.  Despite its Labour links, there is no 
evidence of the new organisation even considering the kind of campaign the WBCG had mounted 
in the 1920s.  ALRA sought to win over non-feminist women's organisations, such as the National 
Council of Women, although without notable success in the pre-war years. 
 
Neither the government nor the medical profession wished to lead the way on reform.  A British 
Medical Association (BMA) report of 1935 noted that while legalising abortions would reduce the 
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death rate, a change in the law was a matter of public not medical policy.59  Such consideration of 
government policy followed in 1937 when the Ministry of Health established an inter-
departmental inquiry into death associated with abortion under Norman Birkett.60  This rejected 
liberalising abortion law and did not wish to 'give licence to all sorts of undisciplined and 
uncontrolled behaviour.'61  The committee's one pro-reform member, Dorothy Thurtle,62 issued 
her own minority report proposing abortion be available to rape victims, carriers of hereditary 
disorders and, most notably, on attenuated social grounds for married women who already had 
four children.63 
 
Reform was more forthcoming from the bench.  In 1931 the outspoken High Court Judge, Mr. 
Justice McCardie,64 criticised abortion law as outdated.65  This view was reflected in the 1938 
Bourne judgement which followed from an abortion performed on a 14 year old girl who had been 
raped by four Guardsmen.  The existence of the case was not chance since the girl had been seen 
by Malleson, who referred her to Aleck Bourne,66 a consultant obstetrician and a member of 
ALRA's Medico-legal Council.  Bourne performed the operation on the grounds of the girl's mental 
health, informed the police and invited prosecution.  The judge's acceptance of this defence and 
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Bourne's acquittal at least clarified the grounds for abortion in case law.67  The leadership of the 
medical profession were happy to let case law develop and politicians were keen to steer clear of 
area of morality.  ALRA went into abeyance in the war years, despite the number of prosecutions 
(and presumably the demand) for abortion increasing.68  When in the closing days of the war, 
ALRA met, it decided to neither submit evidence to the Royal Commission on Population nor 
prepare draft legislation.69 
 
At the end of the war ALRA initially looked to case law to achieve reform.70  After the Bourne case, 
this approach had been further encouraged by the Bergmann-Ferguson case of 1948 where two 
female doctors had agreed to and performed abortions for 'sympathetic' reasons.  The women's 
successful defence was to show clear health grounds in each case.71  This established that it was 
legal for a patient to ask her doctor for a termination; for the doctor to consider the request and 
agree if they, in good faith, considered it necessary to preserve the women's health; and if 
endorsed by a second opinion for a surgeon to act on it.72  In 1949 ALRA sent out 43,000 leaflets to 
doctors setting out the precedent of this case.73  The weakness of assuming that case law was a 
one way street towards liberalisation was demonstrated in 1958 when Dr. Louis Newton was 
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convicted after the death of a patient, and although there was mea culpa on the part of the 
doctor, the case did leave the law in a state of some indeterminacy.74 
 
In 1952 the Labour backbencher Joseph Reeves75 approached ALRA for a draft bill.  There was no 
such bill, so one was prepared in haste76 by a rising figure in ALRA, Glanville Williams.77  Williams 
was an academic lawyer and influence on HLA Hart, caricatured as the 'illegitimate son of Jeremy 
Bentham'.78  Reeves' bill proposed only limited grounds for abortion, but nonetheless stirred up 
enough opposition to be easily defeated.79  It is this bill that led to ALRA changing its strategy to 
one based on seeking a PMB, and they sought more sponsors80 and in 1954 Lord Amulree81 
presented an ALRA-based bill to the Lords.  The leadership of the organisation appears to have 
lacked the lobbying skills this required.  Amulree found himself in conflict with ALRA who wanted 
more liberal reform than he was prepared to back.82  He recalled, 'I got badly bitten by the founder 
of the reform of abortion society – or whatever it is called ... [Alice] Jenkins ... was just hell'.83  
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ALRA appear not to have been involved in Kenneth Robinson's84 1961 PMB which was not the 
subject of a minuted discussion in ALRA beyond being reported at its AGM.85 
 
By 1960 with Malleson, Chance and Browne all dead, it was clear that ALRA was in decline.  One 
younger activist, Diana Munday,86 saw it as a 'group of elderly people who were all very 
embarrassed about the subject'.87  Jenkins had retired from activity in 1960 after publishing her 
book, Law for the Rich,88 in 1960, which combined a history of ALRA with the case for reform, 
although ALRA seemed incapable of using the publicity the book created.  Also telling of the state 
of ALRA was its failure to discuss the thalidomide issue.  The BMA's advice in the 1950s was that 
abortion after rubella was legal on the grounds of the potential affect on the mental wellbeing of 
the mother rather than possible foetal abnormality,89 and some women who had taken 
thalidomide had abortions without legal challenge.90 
 
Outside of ALRA, thalidomide did create debate.  In 1962 Phillip Kimber of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers (SLL) sought to assemble a committee including the Labour-affiliated Socialist Medical 
Association (SMA) and Glanville Williams to investigate how better reporting of case law would 
improve the situation, but this was rejected by both the SLL executive and the SMA who agreed it 
                                                     
84
 1911-1996.  Labour MP, St. Pancras N. (1949-1970).  Minister of Health (1964-1968). 
85
 CMA/SA/ALR/A.1/2/2, ALRA AGM, 1/11/1961. 
86
 b.1931.  Campaigner and secularist. 
87
 Angela Phillips, 'Women on the march', The Guardian, 25/6/1998. 
88
 Alice Jenkins, Law for the Rich (London: Victor Gollancz, 1960). 
89
 Barbara Brookes and Peter Roth, 'Rex v. Bourne and the Mediatisation of Abortion' in Michael Clark and 
Catherine Crawford (eds), Legal Medicine in History (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), p337. 
90
 There are no reports of a test case. 
270 
 
was better to seek reform of the law.91  Inside ALRA, thalidomide was the catalyst for a new 
generation of activists to breathe life back into the organisation.  Munday joined the ALRA 
executive in late 1962.  Madeline Simms became involved at this time, becoming a pioneering 
press secretary.92  Munday persuaded Vera Houghton93 to become chair.  Houghton was of an 
older generation and had long experience as General Secretary of the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation.94 Meetings became longer and more professional.95 
 
This change in leadership ended even indirect links with the first wave of feminism.  Joan Vickers 
spoke at the public meeting after ALRA's 1961 AGM but it would appear to have been as a 
sympathetic MP rather than as the chair of the Status of Women Committee which had no 
position on abortion.96  In 1964 ALRA wrote to the Fawcett Society, to be told that they only 
campaigned on women's economic emancipation.97  The organisations that ALRA had the closest 
relations with were the National Federation of Townswomen's Guilds,98 by this time not 
recognisably a feminist organisation, and the National Federation of University Women.99  The 
new generation of activists were not, however, the harbingers of the second wave of feminism.  
Simms saw herself as part of an 'unfashionable feminism' comprising 'women graduates serving 
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their 10-year stretch of domesticity'.100  By the 1970s ALRA found itself pushed aside by the second 
wave.  Munday recalled, 'we liked their passion but we felt ... their behaviour alienated people'.101  
Rather, the new leadership were part of the new wave of pressure groups formed in the 1960s,102 
this younger generation developing and applying the pressure group tactics of the time.  The 
Homosexual Law Reform Society (HLRS) appears to have influenced ALRA, particularly the society's 
secretary Antony Grey103 and his use of Parliamentary motions to create publicity.104  The pooling 
of resources with HRLS was considered in late 1965, although this came to nothing.105  ALRA also 
considered mimicking HRLS's dual structure, it being allied to the Albany Trust, a charitable 
welfare body but rejected the idea.  ALRA resisted pressure from the Marie Stopes Memorial Clinic 
to move into running advice centres,106 foreshadowing the role which the British Pregnancy 
Advisory Service was later to play. 
 
One area where ALRA were keen to make alliances was with broadly based, non-feminist, 
women's organisations.  Although the National Council of Women (NCW) passed pro-reform 
motions at their conferences in 1938 and 1959, the leadership of the Council had been hesitant to 
do more to back the campaign for change.  In order not to alienate their Catholic affiliates and the 
Anglican Mothers' Union, the NCW initially refused to back Robinson's PMB.107  In some of its 
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structures too, there were pools of hostility to the kind of liberalism embodied in ALRA.  In early 
1964 Simms attended a meeting of the NCW's Moral Welfare Committee: 
It may well be that the Moral Welfare Sectional Committee attracts the worst elements in the 
NCW:  There is certainly evidence that other parts of the organisation are more progressive in 
their outlook.  However, this particular committee ... seems largely concerned with hunting 
down pornography, prosecuting newsagents, and co-operating in this activity with such 
dubious bodies as ... the Public Morality Council, and the London Committee Against Obscenity 
... It is also objecting to the more tolerant attitude to sexual ethics which is apparently being 
preached by some lecturers of the Marriage Guidance Council (baleful Humanist influence 
detected here) and trying to prevent the sale of contraceptives through slot-machines. 
Relations with the NCW remained difficult, although Munday was later to find ordinary members 
of the NCW to be more sympathetic to reform.108  ALRA believed that the leadership of the NCW 
deliberately manoeuvred to stop a pro-reform motion being taken at their 1964 conference.109  
The following year pro-reform policy was passed by the NCW although the Mothers' Union and 
five Catholic groups registered their dissent.110 
 
One obvious tactic for the renewed ALRA was to follow the WBCG in seeking influence through 
political parties and the unions.  In 1963, ALRA members were asked to put motions to any 
political party to which they belonged, although without further co-ordination.111  That a motion 
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was put to Hendon North Labour Party was down to Simms' membership.112  Thus, abortion 
appeared amongst motions for the Labour Party conference in 1963, although falling far short of 
the weight required to be debated.113  Subsequently, Labour's NEC discussed the motion, taking 
the same neutral position as it had taken on contraception in the 1920s.114  When Simms wrote on 
behalf of the Hendon party to Labour's general secretary, Len Williams,115 his reply stated that 
these were conscience issues subject to free votes, not a matter on which the party had policy.116  
Looking a little ahead in the narrative, in April 1965 Labour's NJCWWO responded to an ALRA 
request and invited117 Munday to speak.  She thought that the committee were 'nearly all' with 
her.  The chair agreed to send an ALRA leaflet to 2,000 women's labour movement 
organisations,118 but this was later blocked within Transport House since reform was not party 
policy.119  Ultimately Vera Houghton was left wondering if another backbench Labour supporter of 
reform, Renée Short,120 could get her hands on the mailing list.  She could not.121  
 
The NJCWWO considered the issue again at its October 1965 meeting and wrote to the Home 
Secretary122 stating their support for Renée Short's Ten Minute Rule Bill (see below) and more 
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generally for a change in the law to allow abortion on health, abnormality and sexual offence 
grounds. 123  With support for reform rising in Labour Party women's sections, in early 1966 ALRA 
produced a circular to canalise this, reminding Labour women that in the 1930s they had been at 
the forefront of campaigns for both abortion law reform and family planning.124  But ALRA were 
never able to mobilise a campaign in the Labour Party that might have advanced their cause.  In 
1965 and 1966 Labour Party conference resolutions on abortion were submitted from 
constituency parties calling for the legalisation for abortion, but again they were too few to be 
debated.125  It was nearly after the fact of reform that Labour's 1967 Women's Conference passed 
pro-reform policy, including support for the social clause, with only two votes against.126  ALRA's 
failure to influence the Labour Party may have been due to women's weak position in male 
dominated parties, but it was exacerbated by ALRA's lack of familiarity with working through 
Labour Party structures. 
 
Abortion was not a trade union issue in the 1960s.  ALRA's files contain two isolated letters from a 
trade unionist, George Greaves, Secretary of the Westminster General Branch of the Clerical and 
Administrative Workers' Union.  He attempted to win his branch's support for abortion law 
reform, but failed.127  Similarly, Leeds Trades Council's avowed support for the 1967 Abortion Bill 
stands out for being a singleton.128  The National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (NUTGW) 
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was unusual for having pro-reform policy passed at its 1965 conference and its support of the 
1967 bill.129  Although ALRA offered speakers to NUTGW branches,130 they appear to have made 
no attempt to elicit support from other unions.  The issue is entirely absent from the 
considerations of the TUC before the 1970s when they organised a demonstration against the 
1979 Corrie Bill which sought to restrict access to abortion.131 
 
ALRA's engagement with the Conservative Party was even less productive.  A 1960 letter to MPs in 
the Bow Group drew little support.132  Although the Conservatives' ranks included some strongly 
opposed to reform, many Conservatives were simply unengaged with the issue.  A considered 
Conservative view was supplied by Ferdinand Mount,133 then of the Conservative Research 
Department, who told ALRA that the issue of liberalising abortion was a matter of 'moral and 
religious conviction' and that the Conservatives would not move ahead of public opinion.134  In 
opposition in 1965 William van Straubenzee,135 a member of the Conservatives' shadow health 
team, invited ALRA for an informal discussion.  ALRA did not take the opportunity, suggesting only 
that van Straubenzee came to the film showing in Parliament they had organised and asked 
questions with the rest of the audience.136  Thus ALRA did little to assuage Conservative unease 
over reform.  This was demonstrated by Jim Prior,137 then Edward Heath's PPS, who wrote to ALRA 
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in early 1966, 'I must confess ... that I am a little worried at the number of measures such as this 
[Lord Silkin's abortion law reform] bill and the Sexual Offences Bill which I feel bound to support 
but which I hope will not be interpreted in the country as being a licence to lower standards.'138  
Similarly, ALRA's overtures to the Liberals were surprisingly unsuccessful.  The Liberals gathered a 
committee of medical professionals, welfare workers and an economist, which recommended 
against reform and this was accepted by the party.139 
 
5.2: The Labour Governments 1964-1970 and the development of 
abortion law reform. 
5.2.1: Early attempts under the 1964-1966 Labour government. 
'The country is in favour of reform and against the Conservatives', stated The Guardian when 
Labour's triumph in the general election of October 1964 was clear.140  ALRA had already seen 
obvious potential of a Labour government being amenable to reform, and were encouraged by the 
liberal tone of Harold Wilson's speech to the Society of Labour Lawyers in April 1964.141  Gerald 
Gardiner, the new Lord Chancellor, personified the promise of legal reform in the government and 
Law Reform Now, which he edited along with Andrew Martin of the SLL, made at least passing 
reference to the reform of abortion law,142 while the new Minister of Health Kenneth Robinson 
supported reform.  The House of Commons elected in 1964 included twenty MPs who avowed 
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support for ALRA, and a little work garnered commitments from twenty-three more although none 
won a place in that year's Private Members' Ballot.  Although Vera Houghton estimated that the 
true level of support was 170,143 an attempt to consolidate this support with a tea party in the 
House of Commons that drew just twelve MPs and peers,144 showing much of this support to be 
casual. 
 
There was support for reform in some quarters of the Labour government.  The whips' office 
suggested that abortion might be a suitable subject for PMBs.145  The new Home Secretary, Sir 
Frank Soskice, rejected the advice of his permanent secretary, Sir Charles Cunningham,146 that 
there was no pressure for change,147 but believed that reform should be limited to putting case 
law into statute allowing abortion for those under 14, rape victims and foetal abnormality.  
Soskice's support was further limited by his fear of the corrupting effect of sexual licence, and thus 
he sought moralistic measures 'to lessen the sense of utter irresponsibility which seems to be 
prevailing about illegitimate conceptions' and a legal mechanism to enforce responsibility upon 
young, unmarried parents for their offspring, 'to bring home to young people that they really must 
be more self controlled in their sex relationships'.148  Douglas Houghton, then Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, arranged for an ALRA delegation to meet with Soskice149 who told them that 
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public opinion limited legislation to special cases.  He suggested if the government were to go 
further ALRA needed to 'crystallise public opinion in support of legislation'.150 
 
Following their meeting with Soskice, ALRA pushed for the government to pave the way for a 
backbench bill, and sought the help of the SLL in drafting one.151  ALRA's demand was for 
legislation on some defined grounds152 which they thought preferable to enacting case law since 
this would only protect doctors, not offer women an alternative to backstreet abortionists.  By the 
1950s there was a sense of what these grounds were, the 'medical' (health of the mother), 
'medico-social' (the basis of the 'social clause' including the social circumstances that would allow 
a mother to care for a child), 'eugenic' (foetal abnormalities) and 'humane' (one ALRA supporter 
suggested this should be highlighted since 'mention of rape and incest would arouse wider 
interest').153  The SLL draft bill which ALRA received in April 1965 followed this outline but omitted 
the social clause.154  However, a Ten Minute Rule Bill moved by Renée Short in June 1965 seems to 
have been her own initiative, although she did contact ALRA for advice155 and the bill was similar 
to the SLL draft.  The possibility of the first parliamentary vote since 1961 focused the 
government's attention on the issue.  The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, suggested to the PM 
that although Catholic voters might be alienated, it would have support among women's 
organisations and on the government's own backbenches and thus the government should try to 
please everyone by the offer of government consideration in return for Short withdrawing her 
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bill.156  Cabinet decided to simply allow a free vote for Labour MPs and ministers.157  The bill was 
blocked by a Catholic Labour MP, William Wells,158 who sank the bill by objecting to its second 
reading159 although there was no chance of such a bill becoming law without government support. 
 
ALRA had no choice but to follow Soskice's advice to crystallise public opinion.  They began to train 
speakers to persuade 'professional and social welfare groups, political and voluntary organisations' 
of their case.160  Progress was limited, by late 1965 there was a small roster mainly of like-minded 
groups that supported reform.161  Although there are no signs of an ALRA intervention around 
Short's bill, by early 1965 ALRA developing its parliamentary lobbying.  David Steel's view is that 
Simms invented modern lobbying,162 but the ALRA archive suggests that this was much more 
Alistair Service's163 work164 and that he had learnt something from Antony Grey at the HLRS.165  
This lobbying was good enough to attract negative publicity in 1966 from Iain Macleod166 in his 
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Daily Mail column, complaining of ALRA's unwarranted pressurising of MPs.167  A whipping 
operation was established in the House of Commons in 1965 initially with Lena Jeger marshalling 
the Labour benches and Joan Vickers the Conservatives,168 although in the next two years many 
others were to fill these roles. 
 
By 1965 Cunningham had fixed firmly on the idea that abortion should be a matter for a PMB, with 
the Home Office offering advice and organising consultation only after the Commons had 
demonstrated its support at the second reading allowing the bill to be remoulded in committee.169  
Meanwhile, Soskice came to think that pressure was growing and that the government should 
have a view.170  As was his wont, Soskice then became entangled in secondary issues of 
abnormality and social conditions.171 
 
The next test of parliamentary opinion came in late 1965 in the Lords.  A bill was initiated by Lord 
Silkin,172 again without ALRA involvement.173  Only after proposing the bill did Silkin meet with 
ALRA to discuss drafting, stating that he was seeking 'a slightly more liberal bill than previous ones' 
and wished for it to include a social clause, which would cover large family size and poor home 
environment.  ALRA's position was on the whole cautious, suggesting that the time limits should 
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be stricter to head off potential opposition.174  Late in 1965 the government began to develop its 
own views with the Cabinet's Legislation Committee favouring a limited bill based on case law and 
wished to pause until a BMA working party on abortion issued its report (caution that suggests 
that Soskice's view held sway).  Nonetheless, the Chair of the Legislation Committee, Herbert 
Bowden,175 was relaxed about allowing Silkin's bill to be subject to a free vote.176  Subsequently, 
there was some concern about the social clause in Cabinet since they believed it would be highly 
permissive, but the Cabinet did no more than demand strict neutrality.177 
 
The Lords’ second reading debate of Silkin's bill was held in late 1965 where the mood was for 
reform.  They accepted the principle of reform, and focused on legal safeguards and limitations in 
the bill, on which Silkin promised to consult with Lord Brain,178 the Conservative peer Lord 
Dilhorne179 and Robert Mortimer, the Bishop of Exeter.180  The bill passed this stage by seventy 
votes to eight.181  Potential amendments worried some in ALRA,  particularly Glanville Williams 
who favoured complete liberalisation began to see the social clause as the best achievable 
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approximation to this.  He was concerned that its removal would be 'a temporary dead stop' 
where 'we shall really have made no advance on the most liberal medical practice'.  By the end of 
1965 he wanted ALRA to pre-emptively pull out of supporting Silkin's bill.  Vera Houghton agreed 
with this prognosis, suggesting that Silkin was either 'an old fox or ... incredibly naive'.  Silkin 
protested that his approach was based on the practicalities of building support for the bill182 and 
was maybe an old fox since his compromises, that an abortion be authorised by two doctors and 
the reporting of operation to the Chief Medical Officer, were to persist into the 1967 Abortion Act 
without limiting its affect. 
 
The chances of reform were strengthened with Roy Jenkins becoming Home Secretary at the end 
of 1965.  The change in attitude was displayed almost immediately in a paper for the Cabinet's 
Home Affairs Committee (HAC) of January 1966.  Jenkins, unlike Soskice, started from the principle 
of the need for reform and then posed a choice between the workable alternatives.  Jenkins 
initially favoured the highly liberal move of putting abortion onto the same legal footing as any 
other operation183 although the Ministry of Health argued that there had to be safeguards.184  This 
and the large second reading majority for Silkin's bill encouraged those in government who wished 
it to be more supportive of the bill.  Thus Douglas Houghton, as chair of the HAC, wrote to the PM 
to tell him, 'the present law is harsh and cruel and drives large numbers of women (mostly 
married) to procure abortions in conditions of the maximum risk and distress', and the time had 
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come for the government to propose a 'half-way house' of liberalised abortion limited to specific 
grounds.185 
 
In the face of this, Harold Wilson needed to maintain the government's unity.  The Cabinet's most 
vocal Catholic, Lord Longford, demanded strict governmental neutrality and that he could voice his 
opposition publicly.  Wilson was also sensitive to upsetting any section of opinion with a general 
election looming in his mind, noting, 'we shall need to give further thought to the principle.  Is 
there a case ... for a Sel Ctte, Dept Ctte or R[oyal] C[ommission]?' he wrote on Houghton's memo. 
186  The matter was thrown back to a Cabinet committee under Douglas Houghton to resolve with 
a remit to maintain government neutrality.  The committee proposed to proceed promptly with a 
reform beyond case law, a medicalised version of the social clause that would allow a woman's 
doctors to consider 'all circumstances, present or prospective, relevant to her physical or mental 
health'.187  Houghton suggested that it be treated with 'benevolent neutrality' with drafting 
assistance and government time to ensure it completed its progress through Parliament.188  
Although this was not formally agreed, neutrality became a facade as the Ministry of Health 
started to propose detailed amendments, particularly medicalising the social clause189. The 
substance of what was proposed here was passed in Steel's PMB eighteen months later. 
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The Silkin Bill was considerably amended in committee, and the social clause was attenuated to a 
woman being physically or mentally incapable of looking after another child.190  The government 
introduced several amendments at the report stage that persisted to the 1967 Act, particularly 
that abortions should be carried out in an NHS establishment or an approved private clinic.191  In 
March 1966 it was given its third reading in the Lords without division192 but with the dissolution 
of Parliament ahead of the 1966 general election only days away, the bill fell.  There was also, 
briefly, a Commons PMB on abortion in early 1966 moved, unusually, by a Conservative, Simon 
Wingfield-Digby.193  After an approach from Vera Houghton, he agreed to bring forward an 
abortion reform bill, although drafted by Ian Percival,194 a right-wing Conservative MP.195  The 
result was highly limited, including only medical and abnormality grounds.196  Cabinet agreed a 
free vote with the possibility of government time.197  The February 1966 second reading debate 
was dominated by another Catholic Labour MP, Simon Mahon,198 who talked the bill out.199  
Compared to the Lords, there would be sterner opposition in the Commons, where Catholic 
representation was stronger and often linked to a strong constituency lobby (see below). 
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5.2.2 Reform under the 1966 Labour government and the Steel Bill. 
The 1966 election not only increased Labour's majority but bolstered the ranks of liberally minded 
MPs.  It also created a long session from April 1966 to the autumn of 1967 where PMBs had a 
greater chance of completing all their stages.  There was an intermezzo in the Lords, where Silkin 
reintroduced his bill, as previously amended.  It was given a second reading without division in 
May 1966.  Silkin promised to reintroduce the social clause as an amendment200 and after meeting 
with ALRA201 proposed the wording of 'the woman's capacity as a mother will be severely 
overstrained by the birth of a child',202 which the government opposed as too permissive.203  ALRA 
remained unhappy that the bill was too restrictive204 and continued the search for a new 
champion in the Commons.  As soon as the May 1966 Private Members Ballot was published, Vera 
Houghton wrote to potential sponsors.205  With a wide choice of bills, David Steel206 was an 
unpromising candidate, having already declined ALRA's blandishments in 1965 in favour of 
'constituency interest'.207  When approached again, Steel hesitated, and, after a lunch meeting 
with Glanville Williams, agreed to take an abortion law reform bill forward.208 
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The Home Office would have preferred a more experienced backbencher to take on abortion 
reform,209 but when it became clear Steel had made up his mind it advised him that the bill be cast 
in terms of the woman's health, in line with its preference for medicalised grounds.  Steel was 
unwilling to act as the agent of either ALRA or the Home Office and wished to include safeguards 
that went further than Silkin and some explicit time limits to mollify critics.  Worst of all, from 
ALRA's point of view, Steel was relying on advice from another Liberal MP, Dr. Michael 
Winstanley,210 who had been a GP and was still involved with the BMA.211  The Ministry of Health 
gave Steel a draft bill that followed his wishes modulated to some of the government's concerns 
with a social clause that now read, 'the care of the child if born would place on the mother a strain 
which she is not reasonably capable of sustaining having regard to her age, the condition of her 
family or other relevant circumstances'.  Potential abnormality was measured by the prospect of 
there being 'no reasonable enjoyment of life'.  Grounds of the mother being under 16 or 
'defective' were also included, as were safeguards that two doctors need to certify the grounds 
and that the operation be carried out by a consultant, but Steel omitted this latter onerous 
constraint that would have limited the availability of abortion.212  The Home Office thought that 
the result, while on paper was broader than Silkin's bill, would in practice have much the same 
scope.213 
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Having established their level of support in Parliament,214 ALRA started their lobbying for the 
second reading debate of Steel's bill in July 1966.  In another lesson learnt from Antony Grey,215 
they had already commissioned an NOP poll, and announced the findings in a press conference in 
the run up to the debate.216  This was a coup de theâtre since the poll bore little relationship to the 
details of the bill.  With thalidomide still in the news, the poll unsurprisingly showed that 91% 
supported abortion on the grounds of the risk of a 'seriously deformed baby', and 85% on the 
grounds of the 'mother's health' but these were statements of existing case law.  In areas where 
ALRA sought to extend the law, to incest and those underage, support was less solid at 65% and 
50%.  There was little support for proposals that went further than ALRA's, there being only 30% 
support for the choice to have an abortion being a woman's alone.  In the light of this, it was 
maybe a wise move that the poll was silent on the contentious social grounds, although this was 
where the bill was extending the law.217 
 
In the July 1966 second reading debate Steel concentrated on the evils of backstreet abortion.  
Edward Lyons218 and David Owen219 linked this to the plight of women with large families living in 
poor conditions.  Roy Jenkins injected an overt element of class, arguing that those who could pay 
for private treatment already had access to a medical termination.  Much opposition had a 
religious gloss, although beyond William Wells speaking of 'upholding the common tradition of 
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Christianity', lay only the secular Anglicanism220 of Bill Deedes221 and the agnostic reform 
Judaism222 of Leo Abse, who belted himself as 'a humanist concerned with life' but then added 
braces with a Talmudic reference.  Of the second reading opponents, only Jill Knight223 posed her 
argument in entirely secular terms.  However, all shared the view that abortion was to kill an 
unborn child.  A further moral undercurrent from opponents was the fear that reform would 
encourage promiscuity.  Deedes thought, 'it may well be that science and its little pill will enable 
so-called civilised countries to treat sex more and more as a sport and less as a sacrament in love, 
a divine instrument of procreation', and Knight feared young women might 'degenerate into free-
for-alls with the sleazy comfort of knowing, "She can always go and have it out"'.  These 
arguments failed to sway the Commons which gave the bill a second reading by 223 to 29.224 
 
The more serious source of opposition was medical opinion in the form of the BMA and the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCoG).  Doctors' organisations objected to making 
non-medical judgement such as rape grounds.225  RCoG, whose members faced no threat of 
prosecution, tended to dismiss the issue of backstreet abortion as exaggerated, fearing that 
liberalisation would lead doctors to lose autonomy as the public became more 'abortion 
minded'.226  As the government's Chief Medical Officer commented, 'the motive for this ... seemed 
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to be rather the protection of the position of the gynaecologist than any deep seated appreciation 
of the position of the women involved'.227  RCoG's opinion put pressure on the social clause, 
particularly since Steel's advice from Dr. Winstanley was that it was vital to be seen to be listening 
to doctors' opinions.  ALRA's attempts to use the Drs. John Dunwoody228 and David Owen as 
counterweights cut little ice.229  Alistair Service further attempted to defend the social clause.  He 
had listed 200 MPs who favoured it230 but found that even strong supporters of reform like Lena 
Jeger thought the clause might be too liberal231 and only later did Service recognise the instability 
of the clause's support.232  Although the Minister of Health, Kenneth Robinson, thought reform 
without the social clause would be too limited,233 Steel's response to medical pressure was to 
announce as the bill was ready to start its committee state in early 1967 that the social clause 
would be dropped along with other non-medical grounds and replaced with the broadened 
ground of the mother's wellbeing.234  Despite making bellicose noises to Steel about withdrawing 
support,235 ALRA feared splitting the pro-reform forces on the standing committee and accepted 
this fait accompli236 while fearing that the addition of further restrictions would make the law 
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more restrictive than the status quo.237  In the government, however, Robinson and Jenkins 
worked to ensure the bill would remain a liberal reform.238 
 
If medical opinion was a problem for the reformers, religious opposition was limited.  The Church 
of England was divided but offered cautious support for reform.  Although not a statement of 
Church policy, the Church Assembly's Board of Social Responsibility's Ethical Discussion published 
at the end of 1965, proposed abortion could be judged permissible in the context of a woman's 
'total environment'.239  Other Anglican clergy went further.  The Rector of Woolwich, Nicolas 
Stacey,240 argued in the press that 'no religious group should seek to maintain the religious and 
ethical standards of its members by imposition of laws on the general population' and that 
abortion was anyway 'the lesser of two evils' .241  A more conservative Anglican, the Canon of 
Windsor, GB Bentley,242 wrote to Roy Jenkins that he was 'not one of those who would keep 
secular society in subjection to the moral convictions of the Church' but thought any expansion of 
access to abortion beyond protecting a woman's health amounted to infanticide.243  Reform had 
much Anglican opinion on its side with a 1966 survey showed 89% of 'protestant clergy' to be 
dissatisfied with the current law and 57% supported abortion on social grounds,244 so Jenkins was 
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able to shrug off Bentley's complaint with utilitarian moral neutrality.245  Only with the third 
reading of the Steel Bill imminent did more serious Anglican concerns emerge.  Dr. Michael 
Ramsay, the Archbishop of Canterbury, wrote to Wilson and The Times to express his concern 
particularly at having abnormality as grounds for abortion, and considered that only health 
grounds justified a termination.246  There is no evidence that this had any impact on the bill's 
progress. 
 
Catholic opinion may have been muted by Pope John XXIII's247 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra 
reflecting popular concerns with overpopulation.  Although this did not mention birth control, it 
raised expectations of reform.  These increased with the establishment of the Second Vatican 
Council in 1962,248 leading ALRA to hope that Catholic opinion might soften249 but with Pope John's 
death in 1963, this reforming moment faded.  Catholic opinion on contraception in general was 
not settled until Pope Paul VI's250 Humanae Vitae of July 1968 that restated Roman Catholic 
opposition to contraception and abortion.251  The core of opposition to Silkin's bill in the Lords was 
Catholic.  Of the eight Lords who voted against his first bill, at least five were Catholics.252  In the 
Commons, Renee Short's 1965 Bill was buried by a Catholic.  According to Marsh and Chalmers, of 
the twenty-nine who voted against the Steel bill at its second reading fourteen could be identified 
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as Catholics.  Of the thirty-one identifiable Catholic MPs, none voted for Steel's bill at any stage.253  
Through the course of Steel's bill St. John Stevas attempted to rally Catholic opposition254 and by 
late 1966 constituency pressure was being felt by some MPs.255 
 
Religion was one motivation for opposition, but not the only one.  Some, notably the Conservative, 
Richard Wood,256 who had lost both legs in North Africa in 1943, and Labour's equal pay advocate, 
Christopher Norwood, did not support abnormality as a ground for termination.257  More 
commonly Conservatives like John Biffen258 opposed the bill from a socially right wing position.  
Such social conservatism was not confined to Conservatives.  One Labour MP, Dick 
Winterbottom,259 wrote to a constituent, 'I am more than a little browned off with the stream of 
legislation that protects the sexual and social cranks which really gives a kind of liberty to make 
licence the accepted state of society.'260  Attempts to organise an umbrella for this opposition 
arrived only late in 1966 with the formation of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child 
(SPUC).  Although it owed its origins to correspondence in the Anglican Church Times it attempted 
to avoid being seen as a religious organisation.261  By May 1967, with the third reading 
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approaching, ALRA became concerned about the considerable success SPUC was achieving in 
encouraging constituents to write to their MPs.  They responded with a letter from pro-reform 
MPs on the standing committee being sent to 1,200 newspapers and 35 sympathetic columnists, 
from Nigel Lawson262 to Marjorie Proops.263 
 
One impact of anti-reform campaigning against reform was the withdrawal of support from the 
National Council of Women (NCW) announced in March 1967.  Their president, Joan Boulind,264 
argued that the bill's scope had been extended in committee to allow doctors to make judgements 
on social conditions for which they were not qualified.265  Vera Houghton replied that this was 
specious since the social clause had been removed and the bill's scope reduced in committee.  
ALRA thought this was an inept cover for bureaucratic manoeuvring under pressure from religious 
affiliates to the NCW.266 
 
With the report stage and third reading approaching in June 1967, the bill was far from what ALRA 
wished, shorn of its non-medical provisions, with the social clause attenuated into a medical form 
and with a conscience clause for medical staff not wishing to be involved in such an operation.  
ALRA nonetheless trumpeted these amendments to show what a reasonable and balanced 
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proposal this was, and even issued an appeal to Conservative MPs on this basis,267 although they 
continued to show limited interest.  A discussion at the Conservative backbenchers' 1922 
Committee was curtailed after four contributions because attendance had fallen to a very low 
level.268 
 
The government needed to decide whether to give the bill government time or leave the bill at 
threat of being talked out.269  This exposed the ambiguity of the government's neutrality with 
Longford wanting amendments from an evidently sympathetic Ministry of Health bringing the 
issue to full Cabinet,270 while Patrick Gordon Walker (then Minister without Portfolio) argued these 
did not constitute government policy, but merely an attempt to ensure the bill was workable.271  
On the factual issue, Longford was clearly right.  Roy Jenkins proposed that time should be made 
available only if the bill's sponsors accepted amendments to remove restrictions on those able to 
authorise operations to consultants.272  The bill needed this government backing, and after an all 
night sitting which saw a filibuster organised by St. John Stevas, more time had to be found.273  The 
bill received its third reading in the Commons at the end of a further night sitting in July 1967.274 
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In the Lords in September 1967 the bill was amended, again by Dilhorne, reintroducing the 
consultant restriction.  ALRA sought but failed to find a compromise, and was preparing to repeat 
the whole process next session.275  ALRA had to be told by Jenkins and Robinson that the 
Commons would prevail and to hold their nerve.276  This was aided by Labour backbench pressure 
for reform.  As a leader in The New Statesman put it, 'many Labour backbenchers, split, 
disillusioned and frustrated by the government's policy, are united by a sincere determination to 
see the abortion law reformed.'277  Rather undermining ALRA's reputation for skilled lobbying, 
Vera Houghton continued to seek a compromise278 but with media excitement over a clash 
between the Commons and the Lords leading to constitutional crisis, the Lords backed down and 
passed the bill in October 1967.  A further amendment from Dilhorne provided a seemingly 
innocuous safeguard, that abortion would be legal where continuing a pregnancy would pose a 
greater risk to a woman's health than ending it.279  Although it was pointed out in the short debate 
this served little purpose, abortion being a straightforward operation,280 what was not understood 
was that pregnancy was an intrinsically more dangerous course.   Thus this provided legal defence 
for any decision to abort, and is one reason why there have been very few prosecutions of doctors 
under the 1967 Act, there appears to have been just one successful prosecution in 1974.281 
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5.2.3: Conclusions on abortion law reform. 
While ALRA played an important part in the reform of abortion, it is possible to over-estimate its 
impact.  The PMB route was not their plan in the early 1950s, and both Robinson's and Silkin's bills 
did not originate with ALRA.  In 1966, having started the ball rolling by persuading Steel to sponsor 
reform, and playing an important role campaigning inside and outside Parliament, ALRA had little 
control over the form of the bill.  This resulted from Steel and Winstanley responding to a variety 
of pressures, particularly the medical profession, but more importantly it was shaped by advocates 
in government, Jenkins and Robinson, who ensured that this remained a liberal piece of 
legislation. 
 
Brookes and Roth argue that the Act did little more than enact the case law282 but this is too 
negative a judgement.  Statute law made the decision to abort a medical judgement that would 
prove difficult to legally challenge if a doctor followed the prescribed procedure.  This created a 
much more certain basis for medical practitioners beyond NHS consultants and the Harley Street 
elite to develop abortion services, and this pushed the moral decision to abort much more 
towards the individual, albeit with medical oversight.  The effect may well have been more 
permissive than Parliament intended.  Although passed at its third reading in the Commons by 167 
to 83,283 with inflated press reports of London becoming subject to 'abortion tourism', concern 
grew.  In 1969 St. John Stevas moved a Ten Minute Rule Bill to seriously restrict the availability of 
abortion by requiring it be sanctioned by a consultant, banning abortions for overseas visitors and 
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removing the medicalised social grounds for abortion.284  The Cabinet allowed a free vote on the 
bill, but was not neutral, arguing that the bill should be opposed.285  It was only defeated by 210 
votes to 190.286 
 
That by 1969 a section of opinion was already swinging against the Act for being too liberal 
undermines the claims by radical critics that this was a new, and possibly more pernicious, form of 
regulation.  Other evidence shows that there was little regulation under the new Act.  With NHS 
provision partial,287 a profusion of private clinics were opened up to meet the demand, creating 
something approaching a free market in abortion.  State regulation was limited to those with poor 
clinical practice, often mixed with other rule-bending practices.  For example, in 1969, the New 
Cross Clinic in South London was reported to the Chief Medical Officer by its former medical 
director.  He complained of women being discharged too early, inadequate supplies of blood and 
blank consent forms being signed by doctors for £10 each.  Other staff there described the owner, 
Mr. Shaw, as 'an unscrupulous and dangerous man.'  Shaw, who also owned a motor scooter 
dealership, was reportedly operating as a loan shark, often lending women the £90-£140 to have 
the abortion.  The informants continued that Shaw was paying the proprietor of a student 
magazine, a 'Mr. Bransome', £35 for each referral. 288  (At this time Richard Branson was running 
his Student Advisory Service and his magazine, 'The Student'.)  Although the clinic was eventually 
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removed from the Ministry of Health list of those approved to carry out abortions, no further 
action followed.289 
 
Although there is little evidence that the Abortion Act facilitated greater regulation, neither was it 
explicitly framed in terms of women's equality.  The feminist voice demanding abortion law reform 
was faint although Hunkins-Halinan of the SPG offered some passive support as an individual.290  
Free abortion on demand was a tenet of second wave feminists, but although many reformers 
believed in a woman's right to abortion, proposals were always hedged by medical and legal 
limitations.  There were some signs of second wave sentiment coming through.  A group in 
Kensington calling themselves 'WOMEN' wrote in protest to St. John Stevas in 1967 telling him 
that: 
WOMEN – better women than I – fought courageously for the right to vote half a century ago, 
and since that time WOMEN, (I most reluctantly confess), have sorely neglected their role in 
the realm of politics. 
So with this in mind, I emerge, with others, from a position of passive indifference to express 
horror and indignation at the pomposity with which you expound your theories on the subject 
of ABORTION (on television).  As a member of the male sex, surely you are hardly qualified, or 
have the authority to speak on this subject! 
... our bodies do indeed belong to us, and we alone individually, have the right to make such a 
choice, and if we are to be judged, then GOD alone has this right and certainly no MAN.
291
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But one eccentric letter does not make a feminist movement.  There was some language of 
women's equality poking through the fabric at times.  The Labour MP Peter Jackson292 (an 
academic sociologist) saw Steel's bill 'as a compromise between those who adopt a libertarian 
approach (my own position) and a person such as Mr Steel who has a somewhat over-restricted 
view of women's rights.'293  The language of second wave feminism was maybe already at this time 
developing in the academic protection of university sociology departments, as it may have been 
with Simms' graduate women serving their ten-year terms in Kensington. 
 
5.3: The Campaign for contraception. 
5.3.1: The campaign 1930-1934. 
The struggle for abortion law reform in the 1960s is a story of natural drama.  After its moment in 
the 1920s, contraception campaigning became more low-key with efforts to provide voluntary 
clinics funded by local authorities.  The Malthusian League started to wind down in 1927,294 and in 
1931 the main voluntary and campaigning bodies joined the National Birth Control Association 
(NBCA) (although Marie Stopes soon left) becoming the Family Planning Association (FPA) in 1939.  
This included WBCG although its former chair, Frida Laski, thought it a group of middle class do-
gooders.295  The WBCG's focus on Labour policy continued with Laski liaising with the NBCA around 
the Labour women's conference of 1935296 and the association's general secretary, Josephine 
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Clifford-Smith,297 meeting (fruitlessly) with the Labour Party's women's officers, Mary 
Sutherland,298 in 1939.299  This orientation did not endure.  There is no record of any activity 
around the Labour Party by the FPA from 1939 until the end of the period of this study, 1970. 
 
Nor was contraception given a boost during the Second World War, when the FPA made no 
attempt to capitalise on the relaxing of sexual attitudes in wartime.300  Post-war, they took little 
interest in the formation of the NHS.  They lobbied the 1949 Royal Commission on Population 
which reported in favour of the greater availability of contraception, although the report was 
ignored by government and the FPA did nothing to capitalise on this opening.  Rather, the FPA saw 
itself as a voluntary sector provider of contraception, not a pressure group, and thus maintained a 
polite but distant relationship from government.  It approached the Ministry of Health in 1953 
seeking greater local authority powers to fund contraceptive services.  The ministry responded by 
restating that, whilst the 1930 circular allowed only for advice on health grounds, many clinics 
went beyond this, and that the Ministry was 'letting sleeping dogs lie'.  The FPA accepted this 
approach.  By the mid-1950s, opinion became more open to contraception, with the Minister of 
Health, Iain Macleod, paying an official visit to the FPA in 1955 and the Church of England's 
Lambeth Conference of 1958 condoning contraception within marriage.301  Nonetheless, when in 
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1959 the government expanded the organisations that local authorities could fund, only marriage 
guidance groups were included on the list.302 
 
The FPA considered setting up a group of supportive MPs on more than one occasion in the 1950s 
and early 1960s,303 but this came to nothing.  When London Underground withdrew an FPA advert 
in 1960, the FPA's caution in the face of controversy was evident.  The only MPs they wrote to 
were its long-term supporter Douglas Houghton and the two MPs who had written to them in 
support, the surprising pairing of Jeremy Thorpe and Margaret Thatcher.304  The government's 
position was that it neither approved nor sponsored the FPA's work which, officials claimed, was 
self-funding.305  In the dying days of the Conservative government in 1964, Bernard Braine306 (a 
junior minister in the Ministry of Health) told the Commons that the FPA had asked for no money 
and the government could only move in line with public opinion and thus would not fund public 
bodies to do more that offer the limited advice on contraception that was then available.307 
 
The FPA's political caution was not questioned by its internal review which reported in 1963.  This 
was led by François Laffite,308 Professor of Public Policy at Birmingham University and the adopted 
son of the sexologist, Havelock Ellis.309  Laffite characterised the FPA as having an institutionalised 
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feminist view that they were saving downtrodden women from the consequences of their 
husbands' sexual demands by promoting women-centred forms of contraception, mainly the cap.  
Laffite proposed that the FPA should develop a more centralised public service structure, with a 
broader offer of contraceptive services since many wives were happy to leave contraception to 
men 310 (a view confirmed by Kate Fisher's recent research).311  Regardless of this caution, attitudes 
towards contraception were changing.  The Consumers' Association produced a Which? report on 
contraception in conjunction with the FPA and International Planned Parenthood in 1963.312  Such 
public discussion of contraception was eased by concerns over the 'population explosion' which 
offered a desexualised context.313  For example, The Times reported the advances in the 
intrauterine devices in 1964 under the headline 'The fight against overpopulation'.314  Another 
driver of change was the development of oral contraception for women, the pill, first licensed for 
prescription in the UK in 1961.315  This medicalised contraception and raised the issue of its 
relationship to the NHS.  The NHS charter allowed only treatment of medical conditions, and by 
1964 around 10,000 prescriptions for the pill were being issued annually on these grounds.316  
Those wishing to avoid pregnancy on other grounds could seek a private prescription from their 
GP, if sympathetic.317  The only pressure from doctors was to allow them to charge for issuing 
these prescriptions.318 
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5.3.2: The extension of access to contraception 1964-1970. 
Pressure for reform was slight and on coming to power the Labour Party had no policy on 
contraception.  The new Minister of Health, Kenneth Robinson, was a supporter of reform whose 
initial desire to extend local authority funding powers met with a negative Civil Service legal 
opinion.  This reflected the view that the contraception advice that was already offered on social 
grounds was beyond the NHS's charter.319  Thus Robinson sought new powers in legislation, at the 
end of 1965 he aimed to develop 'policy based on voluntary parenthood and aimed at 
strengthening family life'.  He suggested local authority funded clinics should be encouraged to 
provide prescriptions and free advice, which would require new powers he proposed to include in 
a Miscellaneous Health Services Bill.320  Supporting this, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
Douglas Houghton, wrote to the Prime Minister to argue that those with moral objections to 
contraception were not forced to use it.  When Wilson made it clear he did not want to raise the 
issue before the next election321 Houghton attempted to stiffen his resolve, telling the PM, 'for too 
long have we all been inhibited by religious attitudes', in particular the 'Catholic Vote', and instead 
suggested that Wilson consider the 'secular and humanist opinion in the Labour Party and that 
public opinion was in favour of birth control.'  Even the Cabinet's most staunchly Catholic voice, 
Lord Longford, acquiesced.  Wilson was only partially convinced by this and agreed to a new 
circular but wanted it out of the way as soon as possible.322  The resulting Ministry of Health 
circular of February 1966, offered encouragement but no new powers: 
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Planned parenthood strengthens family life; lack of planning, often due to ignorance of 
effective methods of contraception may lead to marital disharmony, ill-health and social 
breakdown, and in some cases even to criminal abortion and death. 
The circular made it clear that local authority funded clinics could advise, but only provide 
contraception on health grounds.323  The possibility of going further by 'legislating by circular' was 
considered in the Ministry of Health but deemed too limited.324 
 
After the 1966 general election the Labour backbencher Edwin Brooks325 won seventh place in the 
Private Members' Ballot.  Brooks had wanted abortion law reform, and was second on ALRA's 
list.326  Vera Houghton suggested Brooks sponsor a bill on contraception,327 and Leo Abse may also 
have influenced him.328  Brooks met with Ministry of Health officials, but no commitments on 
either help or support were given and they referred him to ALRA (notably, not the FPA) for help on 
drafting.329  Even though the Ministry had clauses for inclusion in the Miscellaneous Health 
Provision Bill,330 they asked Brooks to make his proposals to them.331  Only after this did Abse write 
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to the FPA, telling them that Brooks would be bringing forward a PMB on contraceptive services.332  
The FPA's involvement in the bill remained minimal. 
 
There was little pressure for change from other sources.  There was none from the remnants of 
the first wave of feminism.  There is some evidence that local authorities pushed for change,333 
although this should be seen in the context of the majority of local authorities not providing any 
contraceptive advice at all.  The London County Council sought a meeting with Robinson after the 
1964 election to discuss giving young unmarried women advice to curb the rise in illegitimacy334 
and Robinson used criticism from local authorities of the 1966 circular for not going far enough as 
an argument to the PM for supporting Brooks' Bill.335  After speaking with Brooks, the Ministry of 
Health canvassed the London Borough Association, the County Councils Association and the 
Association of Metropolitan Counties which all supported change.336  There was little pressure 
from the labour movement and the discussion in the Labour Party outside of Parliament was a 
response to Edwin Brooks' proposal not a cause of it.  For example, the Labour Party conference in 
1966 called for family planning to be integrated into the NHS.337  It was only in 1969 after the Act 
had been passed that the Labour Party's Women's Advisory Committee asked the party's research 
department to prepare a paper on contraception.338  The TUC showed little interest, even 
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complaining that the 1968 International Trade Union Congress considered contraception 'to the 
exclusion of other problems of equal importance'.339 
 
One result of this lack of pressure was that there were no blueprints for legal reform.  Robinson's 
1965 proposal was an incremental reform of existing arrangements, seeking to strengthen local 
authority powers by allowing contraception to be prescribed on social grounds.  When the FPA 
learnt of Brooks' bill they had no proposals formulated, although they soon agreed that the best 
course of action was to amend the NHS Act to allow for the supply of contraception on non-
medical grounds.340  The Ministry of Health was divided on the issue, some officials suggesting 
advice clinics become an NHS service,341 but others arguing this would overburden a service which 
was there to treat illness.342  The view that funding should continue to come from local authorities 
was strengthened by the Treasury's insistence that reform should be within existing budgets.343  
Thus constrained, the proposals made were very limited, to increase the power of local authorities 
to provide or fund services rather than the expansion of health services to include 
contraception.344 
 
Relieved of electoral pressure in the summer of 1966, Wilson was willing to allow the reform to 
proceed, stating: 'I agree that my earlier anxieties, despite the nearness to the election ... proved 
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totally unfounded.  I agree also that any Bill should be a Private Member's Bill so what is proposed 
seems entirely appropriate.'345  Only then did the Ministry of Health undertake to supply Brooks 
with a draft of the bill.346  The National Health Service (Family Planning) Bill was fully supported by 
the government in distinction to neutrality afforded to the Abortion Bill.347 
 
The Ministry of Health rejected any 'marriage line' in health provision, and pointed out that 
unmarried women received help if contraception were sought on medical grounds.348  Brooks was 
concerned to supply services to all, and believed that it was Robinson's advocacy on this that won 
the day,349 although there is no evidence that this was ever a concern amongst officials.  Brooks 
accepted the ministry's view that if the bill was silent on this it would be up to local authorities to 
determine the issue.350  That services should be provided to unmarried women was highlighted by 
both Brooks and Robinson in debate in the Commons without contradiction, the only criticism 
being the unsuccessful demand that local authorities should have a duty to provide family 
planning services to all.351  The bill passed through Parliament without amendment and the debate 
was dominated by supporters attempting to strengthen the bill, for example in attempting to 
remove the power to charge for contraception.352 
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It is thus unsurprising that radical critics do not tend to make claims for the regulatory intent of 
the reform of contraceptive services.  The almost unchallenged view was that if single women 
were to have sex, it was better that they did not get pregnant.  Only in the 1970s did this blossom 
into a moral concern about single motherhood and female sexuality.353  Nonetheless, it was 
uncommon to hear overtly feminist voices like Baroness Gaitskell354 attacking the double-standard 
of women's innocence as 'a masculine fetish' which, like the 'excessive adulation of motherhood 
has merely served as a cover to keep women in subjection'.355 
 
The government's lack of concern for moral regulation was in contrast to the FPA's caution in 
requiring the couples they advised be married, only extending it to those about to marry in 
1961.356  When Leah Manning357 put a motion to the FPA's 1964 conference to permit advice to 
those without their marriage banns, it was heavily defeated via an amendment to refer unmarried 
women to (then non-existent) youth advisory centres.358  The FPA's attitude had some basis in the 
voluntary world they operated in, since even this moderate step led to protest with some local 
authorities withdrawing funding.359  One letter writer told the FPA, 'I do not think that your 
organisation should give advice on "contraceptive techniques" to people who are not 
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contemplating marriage.  You are an Association for "Family" planning, and as such are used by 
Young Wives' Group members and other Church people.'360 
 
Only when legislation made the view of Parliament clear did the FPA allow their clinics to choose 
to give advice to unmarried people361 and even then many FPA local branches felt pressure from 
the funding local authority to maintain restrictions.362  Thus, by 1969 fewer than one in five local 
authorities offered a full family planning service.363  Richard Crossman, who had succeeded 
Robinson in 1968 at what became the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), was 
unwilling to use his powers to require them to do so.  The NHS was still limited to offering 
contraception on health grounds, so the DHSS expanded the socio-medical indicators to cover 
more women whose health might be threatened by pregnancy.364  Nonetheless, by 1970 
contraception, including the pill, was still not incorporated into the NHS. 
 
5.3.3 : Conclusion on contraception. 
Reform of contraception was slight but without significant opposition.  While it allowed services to 
be offered on social grounds and to unmarried people, it did not make contraception free or 
available through the NHS.  This does not appear to have been caused by any moral reaction, but 
in the absence of organised pressure for change, the government took the cheapest option.  There 
was no audible feminist voice, save that connected to women's health where Baroness (Edith) 
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Summerskill questioned the safety of the pill and suggested that it should not be made available in 
local authority clinics.365  Thus, arguments in terms of women's equality and their domestic role 
were not raised and measures allowed local authorities to provide contraceptive advice to all, but 
did not create a duty on them to do so and there was no extra funding made available.  The 
measure did little to positively change women's roles in the private sphere.  This is not a clear 
example of the voluntary sector conveying issues from the private into the public realm, and in 
some ways the FPA continued to represent a more traditional morality than government and 
Parliament which were increasingly neutral on the issue of sex outside of marriage.  In the labour 
movement, apart from some concern emerging in women's organisations, most of the interest in 
contraception was concentrated at the highest levels, in the PLP, Labour peers and government 
ministers. 
 
Section: 5.4: Divorce law reform. 
5.4.1: Divorce law reform to 1965. 
The first wave feminist view on divorce law reform is exemplified by Millicent Fawcett whose 
evidence to the (Gorell) Royal Commission on Divorce in 1912 demanded equal treatment for men 
and women but only by making it harder for a man to divorce his wife.366  Fawcett's concentration 
on political rights and women's education places her in the camp of equal rights feminism, but the 
greater pressure on her was that the majority of women were financially dependent on men and 
could be impoverished by divorce.  This view was even more strongly expressed by difference 
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feminists.  The Married Women's Association (MWA) was formed in 1938 by Juanita Frances367 
who had been a member of the egalitarian feminist SPG.  The group's focus on winning 
recognition for women in their domestic role led them to become one of the main bearers of 
difference feminist ideas after 1945.  This was reflected in the title of their journal, Wife and 
Citizen, and its proclaimed aim 'to bind together the Homemakers, the Wives, and Mothers'368 and 
styling itself a 'housewives' trade union'.369  In its evidence to the 1951 (Morton) Royal 
Commission on Marriage and Divorce the MWA bemoaned economic necessity forcing women 
into work and the state taking over childcare and other functions that were properly maternal.370 
 
In the absence of feminist campaigning for divorce reform, non-feminist groups led the way.  The 
longest established campaign was the Divorce Law Reform Union (DLRU), founded in 1906, had 
some lobbying success with moderate reform in the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 which both 
equalised and slightly widened the grounds for divorce between men and women.371  More radical 
was the Marriage Law Reform Society (MLRS), formed in 1946 and of liberal-left make up.  The 
society's secretary was Robert Pollard372 who drafted some of the Labour Party's research papers 
in the late 1940s.373  By the mid-50s the DLRU was ageing and lapsing into inactivity and merged 
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with the MLRS in 1956.374  Fittingly, the two organizations did not get on, continued working under 
their maiden names before splitting again in 1960.  The MLRS pursued its more radical line, 
seeking to make four years separation the grounds for divorce in a draft bill of 1958.375  The 1960 
split was over a DLRU draft bill that would have allowed courts the discretion to grant a divorce 
after a court investigation which the MLRS thought an invasion of privacy.376  Thus, the key 
difference between the two views was that the MLRS thought that the law should recognise that a 
marriage had broken down and grant a divorce on that basis, which became known as the no-fault 
view of divorce.  The DLRU believed that the court should establish why a marriage had broken 
and only grant divorces in cases where that gave one spouse grounds for claiming the other was at 
fault, this being the concept of matrimonial offence.  This had implications for the financial 
settlement accompanying a divorce.  With the split of 1960, the MLRS disappeared from the pages 
of newspapers (and there is no archival trace of their continued existence).  From this point, all 
campaigning was credited to the DLRU yet the 1960s reformers owed more to the MLRS tradition.  
Gerald Gardiner and (maybe) Professor Jim Gower,377 who worked on family law at the Law 
Commission, had been members of the MLRS.378  A PMB moved by Leo Abse in 1963 followed 
MLRS’s no-fault proposals not those of the DLRU.379 
 
                                                     
374
 LSE/SLL/6/15, Just Cause (20), [c.23/11/1956];Letter from Meston et al, The Times, 22/11/1956. 
375
 New divorce law reform plan: Children's interests overriding' and 'New Basis Urged for Divorce, The 
Guardian, 9/11/1958 and '10/11/1958. 
376
 'Divorce Reformers Separate', The Observer, 6/11/1960; '"Breakdown of marriage" as cause for divorce', 
The Guardian, 15/11/1960. 
377
 1913-1997.  Academic lawyer. 
378
 SM Cretney, ‘Gower, Laurence Cecil Bartlett [Jim]’, ODNB. 
379
 See below. 
313 
 
The Labour Party had not been neutral on divorce.  They supported the Gorell Commission's 
recommendations for reform in 1912, widening and equalising the grounds of divorce.  This 
commitment to reform continued in 1948 in a series of policy papers which reflected the MLRS's 
preference for no-fault divorce.380  The problem that this raised was how women who were 
economically dependent on their husbands should be treated, which many first wave feminists 
reacted to by opposing divorce.  The Labour Party research papers proposed that a woman be 
given 'rights in law deriving from her contribution to the home by way of services as housewife 
and mother' as opposed to the existing legal position which tended to 'perpetuate the married 
women's dependent and serf-like status'.  Rather, the report continued the a woman's rights 
should be 'based on social recognition of joint contribution, should be equalised between husband 
and wife.'381  Thus, financial settlements after divorce had to recognise women's different role in 
the private sphere, and while women were not economically independent, this was inevitable. 
 
This radicalism was not reflected in the 1945 Labour government which was confronted with the 
post-war surge in divorces with an average of nearly 200,000 petitions and 39,000 divorces which 
represented a five-fold increase from the 1930s.382  The Cabinet did not wish to pursue any 
contentious reforms, but agreed to appoint a few more judges.383  Justice Denning384 was charged 
with developing what turned out to be modest proposals to expedite and cheapen uncontested 
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divorces385 and his report's lasting impact was that it led to the funding of marriage guidance 
services.386  Further to this the government allowed legal aid for divorce proceedings, which were 
expensive since confined to the High Court, reflecting the sanctity of marriage.387  More radicalism 
was found on Labour's backbenches, with MLRS aligned Marcus Lipton388 proposing an 
amendment to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill in 1949 to allow no-fault divorce 
after seven years separation.  The government remained resistant to further reforms, holding in 
reserve a proposal for a Royal Commission if it was necessary to head off Lipton's amendment.389  
In the event it was ruled out of order.  Despite some Cabinet support for reform, particularly from 
Nye Bevan,390 Herbert Morrison's391 view that this was too contentious held sway.392  
 
After the 1950 election a low key campaign for a Royal Commission followed, with the Society of 
Labour Lawyers (SLL) and MLRS co-ordinating letter writing to the press (with notably no activity 
from the DLRU).  The SLL drafted a Ten Minute Rule Bill for the Labour backbencher Eirene 
White393 based on MLRS’s policies but incorporating improved maintenance payments for 
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women.394  The threat of this rallying support pushed the government into deploying a Royal 
Commission defence395 although there was well founded scepticism on the ability of this 
Commission, under Lord Morton,396 to reach a consensual conclusion.397  As various Labour aligned 
bodies considered their evidence to the Commission, it became clear that there was little 
agreement about the way forward.  A lack of consensus in the SLL led to the submission of two 
reports on maintenance, one suggesting a straightforward equal split in matrimonial property, but 
the other a more complex fault based system including the idea that if a woman was at fault she 
should not gain from her transgression.398  Labour's SJCWWO had no agreed proposals and 
struggled to meet the deadline.399  In Labour circles, the problem was not of the principle of 
divorce, which most accepted, but what would happen to financially dependent women after 
divorce. 
 
There was also no consensus in the Morton Commission whose 1956 final report, in the words of 
one supporter of reform, 'contributes nothing to our knowledge, and fails even to clarify and 
define opposing viewpoints or to facilitate public discussion.'400  A bundle of minor pieces of 
amendatory legislation followed.  Major reform was only raised again by Leo Abse's Matrimonial 
Causes and Conciliation Bill, a Private Members' Bill of 1963, which attempted to reform the 
grounds for divorce on the MLRS template.  After strong opposition, Abse dropped the 
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contentious clauses, and the bill to be passed as another minor reform.401  The passage of the bill 
was to have one lasting effect.  When Lord Silkin attempted to reinsert the separation grounds for 
divorce into the Act in the Lords, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsay, opposed the 
move.  He would support reform if it were possible: 
to find a principle at law of breakdown of marriage which was free from any trace of the idea 
of consent ... I would wish to consider it.  Indeed, I am asking some of my fellow churchmen 
to see whether it is possible to work at this idea, sociologically as well as doctrinally.
402
 
As Lewis and Wallis have shown, Ramsay had considerable encouragement from Conservative 
government ministers, and discussions had already started in the Church pointing to a preferred 
outcome of recommending that the courts have an inquisitorial role in granting divorces on the 
grounds of breakdown.  This had been proposed as early as 1956 by the reforming lawyer Otto 
Kahn-Freund403 and had been adopted by the DLRU in its draft PMB in 1960.404  Ramsay appointed 
a committee whose members were selected to agree with the Church's established view on 
breakdown.405  This was probably intended to pave the way to a moderate Conservative reform, 
but had a greater impact in moving conservative opinion closer to the idea that the de facto break 
up of marriages should be matched by its de jure recognition. 
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5.4.2: The Labour government 1964-1968: the Wilson Bill. 
In retrospect, the reform of divorce law was very likely after Labour's election victory in 1964.  The 
Morton Commission had disappointed.  Divorce reform had support in Labour's ranks including the 
new Lord Chancellor, Gerald Gardiner.  Abse, Lipton and White had a record of proposing reform 
from the Labour's backbenches and many senior members of the government were known to 
favour liberal reform.  Negatively, Wilson remained cautious of any policy that might lose votes 
and there was little pressure from the labour movement or other organised campaigning.406 
 
If divorce reform required small, pragmatic, steps, Labour's new Home Secretary, Frank Soskice, 
was the man for the job.  For example, in 1965 Soskice allowed uncontested cases to start in the 
Crown Court with representation by solicitors reflecting what he saw as changed public opinion.407  
Far-reaching and systematic reform was not Soskice's metier and no bigger programme of reform 
was envisaged.  Again, progress was helped by Jenkins becoming Home Secretary in late 1965 and 
he entrusted the issue to the Lord Chancellor's Department and the newly established Law 
Commission under Justice Scarman.408  The Commission's 'first cockshy' in early 1966 was based on 
the principle of the legal equality of men and women and the ending of matrimonial offence.409  
This process of reform was aided by there being no internal opponents of the reform.  The 
Treasury had an interest since divorce was already the biggest call on the Legal Aid budget, but 
were satisfied that any increase in numbers could be balanced by making the process easier and 
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cheaper and were only concerned that the government should cost firm proposals410 rather than 
proceeding through a PMB, a process over which they might lose control.411  The Department for 
Social Security might have been concerned about the cost of divorcées claiming benefits, but was 
relaxed since it was giving consideration to the issue of women and insurance-based benefits 
anyway.412 
 
There was opposition in the judiciary, notably from Lord Simon,413 President of the Probate, 
Divorce and Admiralty Division, who opposed breakdown becoming the grounds for divorce.  
Instead, he favoured rationalising the legal definition of matrimonial offence and strengthening 
the legal powers to seek reconciliation. 414  Simon's view that the family was the principle 
consideration rather than women's rights can be seen in his ruling in the case of S. v S. c.1967.  
Mrs. S. had been granted a legal separation after six months of marriage on the grounds of Mr. S.'s 
desertion and wilful neglect.  He was later imprisoned for an unrelated assault and around this 
time a child was born.  Against Mrs. S.'s request for a divorce, Simon sought a reconciliation both 
to help the husband rehabilitate and to give him a stable home environment.415  Later, writing to 
the Lord Chancellor's Department in 1969, he criticised the proposed reforms for putting the onus 
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on divorce, not marriage, and siding with those who 'without excuse disrupted their own 
marriages'.416 
 
Such judicial opposition reportedly encouraged Scarman to consider achieving reform piecemeal.  
The situation was transformed by the publication in July 1966 of the report of the Archbishop's 
group, Putting Asunder.417  This presented the preordained conclusion that matrimonial offence 
should be replaced by irretrievable marital breakdown, established by a court investigation, as the 
basis for divorce.418  In November 1966 the Law Commission published its response, Field of 
Choice, which laid out the alternative policies they considered workable.  It made clear the 
Commission's support for breakdown as grounds for divorce and argued that the kind of 
investigation envisaged in Putting Asunder was not practicable.419  Following a debate in the House 
of Lords later that month, the Law Commission and the Archbishop's group worked through their 
differences with a joint statement being published in July 1967.  This proposed that breakdown 
should be the only grounds for divorce, but the Church's intention that the court should 
investigate such a breakdown was replaced with some more straightforward evidential indicators 
which were similar to the old matrimonial offences but without the burden of proof since they 
were now transformed into indicators of breakdown and would have no role in assigning guilt.  
More contentiously, it was proposed to allow the 'guilty' party to seek divorce, albeit after five 
years' separation.  Two years' separation in itself was proposed as an indicator of breakdown if 
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both parties agreed, which appeared to be divorce by consent.420  Critics, with some justification, 
argued this went further than the reformers claimed in undermining marriage.  The limited Kahn-
Freund/DLRU/Putting Asunder proposals had almost alchemically been transformed into 
something much more akin to those of the MLRS. 
 
It was this consideration in the Law Commission that drove reform, rather than backbench 
pressure.  This rapidly changing climate encouraged Abse to renew his campaign for reform after 
the 1966 election,421 and in the summer of 1967 he led a group of MPs to meet Richard Crossman, 
the Leader of the House, to seek government action on divorce.422  At the same time the DLRU 
began to have a renewed impact, although with neither an office nor full time officers this was 
largely down to Alistair Service who, fresh from the victory of the Abortion Act, started acting as 
its Parliamentary Liaison Officer.423  Their demands were those of the Church-Law Commission 
agreement424 with financial safeguards for dependent wives.425  The decision to proceed with a 
PMB was, however, the government's.  In a memo of September 1967 Lord Chancellor Gardiner 
suggested a draft based on the agreement being handed to a suitable backbencher.426  The 
Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, suggested a select committee should look at the issue which he 
considered too much for a backbencher,427 but Cabinet accepted the PMB with a free vote.428  
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After the Labour backbencher Bill Wilson429 had won fourth place in the November 1967 ballot, it 
was Crossman who suggested he take the divorce bill.430  Scarman had already drafted instructions 
for the bill which specified keeping it simple and focused on the grounds for divorce.431  It was 
clear that this was a PMB with the government in control. 432 
 
The small band of campaigners did play a role.  By the second reading an informal alliance to push 
for reform had become established.  Service was a regular both in the corridors of Westminster433 
and as a correspondent with the Law Commission which supplied the DLRU with facts and 
stratagems, for example, suggesting they attempt to win over the Mothers' Union. 434  The Law 
Commission itself proved adept at working behind the scenes.  In January 1968 the lawyer and 
writer John Mortimer435 wrote critically in The Observer that the proposals were compromised, 
with legislators fixing 'one eye on their swinging image and the other nervously fixed to the 
reaction of the Archbishop of Canterbury'.436  The Commission drafted a response, and gave it to 
Joan Rubinstein,437 a member of the Archbishop's group which she sent to The Observer which 
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published the repost.438  Meanwhile, Abse, previously without a good word to say for the Church, 
built a close working relationship with Robert Mortimer, Bishop of Exeter, the chair of the Putting 
Asunder group and a lord spiritual439 and kept Scarman informed.440 
 
While Putting Asunder represented the Church's attempt to relate to a more secular world,441 the 
reform camp was motivated by a more immediate concern with changing family relationships.  
The Law Commission, in the person of John Cartwright Sharp,442 a longstanding member of the SLL, 
was in correspondence with Philip Lewis443 of All Souls College, Oxford, who told him, ‘pooling of 
earnings was very popular with younger couples when both are earning.  They budget, save, and 
each take their pocket money on an equal footing.  [Robert] Zweig444 thinks that this arrangement 
is spreading with young couples.'445  This created a pressure for easier access divorces since the 
two parties were more financially independent.   A similar point was made by Abse at the second 
reading of Wilson's Bill in early 1968, 'the family is becoming more democratic, more egalitarian.  
It is becoming a place where money is shared, where the house may be purchased jointly'.446  As a 
                                                     
438
 TNA: PRO BC3/378, Letter to the editor of The Observer,  [c.28/01/1968]; Rubinstein to Gower 
31/01/1968; Letter, The Observer, 04/02/1968. 
439
 Leo Abse, Private Member (London: MacDonald, 1973), pp122-3. 
440
 TNA: PRO BC3/380, Abse to Scarman, 01/02/1968. 
441
 Chadwick, Michael Ramsey, pp149-151. 
442
 c.1919-2000.  Barrister, Lord Chancellor's Department from 1951, Secretary of the Law Commission 
(1968-1978). 
443
 No biographical information. 
444
 Probably a reference to Robert Zweig, The Worker in an Affluent Society, 1961. 
445
 TNA: PRO BC3/385, Philip [Lewis] to Michael [Cartwright Sharp], 10/06/1966. 
446
 HC Deb, 09/02/1968, vol758 c895. 
323 
 
Freudian, Abse also feared 'the cruel repression of our libidinal drives',447 something which also 
underpinned his support for contraception and homosexual law reform. 
 
Not all of the Anglican episcopacy were in the reform alliance.  Late in 1967 Mortimer told Abse 
that he was unsure whether he could carry the Church with him on the proposals.448  This proved 
true at the highest level.  Soon after the Wilson Bill was published Archbishop Ramsay stated that 
he thought that the Law Commission had broken with their agreement in proposing divorce by 
consent.449  Canon Bentley (like Mortimer a conservative who supported reform450) wrote to the 
Law Commission reassuring them that this was the Archbishop backsliding, and that he would 
have to back down.451  He did not, and continued to oppose the reform.  The following year, as the 
second (Jones) divorce PMB was progressing though the Commons, Ramsay wrote to the Prime 
Minister that he had remained silent on 'social questions' even though he 'feared that vital 
questions were being decided without the necessary leadership of the Government'.  The 
Archbishop's concern was that the bill was neither based on the idea of breakdown nor did it offer 
divorced women enough protection.452  The Prime Minister's response was to restate the 
government's and, above all his own, neutrality on the issue.453  This stance contradicted the 
correspondence being passed to the Law Commission who discussed how to 'soften up' the 
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Primate,454 again by using his own committee's report and members against him.455  None of this 
had much effect and when the Jones Bill (the successor to the Wilson Bill, see below) reached the 
Lords in June 1969, Dr. Ramsay spoke against and abstained.456  Having opened the gates to 
reform, a faction of the Church could not stop its progress.  It is clear that the Law Commission put 
no great store in religious opinion, one official noting: 
If a party's religious convictions are offended by divorce there is no need for that party to take 
proceedings.  If the party is proceeded against he can continue to regard himself as so far as 
his religion is concerned as a married person and behave accordingly.
457
  
The arguments used by the opponents of reform also showed the limited impact of religion.  Thus 
Norman St. John Stevas, while asserting his belief in the sanctity of marriage, accepted that in a 
'pluralist and secular society' his view would not determine the actions of others, and therefore 
called instead on the collective 'moral consensus' of society, although without success.458  
Marriage was more a civil than religious institution, subject to political not moral discourse. 
 
One obstacle to reform was the financial plight of many divorcées.  While many reformers 
highlighted the need to address this, they lacked clear proposals.  The Labour government had 
started well in protecting women.  After the Lords overturned a case law right of a deserted 
woman to the matrimonial home in 1965,459 the Lord Chancellor suggested to Baroness 
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Summerskill that this could be a matter for a PMB460 resulting in the Matrimonial Homes Bill, 
1967.461  Further reform was more difficult.  Roy Jenkins had set up a departmental committee to 
look at maintenance payments in 1966 under another SLL stalwart, Jean Graham Hall,462 but the 
proposals were slight 463 as they had to be without a positive welfare intervention to support 
divorced but dependent women.  Some hoped for a more equal future, as Service wrote in 1968 
divorced women would continue to face hardship until women became economically independent 
through work, something that could be, he added, supported with more childcare.464  Such 
promise of a better tomorrow was of little help to dependent women facing the real prospect of 
hardship. 
 
In the absence of an immediate solution, first wave feminists opposed reform.  Summerskill told 
the Law Commission in 1967 there was no pressing need for divorce law reform, just reform of 
maintenance and matrimonial property law465 and opposed reform in the Lords.  The SPG also 
opposed reform without protection for women 466 and at the time the second reading of Wilson's 
Bill asked Joyce Butler467 to call a meeting of feminist groups in the House of Commons468 although 
no meeting was called.  The non-feminist NCW's support for reform was conditional on these 
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concerns being met469 and thought that this might only be solved in the long-term by women 
having independent National Insurance contributions based on their own careers.470  According to 
The Economist the only women's organisation that supported reform was the Townswomen's 
Guild.471  Perhaps the depth of opposition amongst women's groups was shallow, as Joan Vickers 
(a supporter of reform) told the Commons at the second reading of Wilson's bill, of the 21 
women's organisations affiliated to the Status of Women Committee which she chaired, only two 
had expressed reservations about the bill.472 
 
Feminist and women's organisations' opposition to reform dovetailed with that of social 
conservatives.  The Daily Telegraph made its opposition clear in 1966, emphasising that, 'married 
couples have a duty to society to maintain and strengthen, even at the cost of their happiness, the 
institution of lifelong marriage'.473  Summerskill moved towards an overtly conservative position, 
not only arguing that reform was 'a Casanova's Charter', but that 'marriage may have lost some of 
its flavour in this permissive society' and even opposed young couples without children divorcing 
since this would create a habit of divorce that would undermine marriage.474  At the Wilson Bill's 
second reading in the Commons in February 1968, religious, socially conservative and women's 
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opposition combined in the form of St. John Stevas, Jill Knight and Irene Ward.475  This fragmented 
opposition was too little to stop the Wilson Bill being given a comfortable majority of 159 to 63.476 
 
It was divorced women's financial support, rather than social conservatism, that was to be the 
major obstacle to reform.  Abse used a meeting with the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD) in 
November 1967 to push for greater attention to be given to deserted women's support  in order to 
appease the 'Lady Summerskill lobby'.  Although some concessions were made, the LCD was 
concerned not to 'enable the flood gates to be opened so far as financial provision is 
concerned.'477  The Law Commission recognised that the government might be asked to suspend 
the bill's operations until such measures had been made.478  With the bill going to committee in 
the Commons in the spring of 1968, Service, who was acting as an unofficial whip, reported back 
to the Law Commission that more would need to done to ensure the bill's passage since there was 
a growing uneasiness about the protection women would receive.479 
 
When in the summer of 1968 the Wilson Bill went to the Lords it became clear that the lack of 
provision for women was a problem and the weight of debate and amendments could sink the bill, 
Edith Summerskill alone claiming to have the drafts of fifty amendments.  Service's relationship 
with the Law Commissioners had become cosy enough for him to write to the Commissioners with 
a list of baronesses he had lined up to speak in the Lords, with a request for them to look over the 
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points they would make to calm concerns on protecting women.480  Nonetheless, Abse and Service 
were both worried that concerns about a woman's financial support after being divorced against 
her will had no answer.481  Even Labour's NJCWWO, who had said little on the issue, came out for 
matrimonial property being considered first.482  Scarman was of the view that the bill would have 
to be reintroduced at the next session with some more tangible protection for divorced women483 
and it was still in the Lords at the end of the Parliamentary season and fell. 
 
5.4.3 Divorce reform 1968-1970: The Jones Bill. 
In November 1968 Gardiner proposed a new PMB with government time and increasingly 
euphemistic 'drafting assistance'.484  This line was agreed by the Cabinet's Parliamentary 
Committee (Harold Wilson's experiment with an inner Cabinet)485 and another Labour 
backbencher, Alec Jones, placed ninth in the Private Members' Ballot, adopted the bill.486  The 
Cabinet agreed this approach, with the bill being put down early to ensure its passage with the 
guarantee that the government should take it over if necessary.487  The bill did not need this extra 
help and received a second reading in December 1968 by 183 votes to 106.488   
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There was still nothing in the new bill that allayed the fear that women could be seriously 
disadvantaged.  Early in 1969 another Labour backbencher, Edward Bishop,489 published his 
Matrimonial Property Bill, probably written by Olive Stone, a reader in law at the LSE.490  The bill 
proposed to split all property and savings accumulated over the course of a marriage equally on 
divorce.491  Unsurprisingly the bill attracted the support from SPG,492 MWA, NCW and Labour's 
NJCWWO.493  The Labour Party's women's officer, Betty Lockwood,494 had a meeting with Bishop 
to discuss his bill.495  The DLRU supported the bill too.496  Notably the TUC Women's Advisory 
Committee (TUC-WAC) did not.  The TUC had a long record not discussing these 'non-industrial' 
issues demonstrated in 1962 the TUC-WAC rejected a request to affiliate to the MWA since 
marriage was not a workplace issue.497  In 1969 Bishop's bill was rejected since they thought it one 
sided and without most women's support,498 perhaps because working women, less economically 
dependent on men, felt less threatened by divorce. 
 
In January 1969 the PLP backed the Bishop Bill, causing the Prime Minister to back down from his 
intention to whip the payroll vote against the bill's second reading that same month.  Instead 
Cabinet allowed a free vote on the bill's principle.  The government did not endorse the bill's 
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detailed provisions which they held to be unworkable.499  The problem of finding a viable and 
politically acceptable bill evaded the government.  The Law Commission had started to consider 
such reform as early as 1966500 and by 1969 had developed a shopping list of reforms to change 
provisions that were 'no longer defensible in modern society' on the basis of equality between 
men and women in marriage.  These included allowing a cuckold husband to seek damages for 
adultery, which the Law Commission thought placed him in the 'role of a ponce',501 but the core 
issues of women's maintenance remained unresolved.  So, in order to ease the passage of the 
Jones Bill during its committee stage, the government undertook to take the principles of the 
Bishop Bill forward through government legislation, and to amend any divorce law reform so that 
it would not come into force until this was done.502  This became the Matrimonial Property and 
Proceedings Bill, given its second reading in January 1970.503 It was rushed through Parliament 
being given its Royal Assent on the day that Parliament was dissolved before the 1970 general 
election.504 
 
Back in May 1969, with the third reading debate on the Jones Bill approaching, Cabinet continued 
supporting the bill with government time.505  The Lord Chancellor highlighted that this would help 
manage the Labour backbenches at a difficult time for the government.506  This should have been 
the role of the chief whip, Bob Mellish, but he was using his position to oppose the bill, although 
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his remained an isolated voice.507  With fears that the bill would fall again for lack of time, Mellish 
attracted criticism for acquiescing to a request by a Conservative opponent of reform (and a 
divorcé), Sir Lionel Heald,508 to give time to a critical motion on the government's decision to allow 
time for a PMB before the report and third reading debate.  Not only was this a potential filibuster, 
but it introduced a motion of censure when a only a one line whip was out.509  None of this 
stopped the bill being passed easily by 109 votes to 55.510  Its passage through the Lords was also 
smooth. The bill passed by 122 to 34.511  It was given a third Lords reading without division in 
October 1969.512  Combined with the 1970 Matrimonial Property and Proceedings Act, the Divorce 
Act came into force in 1971. 
 
5.4.4: Conclusions on divorce reform. 
This divorce law reform, despite its form as a conscience issue, was a Labour reform.  Putting 
Asunder was the product of discussions between the Church and a Conservative government, and 
pointed to a much more limited reform.  A Labour government, with much less attachment to the 
established Church, walked through the door that Putting Asunder opened.  While the Anglican 
proposal was for the courts to establish that a marriage had irretrievably broken down, the Labour 
proposals took features such as separation and adultery as indicators that marriages had broken 
down.  This made the law closer to the more radical tradition of reform in the MLRS which, 
although inactive since 1960, had left a reservoir of support for divorce on the grounds of 
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separation alone.  The MLRS had never developed deep roots in the Labour Party, but had 
influenced enough in Labour's political elite and its hinterland to facilitate reform.  With the 
Church divided and other opponents weak, these reformers imposed their vision despite a lack of 
enthusiasm displayed by the Prime Minister. 
 
These reformers were joined by one (barely) extant pressure group, the DLRU which had little 
impact after 1945.  Only in 1967 through Alistair Service did its star rise again, but more as a one-
man-band than organised pressure.  He formed part of a loose coalition for reform including 
longstanding supporters in the Law Commission, the Lord Chancellor (Gerald Gardiner) aided by 
Abse on the backbenches.  Some of these reformers tentatively linked women's moves towards 
greater equality in the public sphere to mitigate the effects of divorce on dependent women.  This 
was in contrast to the remnants of the first wave of feminism, who instead argued to protect 
women's dependent status in their different roles in the private sphere, and this united equal 
rights and difference feminists.  These feminists' concerns were widely shared, and this did lead to 
some reform of the financial support for divorcées. 
 
The 1960s can be seen as a further step in the decline of the patriarchal family.  The moral 
underpinning of this had been supplied by religious ideas but the Church of England under Dr. 
Michael Ramsay came to reflect the changing mores of society rather than being a rampart against 
change.  The first wave feminists were a remnant, and soon to be eclipsed by the rise of the 
second wave.  Although the second wave had no noticeable impact on the development of policy 
of divorce in this period, the social changes they reflected were already in train, and these affected 
divorce reform.  There was, however, no women's movement that was yet able to give voice to 
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this, only isolated voices such as Joan Lestor513 who argued women's economic dependence 
needed to be addressed, not men's alleged promiscuity.514  In the 1920s the feminist movement 
had shown its ability, to a degree, to change the Labour movement, and this was to happen again 
in the 1970s.  But the inchoate second wave was not ready to do this in the 1960s. 
 
As more women worked, the idea that they could be economically independent of men rose.  For 
women who didn't work, the welfare state offered at least some bearable alternative to an 
unbearable marriage.  As companiate marriage and symmetrical family became a popular ideal 
(although not necessarily a reality) against a union of necessity, so did the potential for disillusion 
with it.  As with contraception, Dora Gaitskell provided a singular voice suggesting that divorce 
might benefit women too.  She told the Lords in 1969, 'despite the great strides we have made 
towards sex equality, the idea that men more easily tire of women than women of men is still 
prevalent'.  Divorce, she continued, was as much of a right for women as for men.515  Indeed, 
when the law came into force in 1971 the number of petitions for divorce issued by women 
outnumbered those by men two-to-one.516  Far from being a 'Casanova's charter', divorce reform 
offered women freedom from their husbands.  As Jane Lewis has pointed out, the divorce reform 
was an important step to women becoming legally separate individuals, 'in so doing, family law 
tended to run ahead of a social reality in which women and men were not fully individualised in 
the sense of being self-sufficient.'517  If this can be understood as equality, it was equality in the 
negative sense, not a positive intervention to transform women's position in the private sphere.  
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Indeed, as Lewis notes, one of the few areas where women are still not individuated from their 
partners is in the benefits system.518 
 
5.5: Conclusion. 
Ronald Butt519 was very much writing the first draft of the rightist critics' history of the 1960s in his 
Times column520  This was evident in June 1969 when he complained of the process of PMBs: 
Future historians may well consider that the existence of a Labour Parliament 
since 1964 has been of more real significance to the life of the nation than the 
existence of a Labour Government ... through the impact Private Members' Bills 
on social issues that have become law since 1964, the Labour Parliament, for 
good or ill, has had a significant effect on the life of the nation that was hardly 
calculable before 1964.521 
The Times' post-bag swelled with a Who's Who of sixties reformers in response, pointing out how 
wrong Butt was.  Antony Grey insisted that pressure groups 'at most stages of the Parliamentary 
game ... are apt to feel like helpless spectators'.522  Leo Abse attested that 'the changing 
conventions around Private Members' Bills' had led to far greater government help. 523  Michael 
Cartwright Sharp added, in a considerable understatement, that government had offered 
'technical and legal assistance at all stages and on all amendments tabled'.524  As has been shown, 
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only abortion law reform was even partially the result of pressure group activity, only this bill 
originated in a draft made outside of government, and only here did the government even 
approach neutrality. 
 
Care should be taken not to read too much significance into these reforms being passed as PMBs.  
This gave backbenchers and peers licence to mould and amend bills, and this was significant for 
the Abortion Bill.  Additionally, Bishop's Matrimonial Property Bill helped create a significant 
addition to divorce reform.  These measures' status as PMBs was not part of any over-arching 
government strategy.  Holden has suggested that the 1964 Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) 
Bill, a PMB with a free vote, was a template the reforms considered here,525 but this should not be 
overemphasised.  First, Murder Bill was a PMB of a very peculiar type, alluded to in the Queen's 
Speech and with government whipping on procedural issues.  Second, it did not come through the 
Private Members' Ballot but was debated entirely in government time.  Third, it is not the case 
that ALRA or divorce law reformers took their lead from the Murder Bill.  The Herbert Bill in 1937 
was a PMB,526 divorce reformers had published draft PMBs in 1958 and 1960, and Abse had 
successfully piloted a PMB through Parliament on divorce in 1963.  On abortion, the Reeves PMB 
of 1951 was the template for ALRA campaigning.  Reformers saw these as real chances to change 
the law, not simply a way of raising the issue in Parliament and beyond.  Fourth, there were no 
signs that the government had intent beyond capital punishment.  Immediately after the 1966 
election the government attempted to squeeze the time for PMBs only backing down under 
backbench pressure later that summer. 527  The idea of using PMBs seems to have occurred to 
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Harold Wilson only by degrees, particularly after the Abortion Bill started its progress through 
Parliament.  Thus while the abolition of hanging might have suggested to government a tactical 
use of PMBs, the development of their use appears to be more the pragmatic method to avoid 
alienating Catholics in the Cabinet528 and traditionalists of all types in the electorate. 
 
The degree to which these were 'conscience issues' and thus subject to free votes needs to be 
considered in this context.  Richards sees these PMBs as a vehicle for pushing through religiously 
linked moral change, but where religious divides did not coincide with party boundaries.529  The 
current research does not completely support this view.  These measures were facilitated by the 
Church of England ceasing to oppose reform, consistent with the development of Marwick's 
secular Anglicanism.  While there was no precipitous collapse in traditional morality, it certainly 
undermined the degree to which these reforms were considered moral issues.  Family life and 
gender roles therein were more open to being subject to political debate.  There was some lineage 
of these issues having been considered in the labour movement.  Contraception had been the 
subject of Labour Party campaigns in the 1920s.  A radical liberalism too, exemplified by HG Wells 
and CEM Joad's530 Progressive League that helped germinate both ALRA531 and possibly the 
MLRS,532 scintillated briefly in the interwar years.  This left little trace in the broader Labour Party 
after 1945, and pressure for these reforms did not come up through party structures.  These were 
top-down reforms supported by progressive liberally minded actors many of whom were Labour-
aligned, and opposed by social conservatives of all stripes.  Campaigns for change focused on the 
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labour movement were not a feature of these 1960s reforms.  However, all these reforms can be 
seen as tinged with class.  As Alice Jenkins highlights in Law for the Rich, it was working class 
women who resorted to back street abortionists.  Equally, working class people needed local 
authority contraception clinics and even with Legal Aid, were less able to access the divorce 
process. 
 
By the 1960s the first wave of feminism was a remnant.  As Shelia Rowbotham recalled, perhaps a 
little unfairly, she saw these campaigners as, 'shadowy figures in old fashioned clothes, somehow 
connected to headmistresses who said you should not wear high heels or make up.  It was all very 
prim and stiff and mainly concerned with keeping you away from boys.'533  They had no impact on 
contraception and abortion, although their opposition to divorce was an element in the campaign 
for better financial support for divorcées.  Weeks' point that without a women's movement, 
women's equality was not a feature of these reforms is offered some support by this research, but 
there are key elements of equality in the discussions about divorce and contraception that are not 
linked to the feminist movement.  More generally, these reforms were a move in the direction of 
equality.  Hera Cook rightly concludes, the moral double standard 'faltered and lost all 
certainty',534 but these moves were not motivated as such by clear ideas of women's equality.  If 
anything, removing gendered class inequalities was a greater motivation.   As Lena Jeger put it 
prior to reform: 'Abortion is like equal pay.  The women who are best off get it.' 535 
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The radical critics suggest that these reforms were the opposite of progress towards equality, that 
they were the reassertion of women's oppression.  Stuart Hall has argued for the 'vital and 
continuing force of religion in the articulation of moral ideologies and regulation of moral practice' 
in these reforms, but the above analysis shows even opponents of reform tended to avoid such 
religious modes of expression.  Suggestions of 'strong and restrictive political control'536 are 
equally groundless.  Although there are always social pressures acting on the individual, ostensible 
control in this period weakened.  Sally Sheldon writes that the 1967 Abortion Act can be 
'understood as an adoption of more continuous, regulatory and coercive mechanisms of 
controlling individuals and populations' and 'was actually largely motivated by the legislators' 
desire to facilitate a closer control over this private and hitherto inaccessible sphere'.537  As the 
analysis here shows, there is very little to support these claims.  After the 1967 Act, abortion was 
probably under-regulated allowing exploitative clinics with poor medical standards able to 
operate. 
 
The radicals have made similar points in relation to divorce.  Carole Smart has argued that the 
reforms of the sixties: 
[do] not ... indicate that the law regulates the family less or that it has a more libertarian 
institution.  Instead the law has facilitated a shifting of large-scale dissent from legally 
controlled marriage.  Moreover it has legitimated an increased surveillance over families, 
particularly where there are children, through welfare agencies.
538
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The evidence here is that in reforming divorce, the government explicitly rejected the power of 
the courts to investigate breakdown.  The 1969 Divorce Act led directly to the Special Procedure of 
1977,539 where the vast majority of divorces were granted without a formal court hearing at all.  
Regarding contraception, the reforms were not as Elizabeth Wilson suggests, more concerned with 
controlling the sexuality of women rather than liberating them.540  The law was silent on 
unmarried women receiving advice, and the FPA and local authorities were gently encouraged by 
central government to liberalise their provision.  It is possible to see these policies as practical 
solutions to specific problems, but pragmatism has an underlying ideology that makes it far from 
value-free.  This ideology was an individualised and negative equality exposed by the ebbing of 
traditional morality which in part was the moral justification for women's separate role, the link 
between sex and procreation and the sanctity of marriage. 
 
Moves positively promoting women's equality were not a feature of the 1960s reforms.  Not only 
was contraception and abortion poorly integrated into the welfare state, but other areas that 
could have positively transformed gender roles in the private sphere were little developed in the 
1960s.  Childcare and welfare payments have not been considered here partly due to pressure of 
space but largely because these were on the periphery of government thinking with little coherent 
reform.  Vicky Randall has shown that there was some thought given to the childcare needs of 
working mothers with an emerging lobby for pre-school care in the 1960s, but affected little policy 
at this time.541  Similarly, both the government and the Labour Party gave consideration to women 
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in relation to cash benefits and taxation, without any major policy outcomes in this period.542  
Thus, it was the removal of barriers to gaining access to abortion, contraception and divorce that 
underpinned policies affecting women's equality in the private sphere in the 1960s
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Chapter 6: Conclusion. 
The first conclusion of this thesis the reforms of the 1960s were moves towards greater equality.  
The strongest current in the historiography has been that of the radical critics who suggest that 
these reforms were not simply weak, but controlling and freedom-denying.  This approach might 
have made sense in the 1960s and 1970s where the weaknesses, incompleteness and ambiguity of 
the reforms were their most obvious features in the eyes of those who wanted greater social 
justice.  The longer, historical view allows a different picture to emerge, showing reforms which 
were a movement in the direction of greater equality, laying the foundations of the equality state.  
That increasing distance puts these reforms in to this perspective can be seen in Jeffrey Weeks' 
Politics and Society.  In the second edition (1989) Weeks argues that the reforms tended to 
'sustain and strengthen social control.'1  In the third edition (2012), in line with the analysis 
developed in this thesis, he writes of a 'great series of reforms' in the 1960s.2 
 
Many radical critics, from Stuart Hall's 1980 analysis onwards, have used a Foucauldian analysis to 
argue that regulation was removed from the authoritarian state and placed in dispersed networks 
of power which, if anything, regulated life more thoroughly.  This thesis suggests a different 
picture.  The reforms of the 1960s tended to undermine the power that was dispersed through 
society, the power of an employer to pay women less, or a landlord to racially discriminate.  
Similarly, in a pre-reform Britain divided by class and wealth, those who could pay for an abortion 
in a private clinic or contraceptive advice from a private medical practitioner had much easier to 
access these services.  Working class women had to rely on backstreet abortions or the goods 
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supplied by dingy rubber goods shops.  This was usurped by a state structured civic order, an order 
that was to become the British equality state. 
 
The next question is, therefore what drove this reform process?  One popular answer is that it was 
the product of campaigning activity by pressure groups and broadly defined movements that 
could be described as counter-cultural.3  The organised pressure groups considered here such as 
the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA), the Divorce Law Reform Union (DLRU) and the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) are often seen as central to change.  The evidence 
presented here suggests that it is easy to over-estimate the impact of these groups.  CARD was 
probably the most effective, playing a pivotal role particularly in the amendment of the 1965 Race 
Relations Bill.  That CARD was no longer engaged in lobbying activity by the end of 1967 is at least 
part of the explanation for the weaknesses of the 1968 Race Relations Act.  CARD was not, 
however, the centre of the campaign to reform the 1965 Act.  This was co-ordinated by Mark 
Bonham-Carter who was chair of a state body, the Race Relations Board, from early 1966.  
Similarly, in abortion law reform, the role of ALRA tends to be overstated.  The backbench MPs 
who sought reform through Private Members' Bills from 1951 onwards sometimes acted without 
ALRA's advice, and the Parliamentary tactics that ensured that the 1967 Abortion Act was an 
effective piece of legislation were much more those of the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, and 
Minister of Health, Kenneth Robinson.  In the reform of the provision of contraception, equal pay 
and, to a large degree, divorce, there were no effective extra-parliamentary pressure groups for 
change operating in the 1960s. 
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It is possible that some of the pressure groups had a longer term impact as their ideas became 
embedded, particularly in the Labour Party.  It could be argued the Marriage Law Reform Society 
(MLRS), which had ceased to exist by 1960, was a key factor in establishing the idea of separation 
as grounds for divorce particularly within the Labour Party.  CARD helped popularise the 
US/Canadian model of combating discrimination through conciliation, civil law and administrative 
bodies (although arguably this was mainly Anthony Lester working through whatever 
organisations existed).  ALRA established the social clause as a legal ground for abortion (although 
its final medical form was the work of government).  Doubtless, these ideas could have been 
introduced by social entrepreneurs without pressure groups, but this misses the point.  Reformers 
like Robert Pollard, Lester and Glanville Williams sought, and in some cases helped establish, 
pressure groups to further their ideas. 
 
This suggests the permeation thesis might be an over-generalisation.  Marwick's claim that the 
form of cultural change in the 1960s occurred through permeation of these ideas into the existing 
social structure, selectively transforming it, rather than overthrowing it,4 receives some support in 
this thesis.  Caveats have to be added to this.  Beyond the truism that any popular idea starts out 
as the idea of minority, the role of movements such as ALRA, CARD, DLRU do not fit the template 
of small groups whose ideas permeated, by stages, society.  Indeed, there is little evidence that 
pressure groups were central to the reform process.  ALRA remained small but still the best 
example of such a process.  The Family Planning Association (FPA), although large, was politically 
detached.  At the time of the late 1960s reform of divorce, the MLRS (whose proposals were in 
part enacted) had not existed for ten years and the DLRU appeared to have one active member.  
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There was no active campaign for equal pay between 1954 and 1969 and by the time the trade 
union based equal pay campaign (NJCCWER) was formed, the process that led to legislation was in 
motion.  Similarly, claims for the continuity of first wave feminism and its salience to the reform 
process in the 1960s have little support in the findings presented here. 
 
The corollary of there being limited organised pressure for change through these groups is that the 
immediate impetus for change came from above.  What permeated society came not from 
counter-cultural practice but from within the political elite, or more precisely the Labour and 
liberally-minded part of it.  What was important for reform to happen was, in part, the presence of 
a reforming minister in government.  Only abortion law reform was created in Parliament (and 
note, not by ALRA), but even here the form of the bill, a lightly regulated medicalised measure, 
was in line with the Home Office and Ministry of Health's wishes.  In other areas it was in large 
part about the ministers.  Moves against racial discrimination legislation were retarded by Soskice, 
Crossman and Gunter, and facilitated by Jenkins, Greenwood and Castle.  The lack of reform on 
the police's negative attitude on race was, to a degree, due to Callaghan's arrival at the Home 
Office.  None of the Private Members' Bills considered here were the sole result of private 
member's activity (and indeed, they seldom are).  Divorce reform was entirely driven by the Law 
Commission, and the amendment to contraceptive policy was also a government measure. 
 
For the Home Office to become reforming after Jenkins' appointment necessitated a more liberal 
permanent secretary than Sir Charles Cunningham, which Jenkins achieved with the appointment 
of Sir Philip Allen5 in early 1966.6  Below this level, reform-minded civil servants such as Derek 
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Morrell and Jack Howard Drake found their own way to places where they could aid reform.  There 
is no evidence here to support a Yes Minister view of the Civil Service, but rather of departments 
taking the lead of their ministers if those ministers are were both knew what they wanted to 
achieve and had the Prime Minister's backing. 
 
What emerges from the history of these policy areas is not the importance of a counter-cultural 
movement, but the importance of networks in policy making.7  Policy making on racial equality 
developed before sexual equality for a reason.  At the time of the 1964 election there was already 
a network of individuals with an interest in the policy, Mason at the Institute of Race Relations 
(IRR), Peppard at the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), academics like 
Little, Banton and Moore and campaigning lawyers like Lester, Thornberry and Bindman.  It was 
not simply that this network existed, but that it had an institutional structure through voluntary 
bodies, journals, public bodies and other agencies where its ideas could be disseminated through 
publications such as the IRR's Race, the Fabians' Venture, and the revisionist Socialist Commentary.  
Importantly, it was plugged into policy making through Labour's NEC Commonwealth Sub-
committee and the party's research department.  At this stage, it did not extend to the trade 
unions, the TUC's International Department were not in this network and it was not until Keith 
Morrell established Trade Unionists for Race Relations in 1969 that this began to change.  The 
policy network already existed in 1964, and predated CARD.  It was large made up of white, 
educated, liberals.  
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With women's equality, such a network was underdeveloped, although academics like Nancy 
Seear and Margherita Rendell along with the Status of Women Committee and other first wave 
groups offered some institutional setting.  Labour Party women's structures stood to one side of 
the policy developments analysed here until the late 1960s, and structures representing women in 
the trade union movement only began to develop significance when women in the trade unions 
started to assert their interests around the same time.  Journalists such as Mary Stott8 at The 
Guardian often appeared as lone voices.  This was related to the weakness of the first wave of 
feminism by the 1960s.  On the evidence of this thesis, it is difficult not to take the discontinuist 
view that there was a rupture between the first and second waves of feminism.  Although some 
first wave groups still existed, it is impossible to see any having an impact in relation to women's 
equality in the 1960s.  The weakness of feminism and networks on women's equality is part of the 
reason why the development of policy on women's equality was underdeveloped and why the 
early institutions of the equality state were solely focused on racial equality.  
 
Voluntary groups were just one element of these networks, but an important one.  This was 
particularly the case with welfare services for immigrants that was delivered by voluntary 
agencies, often in conjunction with local authorities from the 1950s.  Additionally, there was some 
national leadership to this voluntary effort offered by the National Council for Social Service and 
the IRR, and this became the first basis of the institutions of the equality state with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Committee (CIAC) in 1962 and the NCCI in 1964.  With 
contraception, the FPA played more the role of the provider of services than a campaigning body 
for more extensive state services.  ALRA, on the other hand, resisted pressure from the Marie 
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Stopes Memorial Clinic to set up a welfare wing, and there was no suggestion that the DLRU had 
the resources to offer advice. 
 
These voluntary groups were important in that they developed policy in areas that were 
considered to be in the private sphere.  Just as the state of a couple's marriage was not a matter 
for state interference and necessitated being dealt with by voluntary action,9 so the welfare of 
immigrants and advice on contraception were seen as issues where the state did not want direct 
involvement.  In both cases the existence of a voluntary network allowed local authorities to fund 
a low level of service if they wished without the central state taking a view on what were seen as 
private, individual, matters.  As the state became more interested in these policy areas, the 
voluntary groups were drawn closer to mainstream state institutions.  The voluntary sector was 
thus a conveyor of issues previously considered private matters for the individual into the realm of 
public policy.  This was also a source of weakness.  The unwillingness of the FPA to upset 
conservative opinion by offering advice on contraception to unmarried people, and the desire of 
local voluntary liaison committees to work only by persuasion were part of the voluntary ethos.  
This led to activity sometimes constrained by public opinion rather than being equipped to 
transform it. 
 
This interplay of the public and the private was important for the development of policy for racial 
equality.  So long as inequality was seen as something which was the result of purely private 
choices, then the ability of the state to act was limited.  The views of Sir Joseph Simpson, the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner (see section 2.4), are particularly telling here.  The police did 
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not see it as any part of their duty to regulate peaceful, private, activity which could include 
discriminatory and exclusionary behaviour.  To assert that racial discrimination was wrong, and a 
society where black and Asian people were integrated was a legitimate goal of state policy, 
necessitated that these been seen as issues in the shared public sphere.  The boundary of the state 
had to be extended into civil society, into employment, pubs and associational culture leaving only 
the home and family as a truly private sphere.  The process of the creation of the CIAC, the NCCI, 
the passing of the 1965 Race Relations Act, the creation of the RRB and the passing of the 1968 
Race Relations Act are all stages in the shifting of that boundary. 
 
When it came to policy on women, the relationship between the public and the private sphere was 
different.  There had been, from at least the nineteenth century, a public interest in women's role 
in the home.  This was expressed both in state policy, for example through limitations of women's 
working hours that did not apply to men, and morality prescribing the behaviour that was 
considered suitable for a woman.  Such morality was sometimes the basis of law, for example in 
divorce or abortion, or was a constraint on the development of state policy, as with contraception, 
and it shaped protective legislation that restricted women's working hours in industry but not 
nursing.  Thus, the pursuit of policy to create greater gender equality did not require the state to 
intrude into the private sphere since it was already there.  To an extent, women's equality could 
be furthered by purely negative measures with the state withdrawing laws and policy that 
restricted women's choice.  In abortion law reform, particularly, this is what the state did.  With 
equal pay, the law required that private (as well as public) employers abjure from paying men and 
women different rates when employed on similar work. 
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Thus, most of the measures that the state took in relation to both women and racial minorities 
remained negative in character.  The anti-discrimination measures of the two Race Relations Acts 
and the Equal Pay Act required that those acting in defined parts of the public sphere (or what 
might be considered the most public parts of civil society) were not to discriminate, although in 
the case of women this was limited to the issue of pay alone.  When it came to positive measures 
of equality that required the state to change something, progress was more limited.  The 
extension of the grounds for abortion and the lessening of restrictions on state funded 
contraception advice were not accompanied by funding to allow greater availability of abortion in 
the NHS or free contraception.  To a degree this did follow under Edward Heath's Conservative 
administration in the early 1970s but a voluntary body, the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, has 
remained a major provider of abortion since its inception on the day the Abortion Act came in to 
force in 1968.10  Easier divorce was accompanied by a law which required ongoing support of the 
economically more dependent partner, but no extra state support.  State childcare and benefits, in 
particular, were not the subject of great reform in the 1960s.  Measures of positive equality that 
would have created greater gender equality in both the public and private spheres were largely 
absent. 
 
With racial equality, there was some limited movement towards positive measures of equality.  
Section 11 funding and the Urban Programme saw some moderate targeting of resources towards 
black and Asian people to address the inequalities that they suffered although this was a limited 
appendix of the equality state, which remained more embedded in negative equality and the 
removal of obstacles.  As Ruth Glass noted, one problem was that society was already highly 
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unequal and this meant that black and Asian people who faced discrimination found themselves 
suffering disproportionally from the uneven distribution of resources.  If society had been more 
equal generally, the consequences of discrimination would have been less severe.  So although in 
1966 black and Asian minorities constituted less than 2% of the population,11 targeted 
programmes such as the Urban Programme were likely only to provide partial palliatives since 
they could not hope to tackle these wider inequalities. 
 
There has been a great deal of debate about the existence, significance and decline of the post-
war consensus.  If such a consensus was established around 1945, mainly covering economic 
policy and a redistributive welfare state, it only lasted thirty years.12  Culturally, the world in which 
we live is one originating in the 1960s.  It is one of pop culture, public displays of sexuality, 
consumerism, personal liberty and disrespect for the political elite. The changes that began to 
promote racial and women's equality were part that 1960s cultural revolution too, with the state 
taking more responsibility for creating a civilised social order.   These changes are an element to 
the developing settlement in which we still live, much of what started in the sixties has continued 
to inform government and it has already lived longer than the post-war consensus.  The changes 
of the 1960s have persisted.  In 1951 Evelyn Waugh13 complained 'The Conservative party have 
never put the clock back a single second',14 and it remains true that the Conservatives have never 
seriously unwound what began to be woven in the 1960s.  The reforms in women's and racial 
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equality of the 1960s Labour governments created an armature around which the equality state 
has grown.
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Annex 1: Policy making in the Labour Party and the TUC. 
The annual conference is the Labour Party's sovereign policy making body, but this exaggerates 
reality in two ways.  In this time period the party leadership could almost always rely on the 
support of the unions which controlled the majority of the vote at conference, and if things did not 
go the leadership's way, they could always ignore the conference.  When the party was in power, 
the unions preferred to negotiate with the government behind closed doors.  When out of power, 
the occasional vote for unilateral nuclear disarmament withstanding, the unions rallied behind the 
leadership to return them to power.  The annual conference was important for the local 
constituency parties, it being their annual chance to vote on issues at the national level.  Here the 
ties of loyalty were not so strong.1 
 
The next tier of policy-making after the conference was centred on Labour's NEC, elected at 
annual conference sectorally.  A number of places were reserved for women, but they did not 
represent women, being elected by all the delegates to the conference and thus tending to be the 
solidly loyalist representatives favoured by the union leaders.  The NEC would meet monthly and 
take the policy decisions for the party.  Under it were a series of Sub-committees, the 
Commonwealth Sub-committee had responsibility for issues concerning black and Asian 
immigrants until the early 1960s, when responsibility transferred to the Home Policy Sub-
committee.  On occasion, the NEC would set up study groups and working parties to investigate 
policy, designed to bring in a wider range of opinions and expertise.  The party's headquarters 
(often referred to as Transport House) had a small but vigorous research department (not to be 
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confused with the Communist aligned Labour Research Department), mostly in tune with the 
revisionist wing of the party.  They would produce the policy documents on which the NEC policy 
making process thrived.  The policy that resulted from this process could be issued by the NEC or 
sent to conference to have that added stamp of approval.  The NEC also elected the General 
Secretary, for most of this period, Len Williams, who held much effective power in conjunction 
with the party leader. 
 
The party had no formal structure for black and Asian members, although the British Overseas 
Socialist Fellowship, an affiliated society, played a limited role in this regard (see chapter 3).  
Women could be members of affiliated organisations to the Labour Party (apart from some male 
only affiliated trade unions early in the twentieth century) and join as individual members when 
this was introduced in 1918.  Rather than have its own women's committee in 1919 the Labour 
Party adopted a curious relationship with the Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's 
Organisation (soon the 'Industrial' was switched to 'Working', SJCWWO).  This had been formed in 
1916, it did not become an affiliated body but remained nominally independent although the 
Labour Party Women's Officer (appointed by and accountable to the NEC) served as its secretary.  
As a non-affiliated body the SJCWWO had no rights within the party structures, sending neither 
delegates nor resolutions to the party's conference.2  This committee oversaw the Labour 
Women's Conference established in the 1920s, again an odd body somewhat to one side of party 
structures.  Only in 1952 was the National Labour Women's Advisory Committee established3 as a 
solely Labour Party body, and in 1953 the SJCWWO became National Joint Committee of Working 
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Women's organisations (NJCWWO) as an odd appendage of indeterminate purpose.4  Women in 
local parties were entitled to establish and attend women sections and send delegates up the 
party structures, but this in no way excluded them from other party structures.  Women's 
structures in the Labour Party, apart from a brief spell of excitement in the 1920s, were on the 
whole a strangely apolitical affair. 
 
The Parliamentary leadership was quite beside this structure.  The leader was elected by MPs only, 
as was the Parliamentary Committee (as the Shadow Cabinet was officially called).  Labour MPs 
met as PLP, but without formal powers, and a variety of liaison committees attempted to co-
ordinate these groups with the NEC and Transport House. 
 
Strictly speaking, the Trade Union Congress is a gathering that meets once a year, and elects a 
General Council (GC) consisting of senior trade unionists.  It is the GC that is the policy making 
body of the TUC, with delegated Sub-committees.  The International Committee, for example, 
made much of the running in issues of race and immigration.  The TUC had no women's 
committee, its Women's Advisory Committee (TUC WAC) was, as its name suggests, not a policy 
making committee.  The staff of the TUC were generally not trade unionists, but employed 
researchers, and it is typical that the General Secretary came up through its staff.  Thus the 
General Sectary is not a powerful figure, but a servant of the GC whose lead they must follow.  
There was no black and Asian minorities officer or representation in this period, and although 
there was a women's officer with Nancy Adam's appointment in1932, she had no staff, sitting in 
the Organisation Department.  The responsibility for equal pay policy for many years rested in the 
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Economic Department, where Len Murray was very clear that he was glad that women's officer at 
this time, Chipchase would now be 'saddled' with the policy, 'you're welcome to it' he wrote.5  
Policy on immigration and race was serviced by the staff in the International Department.  In the 
sixties the department was headed by J. Alan Hargreaves and under him most of the detailed work 
being carried out by the TUC's specialist in this field was Marjorie Nicholson. 
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Annex 2: Terminology used in this thesis. 
Race  
There is no such thing as race.  No scientific basis exists for separating humanity into races, rather 
race is socially constructed in a process of racialisation.  This process leads to people believing in 
the existence and salience of race, an ideology of that can only be called racism.  Thus, it is racism 
that creates race, racism is not a response to race.  So while I have avoided describing groups as 
races, or people as member of races here, there is little option to use terms such as racial 
discrimination, racial equality and race as terms to describe the thing that has been socially 
constructed by racism.  'Race relations' with all its colonial heritage and implied communalism is 
used because this is how this area of policy was described at the time.  If I were in the business of 
coining neologisms, I might replace 'race' with 'visible minorities subject to racism', or 'vimstors' 
for short.  Instead I have tended to use 'minority' with or without the qualification 'racial' but 
certainly not 'ethnic' which assumes a common culture.  I have tended to rely on 'black' and 'Asian' 
to indentify the main minorities in the UK. 
 
There is a popular habit of using terms relating to culture as euphemisms for race.  Thus 'ethnicity' 
is sometimes misused by some to describe national origins, not culture.  Another popular usage 
'multicultural' being used to describe Britain after mass immigration.6  This implies a racialised and 
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essentialist view of immutable culture that stays with the descendents of immigrants through the 
generations.7  I have tended to use the neutral 'diversity', which is not as anachronistic as it 
sounds, occasionally being used in the 1960s.  Unlike race, culture is real.  Immigrants may be 
culturally different from the host population (a Gujarati peasant), or be culturally similar (a 
university educated Anglophile Jamaican).  The culture of their descendents will change, exactly 
how needs to be established, not assumed.  'Multicultural' has two distinct meanings, as a 
description of a society containing multiple cultures, or as policies which incorporate this division 
in a constructive way.  This multicultural policy may understand society to be constituted by 
separate 'communities'.  Again, the existence of such cohesive self-identifying groups should not 
be assumed.  I tried to avoid using 'communities', but it is difficult to avoid where policy assumes 
it.  Its incorporation into the term 'community relations' in the late 1960s was an attempt to 
recognise that the children of immigrants faced problems, but the implication that they formed a 
community is not necessarily right. 
 
'Immigrant' has a clear meaning, here someone who was normally resident outside the UK taking 
up UK residence.  The term 'immigration' is often racialised, ignoring high levels of white 
immigration.  I have attempted to qualify immigrants and immigration with 'black and Asian' in its 
first use and then assumed it in later use in any given passage. 
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Gender 
The problems of sex and gender are altogether easier to deal with.  'Sex' is a biological fact (and 
that it is more complex and mutable than male-female does not impinge upon the analysis here) 
and 'gender' is a social construction.  They are not synonyms.  I have mainly used the terms 'sexual 
equality' or 'women's equality' (these were demands made by and for women).  There is a nuance 
in the use of the term 'gender equality' but I have used this as a synonym for sex equality. 
 
'Abortion' is used to describe a deliberate intervention to terminate a pregnancy without a live 
birth.  I have attempted to avoid value laden language ('unborn child') and the clinical ('foetus') 
and focus on the position of the 'pregnant woman'.  I have also avoided the partisan language of 
the abortion debate ('pro-choice' or 'anti-life').  Here, supporters of reform of the abortion laws 
will be called 'pro-reform' or 'reformers' reflecting that they wanted to liberalise the legal grounds 
for abortion.  Similarly the term 'anti-reform', 'opponents of reform' and so on, describes those 
who opposed changes in the law to make abortion more readily available although many were 
willing to accept abortion in limited circumstances. 
 
Here 'contraception' is used to describe practices, devices and substances used to avoid women 
conceiving (without splitting hairs about whether a fertilised ova of a few cells constitutes 
conception).  The use of this term can obscure the distinction between devices and substances to 
which the Catholic Church was opposed, and practices which it accepted (coitus interruptus, the 
rhythm method).  I do not wish to use the value laden language of 'artificial' and 'natural' 
contraception, but terms such as 'Catholic opposition to contraception' should be read in this 
context.  The terms 'birth control' and 'family planning' are both terms coined by the American 
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birth control advocate Margaret Sanger.8  These were more than euphemisms.  They were 
deliberate attempts to make contraception a respectable practice within marriage.  The terms 
'birth control clinics' and 'family planning clinic' is unavoidable, this is what they were called.  
 
Nationality 
'Britain' or 'UK' is used to describe the state that is the subject of study.  Much of the legislation 
considered here applied only to England and Wales, some of it to Scotland and very little of it to 
Northern Ireland.  These issues of variable policy within the UK state are not the subject here and 
are not discussed except when they illustrate a wider point.  
                                                     
8
 1879-1966. American contraception campaigner. 
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Annex 3: Statistical tables. 
Levels of immigration to the UK 
Table 1:  Estimated net immigration from the New Commonwealth 1953-19629 
Year West 
Indies  
India Pakistan Others Total 
1953 2,000  -  -  - 2,000 
1954 11,000  -  -  - 11,00 
1955 27,500 5,800 1,850 7,500 42,650 
1956 29,800 5,600 2,050 9,350 46,800 
1957 23,000 6,600 5,200 7,600 42,400 
1958 15,000 6,200 4,700 3,950 29,850 
1959 16,400 2,950 850 1,400 21,600 
1960 49,650 5,900 2,500 -350 57,400 
1961 66,300 23,750 25,100 21,250 136,400 
         1962* 31,800 19,050 25,080 18,970 94,900 
* First six months prior to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act coming into effect. 
 
  
                                                     
9
 House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 56, Commonwealth Immigration to the UK from the 1950s 
to 1975 (London: HMSO, 1976).  Cited in Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration, p13. 
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Table 2: UK international migration, 1964-198010 
Year Total 
immigrants 
New 
Commonwealth 
Immigrants 
New 
Commonwealth 
emigrants 
Net New 
Commonwealth 
immigration 
Net total 
immigration. 
1964 211.0 60.0 17.3 42.7 -60.4 
1965 206.3 52.0 19.1 32.9 -78.0 
1966 219.2 49.7 21.2 28.5 -82.4 
1967 225.0 57.5 17.7 39.8 -84.0 
1968 221.6 57.6 19.0 38.6 -56.0 
1969 205.6 48.9 19.7 29.2 -87.1 
1970 225.6 40.8 20.6 20.4 -65.1 
1971 199.7 36.0 16.3 19.7 -40.4 
1972 221.9 34.6 20.3 14.3 -11.4 
1973 195.7 23.8 13.5 10.3 -50.1 
1974 183.8 27.2 13.6 13.6 -85.3 
1975 197.2 34.9 13.5 21.4 -41.2 
1976 191.3 33.5 13.5 20.0 -19.1 
1977 162.6 25.4 13.3 12.1 -46.1 
1978 187.0 33.7 13.4 20.3    -5.5 
1979 194.8 41.4 15.0 26.4 +6.2 
1980 173.7 29.6 14.9 14.7 -55.4 
 
 
  
                                                     
10
 Adapted from RB Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), p84. 
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Women's and men's' employment and pay. 
 
Table 3: Average weekly wages and hours of men and women in selected industries11 
 
 Men Women Hourly pay 
gap (%)* Year Wages (£) Hours Wages (£) Hours 
1948 6.90 46.7 3.71 41.4 39.3 
1949 7.13 46.8 3.93 41.5 37.8 
1950 7.52 47.6 4.12 41.8 37.6 
1951 8.30 47.8 4.49 41.3 37.4 
1952 8.93 47.7 4.81 41.7 38.4 
1953 9.46 47.9 5.12 41.8 38.0 
1954 10.22 48.5 5.41 41.8 38.6 
1955 11.15 48.9 5.77 41.6 39.2 
1956 11.90 48.5 6.16 41.3 39.2 
1957 12.58 48.2 6.49 41.0 39.4 
1958 12.83 47.7 6.70 41.0 39.2 
1959 13.55 48.5 7.05 41.4 39.0 
1960 14.53 48.0 7.42 40.5 39.5 
1961 15.34 47.4 7.73 39.7 39.8 
1962 15.86 47.0 8.04 39.4 39.5 
1963 16.75 47.6 8.41 39.7 39.8 
1964 18.11 47.7 8.95 39.4 40.2 
1965 19.56 47.0 9.60 38.7 40.4 
1966 20.30 46.0 10.07 38.1 40.1 
1967 21.38 46.2 10.50 38.2 40.6 
1968 23.00 46.4 11.30 38.3 40.5 
1969 24.85 46.5 12.19 38.1 40.1 
1970 28.05 45.7 13.99 37.9 39.9 
1971 30.93 44.7 15.80 37.9 39.8 
1972 35.82 45.0 18.30 37.7 39.0 
1973 40.92 45.6 21.16 37.9 37.8 
1974 46.63 45.1 27.01 37.7 30.7 
1975 59.58 43.6 34.19 37.4 33.1 
1976 66.97 44.0 40.61 37.0 27.9 
1977 72.89 44.2 44.31 37.4 28.2 
1978 83.50 44.2 50.03 37.4 29.2 
1979 96.94 44.0 58.24 37.4 29.3 
1980 113.06 43.0 68.73 37.5 30.3 
* The pay gap is calculated at the deficit in women's hourly pay as a percentage of men's hourly 
pay. 
  
                                                     
11
 Adapted from Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp176-178 
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Table 4: Labour force participation rates, Great Britain, 1931-199112 
 
 Men Women All Women as 
percentage of 
Labour Force 
1931 90.5 34.2 60.7 29.8 
1951 87.6 32.7 58.6 29.5 
1961 86.3 37.5 62.8 31.3 
1966 84.1 42.2 64.6 34.3 
1971 81.5 42.6 61.1 36.5 
1981 77.8 45.5 61.0 38.6 
1991 73.3 49.9 61.0 42.7 
 
  
                                                     
12
 Halsey and Webb, Twentieth Century Social Trends, p292. 
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